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1 Introduction:  Philosophy and Child 
Poverty 
 Child poverty is surely one of the most severe problems in today’s world 
and undoubtedly an ethical issue that needs to be tackled. It is hard to 
find anyone who argues against the claim that children should not be 
poor and that we should do something about that. But if we go beyond 
these obvious truths and dig deeper, we will find many unanswered 
questions spanning different disciplines, including conceptual, empir-
ical and – as we will particularly argue in this book – normative ques-
tions. Child poverty is first and foremost an issue of social sciences, and 
most publications and studies on this topic belong to that field. But 
due to its wide-ranging consequences, disciplines such as medicine and 
psychology are also concerned with it, and more and more researchers 
acknowledge that such a complex phenomenon must be investigated 
based on a multidisciplinary approach. Furthermore, it is a highly rele-
vant political topic, and the fight against child poverty is part of the 
agenda of national and international politicians alike. The reduction 
of child poverty was part of the Millennium Goals, it will certainly be 
a goal in the post-2015 agenda, and it is included in the Europe 2020 
strategy of the European Union, as well as in countless national action 
plans or policies. 
 If one looks at the current state of research and what is done to help 
children in poverty, it is not easy get the full picture. There are many 
different conceptions of child poverty, different methods to measure it 
and no consensus on how best to alleviate it. Philosophy is currently 
only marginally involved in these debates, but the fields of poverty 
research and poverty alleviation are implicitly deeply entangled with 
philosophical issues – most importantly, from our point of view at least, 
with normative and ethical ones. We would like to briefly name four 
of them here, before going on to argue for the importance of a deeper 
OPEN
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philosophical look into child poverty and show how we will develop our 
argument in the course of this book. 
 The first issue is conceptualizing poverty and child poverty. Two ideas 
are well suited to illustrate that: firstly, poverty is an ‘essentially contested’ 
concept, which means that there will presumably never be a consensus 
on how to understand it properly; secondly, it is a ‘thick concept’, in 
the sense that it combines both descriptive and normative dimensions 
(Schweiger 2012). Every concept of poverty is more than just an empir-
ical description, including a normative dimension, which unfolds in 
two directions. On the one hand, poverty is evaluative. Describing an 
adult or child as poor is in most cases also meant to describe the living 
condition of this person as bad and, to some extent, morally wrong. 
Entailed in almost all definitions found in poverty research, in policy 
contexts and in the public and media discourse is that being poor is not 
good, not something that should be aspired to. On the other hand – and 
this follows from the judgment that it is something bad – poverty has a 
certain appellative character. It is used to trigger actions of other people 
or institutions. Due to this normative dimension, poverty is in a way an 
‘essentially contested’ concept: reaching a consensus on its definition 
and measurement is very unlikely. Paul Spicker, for example, has distin-
guished twenty-four concepts of poverty in sociological research alone 
(Spicker 2007). What it means for a person to be poor is highly unclear, 
simply because we need to have some kind of normative theory in the 
background to tell us what aspects of human life or of life in a particular 
society are important enough to determine poverty. Are resources or 
capabilities what matter, or is it life satisfaction? What are the important 
things that we can and should use to measure and track poverty? 
Naturally, various normative theories can be used for that purpose, and 
they will most certainly produce different results. We will introduce and 
discuss many of the relevant concepts in the course of this book. What 
is important at this stage is to realize that normative considerations have 
an important place already in the conceptualization of poverty and that 
it is not possible to grasp it descriptively only. 
 The second issue is poverty measurement. There are many ethical 
issues about conducting poverty research itself, especially with children 
(Bostock 2002; Sime 2008). Poverty is a sensitive issue; it runs deep, 
making the poor vulnerable. Qualitative research in particular often 
demands that people talk about private matters. It happens very close to 
the lives and experiences of poor people, and it touches upon sensitive 
issues, which are connected to feelings of anger, shame and humiliation. 
Furthermore, there is an almost unavoidable imbalance in power and 
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knowledge between the poverty researcher and the poor person; this has 
to be dealt with. 
 The third issue is fighting poverty and the question of moral responsi-
bilities of researchers. Poverty research is done not only to gather more 
knowledge about the poor, to count them and to describe their lives, but 
because this knowledge should be also used to a large extent to change 
something and to help end poverty. Many poverty researchers claim with 
Else Øyen that helping the poor is one of the major drivers to engage in 
research in the first place (Øyen 2009), but it is highly unclear what kind 
of obligation is triggered by describing and defining a person as being poor 
and towards what persons it is directed. Some sort of obligation is almost 
always implicitly inherent, and so many studies about poverty conclude 
with some sort of policy advice or name institutions that could make a 
difference. In the case of national or international poverty surveys that 
count and monitor the poor, those who are obliged to change the situation 
are often directly named: the particular state whose official offices track 
poverty, the European Union or the World Bank and its member states. 
Poverty research is therefore not only needed to guide policymaking; the 
definitions and measures employed have power (Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith 
and Stewart 2006) – if one is not counted as being poor, it can mean that 
one does not receive benefits or other forms of support by the state. Alice 
O’Connor has described this issue from a different perspective and argued 
that poverty research that focuses too much on counting the poor and 
on refining methods to ‘intrude’ in their lives and to monitor them is in 
danger of losing its connection to economic and political issues. Rather, it 
is necessary to combine poverty research with inquiry and criticism of the 
economic, social and political environment in which poverty is produced 
and reproduced and how the national and international institutions have 
to change to get down to the roots of the problem. 
 Although liberal in origins, poverty knowledge rests on an ethos of 
political and ideological neutrality that has sustained it through a 
period of vast political change. Very much for this reason, it can also 
be distinguished by what it is not: contemporary poverty knowledge 
does not define itself as an inquiry into the political economy and 
culture of late twentieth-century capitalism; it is knowledge about 
the characteristics and behaviour and, especially in recent years, 
about the welfare status of the poor. (O’Connor 2001, 4) 
 The fourth issue is the inclusion of the poor themselves in theorizing 
poverty. This raises deep questions related to power: Who decides or 
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should decide what poverty is and who is characterized as poor? Who 
has or should have the power to help and change the living conditions 
of the poor? In short, whether one is counted as poor or not is usually 
not dependent on whether one views herself as poor. Poverty measures 
focus mostly – and for good reason – on objective indicators such as 
income, wealth, goods and capabilities, but there is a growing concern 
that this focus might be a major shortcoming and that the multidimen-
sionality of poverty and social exclusion demands  the inclusion of the 
view of the poor themselves (Brock 1999; Norton 2001). The rise of the 
debate about subjective well-being, which obviously cannot be deter-
mined objectively without reference to the interior view, and its use 
for poverty research is also an indicator for this (Kingdon and Knight 
2006). Finally, the  role of poor people themselves in the  conceptualization, 
measurement and evaluation of poverty is in question. Do they know best, 
maybe better than poverty researchers, what poverty means or should 
mean? Neither poverty research nor normative philosophy is situated 
outside the real world, which is full of relations of power and domin-
ation, and it is a fact that some knowledge is privileged and a few have 
the power to shape the discourse about poverty. Robert Chambers, one 
of the pioneers of participatory work, writes about that issue:
 A question remains: whose analysis and categories are to be privi-
leged? These are largely ‘ours’, those of professionals who are not 
ourselves poor, expressed in ‘our’ language. The words, concepts, 
categories and priorities of poor people, especially illustrated by 
the way they were elicited and expressed in the Voices of the Poor, 
were rich and varied with commonalities. There are trade-offs to be 
puzzled over: between ‘their’ realities and ours; between local partici-
patory diversity and commensurability for purposes of aggregation; 
and between many categories representing poor people’s realities and 
fewer categories more manageable for outsider professionals and for 
measurement. (Chambers 2007, 37) 
 We cannot tackle all of these issues in-depth in this book. They give, 
however, a first glimpse into the highly complex issues that surround 
any debate about poverty and the ways in which philosophical, in 
particular normative, questions, arise. This is not breaking news, neither 
to poverty researchers and policymakers nor to philosophers. However, 
today philosophy and poverty research still usually work separately and 
hence miss out on the benefits of a certainly needed interdisciplinarity. 
There are, of course, a few exceptions; for example, Monique Deveaux’s 
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(Deveaux 2013) attempt to include the poor as agents of justice (we will 
comment more on that in the last chapter) or Thomas Pogge’s discus-
sion about the flaws in the poverty measures of the World Bank (Reddy 
and Pogge 2010). But more needs to be done, and it is a shame that phil-
osophy is not a part of most interdisciplinary discussions about poverty. 
Such collaborations demand much from both sides: social scientists 
working empirically have to become aware of what they can actu-
ally profit from the highly sophisticated debates in philosophy about 
justice and morality, and philosophers need to acknowledge that the 
reality of poverty is much fuzzier than we often assume it to be and that 
constructing valuable theories about poverty and its alleviation implies 
doing justice to the empirical basis. 
 Let us now speak more about the aims and scope of this book. It is 
important to make clear from the beginning that we will be first and 
foremost concerned with child poverty as it typically occurs in devel-
oped countries with welfare systems, as in most member states of the 
European Union, the USA, Australia and Canada. There are many differ-
ences between these countries and systems, and it would be wrong to 
suggest uniformity here, but they usually manage to avoid, at least to 
a large degree, extreme or absolute forms of poverty in which children 
miss the resources for survival and basics such as shelter and access to 
the most important health care services. Nevertheless, studies show that 
child poverty is also a big issue in these countries and that most of them 
are far from giving all their children a fair start in life. The reason for 
our focus on child poverty as it appears within relatively wealthy states 
is threefold: First, it is to a certain extent a pragmatic decision. It is not 
possible to discuss all ethically relevant facets connected to child poverty 
in this book; we had to narrow down the topics of investigation for the 
sake of simplicity. Furthermore, data from developed countries are more 
extensive and more easily available. We know more about how poverty 
shapes children’s lives and the opportunities they get, and a moral theory 
can be developed in regard to a richer and more substantive material. 
Second, the injustices of child poverty are more difficult and philosoph-
ically challenging to grasp when relative forms of poverty are at stake. As 
we have already stated, in the countries we take as points of reference, 
children usually do not die because of poverty, and state support as well 
as welfare benefits damp the worst consequences of their situation. In 
some sense, they are better off than their peers in developing countries 
or failed states; a moral evaluation of child poverty needs to go deeper 
than pointing to the fact that even the most basic elements of their lives 
are missing. Finally, our focus on the concept of  social justice , which we 
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consider very useful and rich for evaluating child poverty, quite naturally 
leads to a focus on developed countries with functioning democracies 
and institutions which, despite all their problems and weaknesses, (still) 
provide a solid social structure for large parts of their citizenry, especially 
if they are compared to states where almost no infrastructure and only 
minimal state support is available. Most philosophers in the field devel-
oped their theories in regard to such contexts, and many discussions still 
relate to nation states and ‘internal’ distributions of goods, isolated from 
relationships between countries. We agree that it is important to extend 
these theories to the domain of global justice and world poverty, and 
attempts to do so have substantially enriched the theoretical landscape in 
the last years. In the last chapter, we will therefore briefly address some of 
the additional questions arising in relation to evaluating extreme forms 
of child poverty in the developing world. 
 Our book is located within a certain approach of normative reasoning 
and thinking about poverty: namely, the capability approach and its 
most influential representatives, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. 
The capability approach has many advocates and certainly also many 
critics, and we neither hope nor aim to defend it against all of them. Our 
goal in this book is to apply the approach to a specific topic. Therefore, 
we will not be able to scrutinize it on a general and fundamental level; 
we leave these intellectual battles to others. Still, we will say much about 
the capability approach, how it should be applied to children and what 
additional value it brings for the analysis and critique of child poverty. 
As a consequence, we will bring forward several arguments that speak in 
favor of the approach in general and support many of its assumptions. 
The capability approach seems a good starting point for our examin-
ation, not only because it can provide the normative underpinnings for 
our goals but also because it is widely used in a variety of academic 
disciplines as well as policymaking. When it comes to academia, it is 
extensively discussed, developed, applied and criticized not only in phil-
osophy but also in economics, social policy, political science and devel-
opment studies, which confirms its interdisciplinary usefulness. A no 
less influential document than the Human Development Report, which 
is published annually by the United Nations and monitors human devel-
opment on a global level, explicitly draws on the capability approach, 
even if some have questioned how accurately the report represents its 
theoretical and normative background (Pogge 2002). On the national 
level, too, governments are interested in the approach and apply it for 
diverse purposes; the reports on poverty and wealth in Germany (Arndt 
and Volkert 2006) and the reports of the United Kingdom’s National 
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Equalities Commission, for example, apply the capability approach 
as part of their theoretical background for their respective concerns 
(Burchardt and Vizard 2011). And last but not least, it has been inspiring 
and guiding the work of NGOs and local development initiatives in 
many different countries and cultural contexts (Deneulin and Shahani 
2009). This richness is an asset for our examination of child poverty and 
social justice, and we will draw not only on the philosophical writings 
of Nussbaum and Sen but also on the research done in other disciplines 
which have applied the capability approach to children and to poverty. 
 Any application of the capability approach faces some challenges that 
should be made clear at the outset. To begin with, there is no full consensus 
in the literature on which set of claims and postulates are constitutive 
of the capability approach. In fact, different authors work on it, and 
each of them has introduced some new elements or focus points, some-
thing that is, inter alia, documented through a constant rise in academic 
publications on the subject. Furthermore, the capability approach can 
be characterized not only as a theory in political philosophy but as an 
‘intellectual movement and programme for action’ (Venkatapuram 2011, 
114) involving many different agents on the theoretical and practical 
level. This fact also introduces a certain internal variety and complicates 
its representation as a clear-cut theoretical concept. In the formulations 
of Nussbaum and Sen, there is no uniformity to be found, either. While 
Sen is considered the founder of the approach, Nussbaum joined in early 
on and over the years developed her own account, which is, in some 
aspects at least, different from Sen’s ideas. In the end, our suggestion will 
be to work with a kind of ‘hybrid’, combining elements of both theories, 
a strategy which has itself proven valuable in other contexts (see, e.g., 
Wolff and de-Shalit 2007; Venkatapuram 2011). 
 Besides the capability approach, another major influence on our exam-
ination of child poverty comes from the multidisciplinary research on chil-
dren’s well-being and well-becoming. We will argue that these concepts 
should have a central role in a theory of justice for children, claiming that 
a just society is one in which each and every child develops and achieves 
functionings and capabilities that are necessary for her well-being and well-
becoming. This introduction of well-being into the capability approach 
might seem odd, because of the rivalry between capabilities and subjective 
welfare as possible metrics of justice (a topic which we will discuss in more 
detail in the first chapter). Let us be clear from the beginning what we 
understand as well-being and well-becoming. They are not the same as 
subjective welfare or happiness or satisfaction; in our view, well-being is 
a multidimensional concept encompassing a wide range of important 
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features of children’s lives: health, education, social inclusion and partici-
pation, access to material goods and shelter and the like. A concept of 
justice for children that is oriented towards children’s well-being and well-
becoming is primarily concerned not with them being happy but with 
providing them with the full range of capabilities and functionings that 
they are entitled to reach comprehensive well-being. Such an objectivist 
understanding of well-being, as an actual state of being well, and of well-
becoming, as the change from one state of being to a state of being well, 
is now common in much research on children and guiding policies. The 
capability approach is itself such an objectivist approach towards well-
being; for example, Mario Biggeri and his colleagues understand children’s 
well-being as the combination of important capabilities and functionings 
(Biggeri and Mehrotra 2011). It is also possible to interpret the ten central 
capabilities of Nussbaum as being a formulation of a concept of well-being. 
This perspective has been articulated by Alexander Bagattini:
 According to the capability approach, the well-being of persons is 
identified with a bundle of capabilities that are essential for human 
nature. (This is seen in analogy with other beings in nature, like plants 
that need photosynthesis or predators that need to be quick and silent 
when hunting.) In her recent book,  Creating Capabilities , Martha 
Nussbaum gives a list of ten basic capabilities that are supposed to be 
constitutive for the well-being of human beings: life; bodily integrity; 
bodily health; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical 
reason; affiliation; concern for animals and plants; play; and control 
over one’s environment (Nussbaum 2011, p. 33f). Due to its objective 
account of well-being, the capability approach is very attractive for a 
conception of child well-being. (Bagattini 2014, 175) 
 Let us say something about the concept of well-being then. First, we 
suggest that well-being in childhood matters for its own sake. While it 
is true that most political philosophers evaluate childhood only insofar 
it contributes to the genesis of the characteristics necessary for the good 
life of an adult, this conclusion seems wrong, as a thought experiment 
by Harry Brighouse powerfully shows (Brighouse 2003): Imagine a tragic 
world in which happiness in childhood – even though no necessary 
condition – is a serious barrier to flourishing in adulthood. Under such 
circumstances, it is obvious that we would consider the scarce individ-
uals who managed to have both a happy childhood and adulthood to be 
privileged. The standard and more reliable route to get to a flourishing 
adulthood via a dreary childhood is an inferior option. Furthermore, 
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let’s assume with Brighouse that in such a tragic world there is a reliable 
correlation between the degree of dreariness in childhood and the level 
of flourishing in adulthood. Would we really judge parents who impose 
enormous amounts of dreariness on their children compared to those 
who allow moments of enjoyment, even knowing that it affects the 
child’s future negatively, as the better ones? We agree that the answer 
to this question is not an obvious one; there is the strong intuition that 
the well-being of children seems to matter for its own sake, independ-
ently of its contribution to life as an adult. It is simply a good thing that 
a child lives a flourishing life, exercising and developing her capacities 
(Macleod 2010). Accordingly, we assume, in line with most theorists in 
the field, that childhood is intrinsically valuable and that children as the 
subjects of moral concern have a right to a good life. 
 Second, the child’s condition, which includes a particular vulner-
ability, immaturity and dependency on others, makes her well-being an 
especially salient normative category. Children cannot be held respon-
sible for their life choices as adults can, and therefore any harm to their 
well-being is particularly problematic from a moral point of view. Hence, 
a society that does not manage to sustain a certain level of well-being 
for its children cannot be a just one. This does not mean, of course, that 
the well-being of children is the  only thing that matters for justice. The 
child’s future as an autonomous and thriving citizen – her becoming – is 
of importance as well, as is the well-being and well-becoming of all other 
members of society. However, since it often gets completely neglected in 
theories of justice, we want to stress clearly the importance that the well-
being of children, qua children, should have for normative reasoning. 
 Third, a comprehensive understanding of children’s lives must include 
a multitude of information. It just is not enough to know, for example, 
the economic situation of a child or her family in order to judge if she 
is indeed well off. There is more to disadvantage than can be expressed 
in monetary terms. In many approaches to the measurement of child 
poverty, this insight is well established. There, the well-being of chil-
dren is judged in different dimensions, which are also set into rela-
tion with each other. When looking at the lives of children explicitly 
from a  normative perspective, such a multidimensional approach is also 
requested. This is the case for the following reasons: First, if philosophy 
wants to develop an understanding of justice that is applicable in the 
real world and its non-ideal circumstances, it must work with a realistic 
picture of well-being. It should reflect our intuitive judgments about 
the subject and allow plausible assessments of the social position of an 
individual (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 21). It is obvious that different 
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aspects of children’s lives matter; it would be a theoretical distortion to 
reduce them to a single good or source and to suggest that being privi-
leged in one dimension compensates the difficulties a child experiences 
in another. Suppose, for example, that a child with superior academic 
achievements has serious difficulties socializing and finding friends. The 
argument that the success in one area is a good reason for neglecting the 
problems in the other does not, from a commonsensical perspective, do 
justice to the child’s situation and misses important aspects of her well-
being. Second, only a pluralist view of the well-being of children allows a 
differentiated look at what kinds of disadvantages are especially harmful 
or, to approach it from a different angle, which aspects of a child’s life 
can have a comprehensive and sustainable positive effect on her general 
situation. Evaluations from a social justice perspective must be sensitive 
to such differences. Of course, many empirical questions concerning the 
identification of the most important dimensions of a child’s life emerge 
here, and philosophy cannot answer them a priori. However, its theories 
must be able to grasp and conceptualize them adequately. 
 With our focus on children’s well-being we strongly agree that it is 
wrong to look at children  only as ‘human becomings’ (Qvortrup 1994; Lee 
2001), meaning that they are conceptualized primarily as the future adults 
they will become. There are very good reasons to take their well-being 
per se into account and to give it normative weight. In fact, this already 
follows from a very basic and commonsensical assumption about the 
moral status of children: namely, that they are entitled to the same moral 
consideration as adults. This means that their moral claims count equally 
to those of adult members of a society and that it is morally wrong to 
discount them with the argument that they are ‘only children’ (Brennan 
and Noggle 1997). However, we would also like to stress that consider-
ations concerning justice for children cannot exclusively focus on chil-
dren qua children. As important as it is to recognize the ‘being’ child as 
a social actor in her own right participating in and constructing her own 
childhood (Uprichard 2008, 304), there is also a need to allow for a life 
course perspective which recognizes that children usually become adults 
and that childhood is the most formative period of human life, influen-
cing profoundly the level of well-being one experiences later on, from 
adulthood to old age. The overemphasis on the child’s future and the 
child’s becoming, which is prevalent in large parts of political philosophy, 
should not be replaced by an overemphasis on childhood itself as is, at 
least partly, currently the case in the blooming field of childhood studies 
(Uprichard 2008, 305; Qvortrup 2004, 269). Rather, the being and the 
becoming aspects of childhood have to be brought together, and a child-
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sensitive concept of justice has to operate within the tension between a 
present- and a future-centered perspective on children’s lives. This does 
not mean a return to an oversimplifying and misleading notion of chil-
dren as incomplete or innocent incompetents (Archard 2004) who stand 
in sharp contrast to fully developed and capable adults. Competency 
depends on both context and task, and in many aspects and situations, 
children can in fact be more competent than adults (Alanen and Mayall 
2001); in addition, it must be acknowledged that development and change 
are processes at work during the whole life cycle, including adulthood 
and old age. Still, we suggest that the child’s future and her  well-becoming , 
that is, her development to a state of well-being over time, is a particularly 
important normative category; justice should be concerned with human 
life as a whole and not just with sections of it. Well-being in adulthood 
and old age is also morally relevant, and therefore one should not under-
estimate well-becoming considerations, especially since they can get into 
conflict with claims to a child’s well-being. And while childhood is intrin-
sically valuable and should not be subordinated to adulthood or seen as 
a mere preparatory phase, it is reasonable to say that children (normally) 
lack morally relevant characteristics that are of great importance for adult-
hood and that can be certainly fostered – but also inhibited – by the way 
children are raised and educated. In particular, we want to argue that the 
ability to live a self-determined and autonomous life according to a mature 
conception of the good is generally a valuable achievement in human life 
(Rawls 1971; Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999). Now, to act on one’s own judg-
ment and to live a life one has reason to value presupposes knowledge, 
experience, stability of character, the ability to assess the consequences of 
one’s actions and to relate them with one’s identity in time, as well as a 
certain level of emotional health. These abilities, skills and facets of life 
have to be trained and nurtured – if not, the well-being in adulthood, 
which crucially includes the ability to act on one’s own judgments, is 
seriously jeopardized. However, sometimes trade-offs are necessary, and 
so the way children are treated and reared should also include a develop-
mental perspective (Noggle 2002; Brighouse 2003; Adams 2008). Indeed, 
it is very plausible to claim that children have a right to an adequate 
development of their capacities, especially those relevant for exercising 
autonomy broadly construed. Accordingly, injustices for children can 
be comprehensively grasped only when the effects certain treatments in 
childhood have on the whole life course are considered. 
 Before we present a brief outline of the chapters in this book, we want to 
say something about two issues that we do not deal with but that are related 
to the topic at hand. The first issue is the question of the moral status of 
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children, in particular toddlers and newborns, compared to that of (some) 
animals. There is some philosophical debate about why we should treat 
such young children differently compared to bonobos or other apes, and 
this debate is centered on issues of rationality, autonomy and the ability 
to experience harm. We do not have a clear-cut answer and we also do not 
engage with this question in this book. Our premise is to say that human 
children have a moral status which implies that we should treat them 
with respect and be concerned about their well-being and well-becoming. 
We will later on explicate what this means in terms of responsibilities of 
different agents of justice towards children. Whether this moral status 
should also be applied to other non-human children is not our concern; 
we leave it to others to debate whether or not a just society would also 
require us to battle child poverty among non-human animals. 
 Closely connected to that issue is the second question: the status of 
children not yet born. This question has two aspects, both of which are 
connected to a rich as well as controversial philosophical and political 
debate. On the one hand a society which wants to realize justice for all its 
children has to take a stance on abortion and also on what it owes to chil-
dren during pregnancy. We also do not give a answer here, although we 
will briefly touch upon the issue that it can have harmful consequences 
if the mother is poor during pregnancy and that this health risk for the 
baby has to be taken seriously. It is a very delicate question whether or 
not the right answer here is mandatory prenatal care, based on evidence 
that being poor influences reproductive health and that girls living in 
poverty more often get pregnant (voluntarily and involuntarily) than 
their non-poor peers. On the other hand we focus in this book more or 
less exclusively on children already born, and we do engage with ques-
tions of intergenerational justice. Poverty reduction and alleviation, also 
during childhood, fight an injustice that should not exist from the start, 
and intergenerational justice is part of the larger question of how we can 
make sure that each and every child that is born is free of poverty. 
 This book is organized in four chapters. Chapter 1 develops a concept 
of social justice for children. We will argue that the capability approach 
provides a good framework and discuss some issues that arise when 
applying this approach to children. Neither Sen nor Nussbaum have 
written much about children, how a capability-oriented concept of 
justice for children should be constructed and in what ways it differs 
from a concept for adults. The most important modification we want 
to make is to have a more dynamic understanding of functionings and 
capabilities, since childhood is a phase of development. Furthermore, an 
initial focus on achieved functionings seems advisable, since children 
Philosophy and Child Poverty 13
lack some of the conditions, like autonomy and rationality, to enjoy 
capabilities in the genuine sense of the term. We will also tackle the 
issues of selecting relevant functionings and capabilities for children and 
will specify which distributional rule is best suited for our purposes. We 
will suggest that a sufficiency-based rule is the most adequate one and 
explain how it should be interpreted in the context of modern welfare 
states. Nussbaum and other capability theorists present the capability 
approach as a concept of minimal justice, which focuses on severe injus-
tices as they typically appear in global poverty in poorer countries. This 
feature of the approach poses some problems for our case, since we will 
criticize child poverty in affluent countries, where poverty is usually less 
severe and harmful. We will conclude the first chapter by claiming that 
children are entitled to a set of functionings and, as they grow older, 
capabilities that are important for their well-being and well-becoming. 
It is a question of justice that they enjoy these functionings and capabil-
ities up to a certain threshold as far as the states in which they live can 
secure. Furthermore, every child is, within reasonable limits, entitled to 
develop and achieve well-being as adults. We want to catch this aspect 
with the term ‘equality of opportunity to well-being’, which, again, can 
be expressed on the basis of important functionings and capabilities. 
 In Chapter 2, we will, based on these normative considerations, 
examine child poverty and investigate how it affects certain important 
functionings and capabilities related to both the well-being and well-
becoming of children. We will focus particularly on mental and physical 
health, education and social inclusion, which we consider rather uncon-
troversial aspects of the well-being and well-becoming of children. We 
develop our argument in close dialogue with the results of empirical 
research and show that there is overwhelming evidence that child 
poverty has detrimental effects on all of them. This finding will lead to 
the conclusion that child poverty has to be understood as a corrosive 
disadvantage. It negatively affects more than one important functioning 
or capability, both horizontally and temporally: child poverty is corro-
sive during childhood, throughout the whole future life course of the 
children and to their chances for well-being as adults. 
 In Chapter 3, we will focus on ‘agents of justice’; that is, persons or 
institutions responsible for securing justice for children in poverty. We 
will develop a model of responsibilities, using and further advancing a 
suggestion of Iris Young as presented in her book  Responsibilities for Justice . 
There, she distinguishes different grounds or parameters that can be used 
to attribute agents of justice with various kinds and weights of responsi-
bilities. The grounds that will be at the heart of our model are causation 
14 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
(being responsible for that injustice in the first place), power (being able 
to help the victims of that injustice), privilege (having benefited from 
the existence of that injustice) and interest (having an interest in over-
coming that injustice). We will then distinguish eight potential groups 
of agents of justice (the poor child, the family and close caregivers, the 
neighborhood and close social environment, the state and its institu-
tions, the community of citizens, the economy, the international institu-
tions, the global community) and give a first ranking of the weight of 
their responsibilities in the context of child poverty. Our model is still 
vague, but this reflects both the complexity of the issue and the limits of 
philosophical inquiry. Attributing concrete responsibilities to the groups 
of agents we named based on the criteria we presented requires deeper 
empirical knowledge than we can bring to bear in this book, and to some 
extent it will never be possible to disentangle all of the relations and 
interferences. We will then take a closer look at two highly influential 
agents: the family and the state. We will argue that families in poverty 
are limited in their power and that their parenting behavior is shaped 
and influenced by how these parents grew up and how they have lived 
in poverty. It is not possible to disaggregate exactly how much of the 
behaviors that are actually harming their children can be attributed to 
this circumstance, for which they are not responsible themselves, and 
how much responsibility they have to shoulder. Being poor comes with a 
restriction of freedom; this restriction, however, is not a total one, and it 
would be unjust to neglect poor parents completely as agents of justice. 
We will conclude that the state has high responsibilities to support the 
child and her family in order to overcome poverty and to secure that the 
child achieves the functionings and capabilities she is entitled to. 
 Finally, instead of summarizing the book, Chapter 4 will sketch how 
our concept could be advanced to cover issues of global justice and 
global child poverty, which we widely neglect in the other chapters. We 
will identify a few of the questions that need to be tackled and give an 
idea how they should be approached. Again, the great urgency and need 
to address child poverty as a global phenomenon should be obvious. 
Here too, however, the topic needs philosophical inquiries that clarify 
in detail the moral implications involved. 
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view 
a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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 Social Justice for Children – A 
Capability Approach 
 In this chapter, we will outline a concept of social justice for children 
based on the capability approach. So far, this issue has received much 
less attention than it deserves given the particular social and political 
status of children in today`s world. The capability approach, as well as 
most other theories of justice, has not dealt with children thoroughly, 
although more and more literature on important questions in this regard 
is being published. We seek to answer two important questions that every 
concept of justice has to deal with: what is the right currency of justice, 
and what is its right principle? To phrase the questions slightly differ-
ently: what kinds of things are children entitled to as a matter of justice, 
and how should they be distributed? Our answer to the first question is 
that children are entitled to the achievement of important functionings; 
only as they develop is it adequate to provide them with capabilities. 
Hence, the capability approach to justice for children we want to defend 
is in large part a functioning approach. In regard to the second question, 
we defend a sufficientarian approach. In a nutshell, each and every child 
is entitled to reach a certain threshold in all these important function-
ings, and failing to do so constitutes an injustice. Since the main target 
of this book is child poverty in affluent societies and welfare states, we 
will model our concept of justice on children living within these soci-
eties, although we believe that many of our claims hold universally and 
could serve as the basis for a concept of global justice. In the end, we 
argue, justice for children is about safeguarding their well-being and 
well-becoming, and the functionings and capabilities that matter for 
justice, as well as the thresholds for them, should be selected with refer-
ence to that. Hence, well-being and well-becoming are the guiding prin-
ciples for our approach. 
OPEN
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 1.1 The currency of justice 
 The first question a concept of justice for children has to answer is, what 
is the adequate currency of justice? That is, what types of things are chil-
dren entitled to as a matter of justice? The capability approach is first 
and foremost an answer to that question; it claims that the best avail-
able currency of justice is constituted by capabilities. In what follows, 
we will argue that the approach has something very valuable to offer to 
the  conception of justice for children but that it must shift its sole focus 
from capabilities, which essentially incorporate the notion of freedom 
of choice, to functionings that are actually realized. Justice for children 
has to be thought of as a dynamic concept that starts with functionings 
as the right currency; as children grow up, capabilities become ever more 
important. In the end, for adults, capabilities are what matter most, and 
the state or any other agent of justice should refrain from imposing 
functionings upon people who do not wish to have them. 
 Let us begin by spelling out some of its central concepts and assump-
tions. The origin of the capability approach lies in Sen’s criticism of utili-
tarianism and in his claim that human well-being cannot and should 
not be identified with subjective welfare or utility. There are several well-
known objections to the traditional formulation of utilitarianism, and 
replicating and assessing all of them here would exceed the scope of this 
book. Instead, we would like to point to some of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s 
concerns directly related to the metric of justice employed by utilitarians 
(Crocker 2008, 126–129). First, subjective welfare ‘does not adequately 
represent well-being’ (Sen 1990, 47). In its standard interpretation, it 
reduces the diversity of human experience to one single measure and 
suggests that, in the end, all different types of pleasures or satisfactions 
are commensurable. But does it really make sense to compare the pleasure 
we feel eating ice cream to that we get from helping a friend in need or 
raising a child? From Sen’s and Nussbaum’s point of view, it does not; they 
argue that the theoretical simplicity gained by adopting such a monist 
understanding of human well-being comes at a high cost: it cannot inte-
grate our commonsensical experiences of how we perceive our lives and 
the intuition that a variety of different aspects matter for our ‘wellness’. 
To be clear, subjective welfare is highly valued in the capability approach, 
and indeed, Sen refers to it as a ‘momentous functioning’ (Sen 1985, 
200). However, it should be seen as one aspect of a person’s well-being 
and not, as utilitarians suggest, the only thing that matters. 
 Second – and this is connected to the first point – the phenomenon 
of ‘adaptive preferences’ also suggests that a focus on a subjective metric 
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is misleading when conceptualizing the well-being of a person. To make 
his point, Sen refers to empirical evidence: human beings often adapt 
their assessment of their own situation, including their wishes, hopes 
and general psychological state, to the circumstances they find them-
selves in. On the one hand, this may have the effect that one can feel 
subjectively happy even when suffering considerable disadvantages:
 Our mental reactions to what we actually get and what we can sens-
ibly expect to get may frequently involve compromises with a harsh 
reality. The destitute thrown into beggary, the vulnerable landless 
labourer precariously surviving at the edge of subsistence, the over-
worked domestic servant working round the clock, the subdued and 
subjugated housewife reconciled to her role and her fate, all tend 
to come to terms with their respective predicaments. The depriva-
tions are suppressed and muffled in the scale of utilities (reflected 
by desire-fulfilment and happiness) by the necessity of endurance in 
uneventful survival. (Sen 1999a, 15) 
 On the other hand, some individuals might have ‘expensive tastes’, 
meaning that they feel satisfaction or subjective happiness only if they 
possess or consume costly goods, such as high-powered sports cars or Almas 
caviar. In such cases, unhappiness related to the nonavailability of such 
goods should hardly be taken as an indicator that their overall well-being 
is jeopardized. Again, these feelings are important to consider as an aspect 
but not as the only definitional feature of their well-being. Accordingly, 
the malleability of any mental metric counts against its adequacy. 
 Third, Sen argues that a focus on utility sees a person only as the ‘site’ 
in which pleasant or painful experiences take place; there is no further 
interest in any other information about her interests and objectives. 
Or as Sen and Williams once put it: ‘Persons do not count as individ-
uals in this [utilitarian approach] any more than individual petrol tanks 
do in the analysis of the national consumption of petroleum’ (Sen and 
Williams 1992, 4). In other words, the informational space employed by 
utilitarianism neglects a person’s agency; that is, her ability to act and 
bring about change in the world in line with her own values and goals 
(Sen 1999b, 19). According to Sen, being able to pursue a life she has 
reason to value is an immensely important feature of a person’s agency. 
Sometimes realization of values can imply hardship and may jeopardize 
many forms of human welfare and well-being. Nonetheless, he claims 
that a person’s freedom to follow her ideals must be considered in evalu-
ative exercises. 
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 The second position (or better, family of positions) Sen has exten-
sively criticized regarding its informational space can be labeled ‘resour-
cism’. Its central claim is that an individual’s social position can best be 
judged by her possession of some set of external resources. It comes in 
different versions, but the arguably most influential account is defended 
by John Rawls, whose work on justice has had a profound impact on the 
development of the capability approach. For Rawls, external resources 
relevant for the evaluation of social position embrace both material 
ones (such as money and wealth) and immaterial ones (e.g., rights and 
liberties). What really matters about them, according to Rawls, is that 
they are useful for pursuing a wide range of conceptions of the good 
life while being neutral about what this goodness consists of. In Rawls’s 
theory, it is up to the autonomous citizen to decide what kind of life she 
wants to lead. The state should provide only the means and the insti-
tutional settings needed for an ample variety of ways of life; it should 
have no right, however, to prescribe one doctrine (moral, religious or 
spiritual) that all its members have to follow. This skepticism stems from 
the conviction that even between completely reasonable and rational 
persons, there will be no full agreement about fundamental ethical and 
political matters. However, according to Rawls, a set of all-purpose means 
that are useful to all and therefore have to be distributed in a fair way can 
be agreed on. At the same time, they are useful for making interpersonal 
comparisons, since the same index of these resources (primary goods, in 
Rawls’s terminology) can be used to evaluate the social position of every 
citizen – they express each person’s level of advantage (Rawls 1982, 
163). Surely, Rawls’s theory of justice is complex, and his account of 
primary goods is but one of its aspects. Its critique should therefore not 
be taken as a critique of the whole theory, which has to include many 
more facets. Nevertheless, resourcism is arguably deeply entrenched in 
it and cannot be easily given up without a complete modification of his 
concept of justice (Nussbaum 2006). 
 Against resourcism – be it Rawls’s or any other version – Sen has 
brought forward inter alia the following two worries: First, Sen argues 
that the possession of resources is a misleading indicator for the social 
position of an individual; a variety of factors influence a person’s ability 
to use a bundle of resources for her objectives. In the societies we know, 
it is not generally the case, as a matter of empirical fact, that two indi-
viduals who possess the same (primary) goods are equally advantaged. 
Personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social 
climate, differences in relational perspectives and distributional issues 
within the family influence a person’s abilities to convert resources into 
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valuable outcomes (Sen 1999b, 71–72). A person in a wheelchair, for 
example, has to invest considerable resources just to achieve a degree 
of mobility someone without the disability enjoys with no investment 
whatsoever. As a realistic notion of advantage, resources are therefore 
problematic and in fact lead to unfair judgments. At closer examin-
ation, their alleged neutrality fails, allowing for discrimination against 
the less fortunate, who are generally in a less favorable position to use 
their resources for the ends they value. Second, and entangled with the 
first objection, Sen argues that a focus on resources ‘suffers from [a] 
fetishist handicap in being concerned with goods [ ... ] rather than with 
what these good things  do to human beings’ (Sen 1980, 218). Resourcist 
theories are right, according to Sen, to stress human agency, and indeed, 
resources are often a good approximation of the freedoms one enjoys. 
However, they are only the  means to achieve these freedoms and do 
not adequately represent a person’s actual opportunities to achieve well-
being or to find value in life, which are, according to Sen, the  ends we 
should seek and therefore include in societal evaluations. There are also 
other forms of resourcism, and some of them broaden the notion of 
what counts as a resource considerably, bringing them, in fact, closer to 
the metric of justice of the capability approach, which we will argue for 
in the course of this chapter. Take, for example, Ronald Dworkin’s influ-
ential position, which is typically discussed under the heading “equality 
of resources”, where he advocates that individuals should, over their life 
span, have access to an equal share of resources These resources consist 
of two types, personal and impersonal ones:
 [A person’s] personal resources are his physical and mental health 
and ability – his general fitness and capacities, including his wealth-
talent, that is, his innate capacity to produce goods or services that 
others will pay to have. His impersonal resources are those resources 
that can be reassigned from one person to another – his wealth and 
the other property he commands, and the opportunities provided to 
him, under the reigning legal system, to use that property. (Dworkin 
2000, 322–323) 
 In Dworkin’s theory, therefore both external goods (income and wealth) 
and the internal features of a person (such as talent and ambition) 
are seen as resources relevant for justice. However, personal resources 
are to a large extent subject to the natural lottery, and their unequal 
distribution usually cannot be redistributed easily or without ethically 
problematic measures. But people can be compensated for their low 
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share of personal resources with impersonal ones. The fairest way to do 
so, according to Dworkin, is determined by a hypothetical insurance 
market where people can be insured against being untalented, handi-
capped and the like. Here is not the place to discuss Dworkin’s theory in 
detail, but there are two interrelated issues we would like to note. The 
first one is that Dworkin’s resourcist metric of justice has to be distin-
guished from a capability-based theory, and the second is that his idea 
of equality of resources is connected to assumptions that are plausible 
in the context of ideal theory but lead to problematic consequences in 
nonideal circumstances (Pierik and Robeyns 2007). This book needs a 
theory that works within nonideal contexts, and this is a strong reason 
to reject the sophisticated form of resourcism put forward by Dworkin. 
We now treat these two issues in turn. 
 Taking up and extending a critique of Dworkin’s theory first brought 
forward by Andrew Williams (Williams 2002), Roland Pierik and Ingrid 
Robeyns introduce the following example to show that there is a diffe-
rence between equality of resources and equality of capability, which 
Dworkin explicitly denied; they argue that capabilities, in fact, can not 
be subsumed under his theory of resources (Pierik and Robeyns 2007; 
Dworkin 2000, 299–303; Dworkin 2002). Amy and Ben are twins and 
happen to have exactly the same personal and impersonal resources; 
both want to found a family with a member of the opposite sex. We 
do not know how they would like to divide care work and market work 
between them, but there are basically three categories of persons in this 
regard: homemakers (who are primarily in charge of domestic work and 
child rearing), ideal workers (who work to generate income and neglect 
domestic work) and coparents (who share different kinds of work roughly 
equally). We also know that half of the men in society prefer sharing 
coparent duties and that the other half prefer being ideal workers. With 
women, the distribution of preferences is as follows: Half are indifferent 
to being an ideal worker or a coparent, 40 percent want to be either a 
coparent or a home worker, and 10 percent prefer to be ideal workers. 
According to this distribution of preferences, Ben has a very high chance 
of becoming a coparent (90 percent) and a reasonable opportunity to 
be either a home worker (60 percent) or an ideal worker in his relation-
ship. For Amy, the situation looks different. She has a 50 percent chance 
of becoming both a coparent and a home worker. But the option to 
become an ideal worker in her family is nonexistent because there are 
no men willing to do the domestic work on their own. Now, given that 
the preferences of the members of this society are authentic and not 
influenced by prejudice (two important conditions for a just background 
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structure), Dworkin’s theory leads to the conclusion that there are no 
morally relevant inequalities between the situations of Amy and Ben 
since they possess exactly the same resources. The actual distribution 
of (authentic) preferences and tastes is a matter of luck and should not 
be seen as triggering claims of justice (Dworkin 2000, 69–70). As will 
become clear in the following, a capability perspective would judge this 
example differently. There is a difference between the real freedoms of 
Amy and Ben. Their resources are the same, but what they can do with 
them is different. This aspect matters from the perspective of justice, 
expecially in nonideal circumstances, bringing us to the second reason 
why we reject Dworkin’s resourcist approach for the purposes of our 
book. Dworkin’s theory can best be classified as an ideal theory of justice 
that works with strong assumptions and idealizations. His principles of 
justice are derived from a thought experiment assuming that the people 
involved choose against a background of equality of opportunity and 
nondiscrimination the rules that should govern the institutional struc-
ture of their society. He abstracts from inequalities and power structures 
as they exist in virtually all societies and does not consider histories of 
subordination, be it in relation to gender, race or wealth, and simply 
assumes that the preferences of all people involved in his thought 
experiment are authentic. It is therefore not clear what the implica-
tions of his theory are for real-world contexts. He seems to assume that 
legal measures and economic redistribution (Dworkin 2000, 175) can 
effectively fight injustice, ignoring the widely established relevance of 
sociocultural inequalities, which are of the uttermost importance for 
studying, understanding and alleviating poverty. Here, a direct focus on 
how people effectively live their lives and the real freedoms they enjoy 
seems to provide a more feasible way than a focus on resources – even 
if understood in Dworkin’s broad way. Looking again at the example 
of Amy and Ben, the difference in the opportunities they have within 
a social context because of sex should be alarming; downplaying the 
issues of justice involved by pointing to the fact that they have an equal 
share of resources just seems too easy an excuse. 
 With this we do not claim that Dworkin’s approach cannot, in prin-
ciple, be fruitfully used as a normative background theory for criticizing 
poverty. However, it seems to us that much more theoretical work needs 
to be done to apply it in this domain and that the capability approach 
provides more accessible tools to deal with injustices as they factually 
happen. It is true in part that it lacks the clarity of Dworkin’s (also 
Rawls’s) theory of justice, a clarity gained by idealization and abstrac-
tion. However, clarity is not very useful if it is too far from the social 
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world’s realities. Here, so we argue, the capability approach works much 
better. 
 Let us look at Sen’s alternative account to well-being and advantage, 
which solves, or so he argues, the issues criticized on the other proposals. 
In doing so, he introduces the concepts of functionings and capabil-
ities, which focus directly on an individual’s life and which enable 
the conceptualization of her opportunities (e.g., Sen 1992, 39–42; Sen 
1999b, 74–76; see also Alkire 2002, 4–11). Functionings are the activities 
and states that make up a person’s life; they are the different ‘beings’ 
and ‘doings’ living consists in. And since human existence encompasses 
many different doings and beings, the category of functionings is a 
broad one and includes being healthy and educated, having a shelter 
and taking part in the life of the community, as well as being under-
nourished, killing animals and feeling emotional distress. In any case, 
it is essential to note two things: First, they have to be distinguished 
clearly from the resources employed to achieve these functionings, 
even if most of them depend heavily on some of their input. Second, 
the criticized mental metrics as used by utilitarians can be seen as a 
relevant subcategory of functionings (e.g., being happy), but they do 
not – by far – include all the necessary information about an individ-
ual’s circumstances. For Sen, however, it is not enough to look only at 
the functionings realized by a person in order to compare his situation 
with that of others. As already indicated, he considers the freedom to 
lead a life one has reason to value as one of the most valuable features 
of human life. In order to express this idea, he introduces the notion of 
capabilities. They are defined as the functionings a person has actually 
access to and reflect the person’s freedom to realize different achieve-
ments. To give an example: eating is a functioning, while the real oppor-
tunity to eat is its respective capability. Normally, it is important to look 
at capabilities not one by one but in combination with each other – 
usually, the realization of one specific functioning influences others, 
and only a holistic approach can retrieve all the relevant information. 
Notice that Sen in fact originally introduced the concept of a capability 
to refer to  a set of combinations of functionings , each representing a feas-
ible lifestyle (Sen 1980; Sen 1992). However, in his other writings, he 
uses the term ‘capability’, as introduced here, to refer to the freedom 
to achieve one particular functioning, a usage that is nowadays wide-
spread in the literature. Take, for example, someone who has to make a 
choice between a job that gives him an income necessary for a decent 
living but that is so time-consuming that his personal relationships will 
be reduced drastically. It is this interconnectedness between different 
Social Justice for Children – A Capability Approach 23
valuable achievements that must be considered for evaluating a person’s 
situation comprehensively. If not, it might get overlooked that a good 
choice with respect to one domain was – all things considered – a tough 
or even tragic one. Since capabilities are a kind of freedom, it also 
becomes clear that the approach gives a high value to people’s agency, 
which is, according to Sen, understood as the faculty to act and bring 
about change according to one’s values and objectives (Sen 1999b, 19). 
In the end, people should be able to identify with their choices and 
actively shape their own lives; it is therefore decisive for a just society to 
provide the conditions to make this, in fact, possible. 
 It is crucial to understand that the notion of well-being as it is used 
in the capability approach must not be identified with what is typically 
termed ‘welfare’ in political philosophy or economics, where the term 
is understood exclusively in relation to individual preferences or happi-
ness. As shown, this position was powerfully rejected by Sen. Or to put it 
differently, the notions of well-being, on the one hand, and functionings 
and capabilities, on the other, are closely related, and there is by now a 
vast literature confirming this diagnosis (Comim, Qizilbash and Alkire 
2008; Deneulin and Shahani 2009; Biggeri, Ballet and Comim 2011). 
Welfare, on the other hand, in Sen’s terminology, is only one aspect of 
the overall well-being of a person and must not be reduced to it. 
 A person’s capabilities (but also achieved functionings) depend on 
many different factors. They are a product of a person’s abilities and 
skills, as well as the political, social and economic context she finds 
herself in. They obviously usually depend on resources; without the 
necessary goods, it is simply not possible to live a self-determined life 
according to one’s own conception of the good. However, what matters 
is the ‘relationship between persons and goods’ (Sen 1980, 216) and 
what the relationship allows us to do and be. 
 In this context, the term “conversion factors” is helpful. It was intro-
duced by Sen to conceptualize the relation between resources and the 
realization of certain functionings, and it calls attention to the degree a 
person in fact can use the goods at her disposal for her purposes. At least 
three different kinds of such factors can be identified, all of which have to 
be taken into account when evaluating the real freedoms somebody has 
access to (Sen 1992, 19–21; Sen 1999b, 70–72; Robeyns 2005, 98–100). 
First, there are personal conversion factors. Our physical, psychological 
and emotional characteristics, as well as our achieved levels of skills, 
influence what we can ‘get’ out of the resources we command. If we 
are in good health, for example, we do not need a lot to achieve basic 
mobility. However, due to illnesses or impairments, moving around can 
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be burdensome and only possible with the right assistance or technical 
tools (e.g., by using crutches or a wheelchair). We can observe that, in 
some cases, lower levels of well-being or freedom resulting from personal 
heterogeneities can be compensated by more or special kinds of resources. 
Sometimes, however, even the best support or the greatest wealth does 
not outweigh the respective disadvantages (Nussbaum 2006). Personal 
conversion factors highlight the many differences existing between 
people and their relevance for using the goods they possess for their 
ends. They can add much interesting information to evaluative exercises 
and detect inequalities relevant for ethical theories, but they also point 
out that during a person’s life course, the characteristics decisive for her 
realization of valuable functionings vary greatly. 
 Second, there are environmental conversion factors relating, for 
example, to varieties of climates and geographical locations but also to 
pollution and the prevalence of diseases. All these aspects have a direct 
impact on the individual, her freedoms and level of well-being and 
must be considered in the conceptualization of a person’s capabilities. 
Pure survival in a country with low temperatures depends on adequate 
clothing and shelter with heating facilities and the respective invest-
ments that are not necessary to make in milder regions of the world. Or, 
to give another example, the high levels of smog and problems in the 
water supply as experienced by some of the world’s megacities directly 
bear on the quality of life of their inhabitants. These environmental 
circumstances restrict good human functioning in many ways, and even 
considerable wealth cannot outweigh them. The life of each person must 
therefore be examined in a variety of environmental dimensions to get a 
realistic picture of what can be achieved with a fixed set of goods. 
 Third, social conversion factors play a role in how an individual can 
benefit from resources or a certain amount of income. This category 
embraces public policies, power relations and social norms, for example, 
and emphasizes that every individual is embedded in a social context 
that is crucial for understanding her real freedoms. Educational and 
health programs run by the state might allow access to important func-
tionings without demanding material wealth, and the absence of crime 
or violence contributes massively to the quality of life in the locations 
in question. If the streets are not safe, options of what can be done with 
one’s possessions get restricted. A nice car is of no use if it is too dangerous 
to drive it on the streets. Discriminating practices, gender roles and soci-
etal hierarchies, too, must be taken into account when analyzing the 
relationship between persons and goods. If there are rules excluding girls 
from the educational system in a certain society, even having the best 
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schools next door is not helpful for the capability to be educated; if a 
social norm forbids women to cycle, possessing a bike in combination 
with cycling skill does not lead – as is usually the case – to the result that 
a woman will consider cycling a real option; her actual possibility to use 
the respective good gets restricted by her social environment. 
 Summarizing, conversion factors point to the complex relationship 
between what a person has and what kind of life she in fact enjoys, 
and accordingly, we need to know many aspects of a person’s situation 
in order to judge how well off she is. Resources, social institutions and 
norms, as well as the environmental context, all play an important role, 
and an analysis focusing on functionings and capabilities must take all 
of them into account while acknowledging that they matter primarily 
as means and not for their own sake. Two important points follow from 
these considerations: First, the capability approach entails a position 
called ‘ethical individualism’, which claims that the individual is the 
fundamental moral category. In the end, the quality of a society is judged 
by how well it manages to show respect and concern for each and every 
one of its members, taken one by one. As Nussbaum once put it:
 [ ... ] the capabilities sought are sought for  each and every person , not, 
in the first instance, for groups or families or states or other corporate 
bodies. Such bodies may be extremely important in promoting 
human capabilities, and in this way they may deservedly gain our 
support: but it is because of what they do for people that they are so 
worthy, and the ultimate political goal is always the promotion of the 
capabilities of  each person . (Nussbaum 2000, 74) 
 Second, however, it must not be overlooked that this focus on the indi-
vidual does not ignore the social nature of human life. On the contrary, 
what the discussion about conversion factors showed is that the 
capability approach stresses the social embedding of every person and 
that only against this background can her individuality come forward 
and her life be assessed adequately. This also means that the capability 
approach naturally goes hand in hand with a critique of social relations 
which hinder the social conditions of freedom for every citizen (Graf 
and Schweiger 2014). The evaluation of capabilities, therefore, has to 
recognize the many ways oppression and exploitation are present in a 
society and how these phenomena affect relations of equality between 
people (Anderson 1999). 
 We have outlined some of the criticisms capability scholars have 
brought forward against other informational spaces, and we have 
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introduced the notions of functionings and capabilities and put them 
into the wider context of the concerns of the capability approach. From 
our point of view, they provide the best approach to a metric of indi-
vidual advantage, and they should also therefore be used to make inter-
personal comparisons that matter from a social justice perspective. They 
shift the focus from a mere provision of goods to the question of what 
these goods allow persons to be, do or achieve, recognizing variations 
in a person’s ability to convert goods into valuable functionings. This 
characteristic, together with the explicit recognition of the multidimen-
sional nature of a person’s well-being and the central place attributed to 
human freedom, makes this metric of justice suggested by Sen preferable 
to other options, such as primary goods or utilities. Furthermore, they 
allow for a direct connection to the social scientific literature, where 
functionings and capabilities are used in issues of measurement and 
conceptualization. Does this conclusion also hold for children, with 
whom this book is concerned? Or do we need to adapt the capability 
approach somewhat? In what follows, we will discuss why the adequate 
currency of justice for children does not straightforwardly consist of 
capabilities, as is typically the case for adults. 
 Children are different in many important aspects, the two main ones 
being that children are not autonomous beings from the beginning but 
become autonomous over the course of childhood and that they are 
developing beings who change rapidly and whose development can be 
severely hurt by outside influences. Both imply that children are more 
vulnerable to certain forms of harm and that they are heavily dependent 
on others as well. We distinguish three kinds of vulnerability: phys-
ical, mental and social; the last can be further differentiated into legal, 
economic and political forms. These forms correlate with dimensions 
of powerlessness. It is evident that a child’s body suffers more severely 
than an adult’s from physical violence, such as shaking, and that certain 
hazards that are only a small problem for an adult can be a deadly threat 
for a newborn or toddler. It is also a fact that the physical and mental 
development of children can be severely distorted by external factors 
like toxic chemicals in the environment and that such influences on 
development can be irreversible (Landrigan and Goldman 2011). Various 
psychological research studies on the development of the self and 
personality and on socialization have examined the effects of outside 
surroundings on children. For instance, it has been shown that girls who 
suffer from maltreatment during childhood may develop a low percep-
tion of their own social power in relationship with others; this state 
may be predictive of a propensity for abusiveness in their relationships 
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with their own children (Bugental and Grusex 2007). Another example 
includes the associations found between early attachment security and 
measures of emotional health, self-esteem, agency and self-confidence, 
positive affect, ego resiliency and social competence in interactions 
with peers, teachers, camp counselors, romantic partners and others 
(Thompson 2007). It is crucial always to be aware of the fact that there 
is only one chance for each child to develop and grow up, and distor-
tions in early life cannot be taken back. Still, research like this should 
not be interpreted to mean that children are passive objects in their own 
development and that childhood predicts everything. Rather, it should 
help us understand that all humans are dependent and are shaped by 
interactions with others and the environment – interactions that greatly 
influence who we are and what we are able to be and do. 
 The social vulnerability of children partly stems from their limited 
capacities and their needs and partly from how childhood is framed in 
modern societies (Graf 2015). They are economically vulnerable because 
they cannot take care of themselves in the same sense as adults. Most 
importantly, they cannot (up to a certain age) work and are not allowed 
(again, up to a certain age) to work and be economic agents, and they 
have essentially no control over their income and other resources like 
housing and transportation. If their parents become unemployed, for 
example, children cannot substitute that lack of income or otherwise 
sufficiently support their parents to cope with this situation. They are, 
in fact, often victims of these situations and the high level of stress that 
they cause (Edwards, Gomes and Major 2013). Furthermore, they are 
legally subject to their parents and their decisions in many ways. If a 
child is neglected, it is often not in the child’s power to claim proper 
treatment by her parents, and it can be very difficult for her to reach 
out and demand others to help and intervene (also because family rela-
tions are fueled by emotions). In many welfare states, parents have a 
wide range of rights to control and shape the lives of their children; 
in some of them even corporal punishment and with it many possible 
severe consequences for the child’s development are allowed and toler-
ated (Durrant and Ensom 2012). 
 Children are politically vulnerable because they cannot effectively 
change their political position and they depend on the rights they are 
granted by others (Milne 2013). Children cannot fight for their rights in 
the way adults can, and they cannot organize themselves in a compar-
able manner that would gather them political influence. Their social 
vulnerability is hence also produced and sustained by their social power-
lessness. Children have less power and fewer capacities and opportunities 
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to alter their lives, and many opportunities they have are not good ones. 
The rare opportunities to acquire resources and funds to make a better 
living, for example, through work and labor, are limited, and there are 
very good reasons to ban children from working and laboring, not to 
speak of such illegal and evidently harmful ways as begging and stealing. 
In certain cases, it is better for children to leave their families and homes 
and live on their own (if they are old enough) or in other forms of care 
arrangements, but in general it is widely acknowledged that this is not 
good for either their well-being or well-becoming (Lawrence, Carlson 
and Egeland 2006). 
 The vulnerability and powerlessness of children reflect, thus, two 
dimensions of the specific moral and political status children can 
and should have due to the nature of their being. On the one hand, 
as we have argued so far, powerlessness increases and creates certain 
 vulnerabilities in children; it is also socially created to an extent. On the 
other hand, to hold children powerless in some areas is not only permis-
sible but an entitlement of justice and morality that children should be 
granted. It is important to note the crucial difference between children 
and women and other powerless subjugated social groups in large parts 
of this world. Being held powerless certainly does not protect women; 
they are oppressed, and justifications applied to children, like inferior 
competence and vulnerability, do not apply to women or minority 
groups (Nussbaum 2000). 
 Most theorists concerned with justice for children acknowledge that 
these vulnerabilities, together with their potential to develop into 
autonomous beings, constitute a particular ‘nature’ of children that 
grants them a different moral and political status (Archard and Macleod 
2002; Brennan and Noggle 2007). It is also at this point, where the 
capability approach has been criticized for not being suitable as a norma-
tive theory for children. As Colin Macleod argues, the notion of capabil-
ities is closely tied to an ‘agency assumption’, one that presupposes that 
the subject in question is able to make autonomous decisions. And since 
children – especially younger ones – miss this feature, the capability 
approach has problems to integrate them into his conceptual framework 
(Macleod 2010). We will argue later on that this problem is solvable and 
that the concepts of evolving capabilities and achieved functionings are 
of great value here. But before we do this, let us explore more deeply 
the question of autonomy and development, how children are ‘special’ 
and that it is very important to distinguish between different groups of 
them: Children are a very heterogeneous group, more so than a group of 
adults, when it comes to significant differences. A ‘normal’ two-year-old 
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toddler’s skills and capacities differ more from a ‘normal’ twelve-year-old 
teenager’s than those of a ‘normal’ twenty-five-year-old differ from a 
‘normal’ fifty-five-year-old’s. Exceptions, such as people with severe 
disabilities, do no refute this assumption, because they are seen as just 
that: exceptions. Nor does this rest on a strong anthropological concep-
tion about what is human; it can be expressed only via a very shallow 
understanding of empirical facts about humans. A good comparison is 
provided by the concept and definition of health and disease: the fact 
that some people are born with severe cognitive disabilities does not 
lead to the conclusion that suffering from a head trauma that shows 
the same outcome is something ‘normal’ in the sense that it should not 
be seen as impairment to health. Humans can differ greatly in many 
aspects, but it is plausible to assume that children are particular in some 
of those and that these aspects change as children develop. A capability 
approach to children has to recognize these differences and changes and 
see them as morally relevant, a view supported by Nussbaum and Dixon 
in the context of children’s rights:
 The idea of agency has a central role to play in the CA: the capability 
approach sees people as striving agents, and in contrast to approaches 
that aim only at the satisfaction of preferences, it aims at supporting 
the growth of agency and practical reason. This emphasis on agency, 
under a CA, further means that children should be afforded the 
maximum scope for decisional, freedom consistent with their actual – 
or potential – capacity for rational and reasoned forms of choice, or 
judgment. For adolescents in particular, this may mean recognizing 
a range of rights to sexual and reproductive choice, religious choice, 
and choices regarding custody. In many cases, it will also mean 
granting at least certain decisional rights to younger children. (Dixon 
and Nussbaum 2012, 559–560; footnotes omitted) 
 Childhood is a phase of rapid changes in all known mental, physical 
and social categories. So, when we write here about children, we should 
always be aware that the category of children is very vague and encom-
passes humans with great differences in skills, capacities and needs, 
which implies that a claim justified toward a toddler can be unjustified 
toward an adolescent. In fact, treating an adolescent like a toddler is 
denigrating and humiliating and certainly does not accord with treating 
her justly (Brighouse 2003). 
 What we can say, though, is that children lack the skills and capacities 
needed to make fully autonomous choices and decisions for themselves 
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until they are grown up and are hence to be seen as adults. This does not 
mean that they cannot articulate their wishes and preferences or that they 
cannot decide anything for themselves from a certain age on, but a theory 
of justice for children cannot and should not assume that the subjects of 
this justice are fully autonomous beings. The same is probably true for 
many adults, but in a different sense, which does not hold as a general 
rule rooted in their ‘natural’ capacities. Many adults are restricted in their 
freedom because of external factors, but children are so because of what 
they are and what they can do and be, based on their still developing minds 
and bodies. This becomes obvious if one looks at very young children: A 
toddler cannot make any reasonable decision for herself and is dependent 
on adults to the extent that her life is in danger if she is abandoned. The 
lack of autonomy of children is surely based not only in human biology 
but also in the social arrangements constructed around childhood. The 
legal position of children, for example, restricts them in their autonomy 
even though it is unclear in the cases of some older children and adoles-
cents whether they are really less capable of making their own choices 
than many adults, who are not equally restricted by the law. Such arrange-
ments are in need of a close examination as to whether they really fit chil-
dren, respect them and do justice to them, but in general, it is reasonable 
to claim not only that children are less autonomous but that there are 
good reasons to let them make only limited choices for themselves. 
 This refers both to their lack in competencies and to their nature as 
developing beings. All humans change throughout their entire life, but 
childhood is a phase of rapid and significant change like no other, and 
this development is highly influential for the whole future life course. 
Development does not simply happen to children; it must be fostered, 
and children’s development is influenced by their environment and 
the people and institutions interacting with them. Children’s devel-
opment can be severely hurt and damaged, with sometimes lifelong 
consequences. We will soon introduce the concept of corrosive disad-
vantages, which is a suitable description of such damages with lifelong 
consequences. Children do not know what is best for their develop-
ment, as well: A baby cannot know whether a vaccination helps prevent 
severe diseases, and she cannot know that the pain of getting a shot is 
outweighed by the lifelong protection from severe illness. Older chil-
dren cannot know what learning is good for, even if they often enjoy 
learning, and that going to school is a crucial condition for their future 
well-being and for what they can do later on in their lives. 
 As a consequence, we wish to endorse the view that childhood should 
be a protective phase and that children have a right to have a childhood 
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separated from the adult world in some features. Not having to make 
certain decisions and not being held responsible for one’s actions to the 
full account also provide protection, and children would be overbur-
dened if they were granted the full range of rights and duties as adults. 
Children lack the competencies and autonomy to make many decisions 
for themselves and to know what is best for them, their actual well-
being and their future well-being. Such a justification of partial pater-
nalism toward children, which decreases as they grow up and become 
more mature, is widely acknowledged, although there is significant 
disagreement about the justificatory bases of paternalism and how far 
it should go; for example, in regard to teenagers and adolescents who 
show (nearly) the same competences as most adults (Archard 2004; 
Franklin-Hall 2013; Anderson and Claassen 2012). 
 What such a developmental view of children, together with an 
acknowledgment of their agency, means for capability approach theory 
has already been fleshed out in some detail (Ballet, Biggeri and Comim 
2011). In particular, the concept of evolving capabilities was introduced 
as a crucial conceptual extension to the prevalent terminology. Evolving 
capabilities include the dynamic aspect of the development of capabil-
ities and explicitly link the person’s abilities, achievements and circum-
stances at different points in time:
 The process of capability expansion or of evolving capabilities starts 
from an initial set of achieved functionings of the child at time tn. 
The process of resource conversion is very much affected by how 
different institutions, norms and cultures constrain or empower 
them, shaping the formation of a new set of functionings and 
capabilities that are inter-temporally distinct. The child’s capability 
set (opportunity freedom, i.e. the vector of potential valuable and 
achievable functionings) is thus given by the resources/constraints, 
by his or her limited opportunities and by his or her own abilities. 
From the multidimensional capability set the choice will determine 
the vector of new achieved functionings at time t  n +1 . The dynamic 
process is going to be influenced by feedback loops if seen as taking 
place in sequential periods of time. [ ... ] The emotional and cognitive 
development of children goes through different stages in which their 
decision making and agency is shaped by their life experiences and 
mimicking behaviour. (Ballet, Biggeri and Comim 2011, 34) 
 The concept of evolving capabilities thus grasps the fact that capabilities 
change over time according to different factors. The already introduced 
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notion of conversion factors is helpful to further clarify this point. If 
we look at internal factors, we realize that a child’s opportunities typic-
ally broaden in childhood due to physical, psychological and emotional 
changes. Furthermore, children acquire skills that can be used to get 
more out of the commodities they have access to. This expansion of 
their capabilities is certainly related to biological facts about the way 
humans grow up, but it would be wrong to reduce human development 
to such a perspective – this is where social conversion factors come into 
play. On the one hand, they often relate directly to what is ‘internal’ to 
a person. The social context profoundly influences our psychological, 
emotional and even physical development, the skills we are able to learn 
and the aspirations we have. This shows that internal conversion factors, 
too, do not merely exist in a vacuum but must be interpreted over a 
certain social context. One can also mention here the close relationship 
between a child’s capabilities and those of her parents or close caregivers 
(Ballet, Biggeri and Comim 2011, 30–31). As is well known from empir-
ical research, disadvantages are often transferred from one generation 
to the next, and without improving the capabilities of a child’s attach-
ment figures, it is unlikely that her life chances will be comparable to 
those of her peers from a privileged background as understood in terms 
of the caregiver’s capabilities (which do not equal their material wealth). 
On the other hand, social norms and institutions regulate our lives in 
many ways and our ability to use resources for our aims. The case of chil-
dren in modern Western societies serves to illustrate this point: Often 
enough, their possibilities are constrained; for example, by the fact that 
they have to attend school, kindergarten or other educational facil-
ities that entail a set of rules and restrictions that are, at least in some 
aspects, different from the regulations adults face. Furthermore, there are 
usually laws and social expectations in place, treating children and adults 
differently and granting them different degrees of authority over their 
own circumstances. As we have argued, such an approach is valid if it is 
applied sincerely and with care. But the point is that all these facets – and 
many more – have to be taken into account when analyzing the evolving 
capabilities of children and the effective freedoms they enjoy. 
 Analyzing the well-being and well-becoming of children in terms of 
evolving capabilities brings another aspect to the surface, which relates 
to the many interconnections between different functionings and 
capabilities, their synergies but also negative interactions. This point is 
worth emphasizing for several reasons and will provide a main point of 
reference for our argument about the injustice of child poverty, which 
we will develop in the next chapter. 
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 First, it is likely that certain functionings and capabilities are valu-
able not only in themselves but also because their possession posi-
tively influences other functionings and capabilities. As we will argue 
in more detail in the next section, a clear case can be made that health, 
for example, fulfills such a function and that it therefore makes sense 
to have a special look at health, also in the case of social analyses and 
distributions of inequalities. This idea of particularly important dimen-
sions of the life of a human being, which ‘spread their good effects 
over several categories either directly or by reducing risk to the other 
functionings’, was introduced by Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit 
in their book  Disadvantage , connecting it explicitly with the capability 
approach. They term this category ‘fertile functionings’ (Wolff and 
de-Shalit 2007, 121) and suggest that their identification and promo-
tion among the least advantaged members of society will lead to social 
change and a reduction of disadvantage. They are also very clear that 
social policy has to make sure that people in fact realize these func-
tionings and that they not be defined as capabilities where freedom of 
choice plays a major role (Wolff and de-Shalit 2013). While this point 
has been controversially discussed for adults, for children the case is 
clearer; for them, the category of achieved functionings needs to have 
priority, especially when they can be proven to be fertile. However, since 
for children the differentiation between well-being and well-becoming 
is particularly important, the notion of ‘fertile functionings’ has to be 
understood from both perspectives, as well. On the one hand, they are 
important because they promote other dimensions of well-being. On 
the other hand, their positive effects might spread to a child’s future 
and well-becoming. Certainly, both aspects are relevant and have to be 
included in the concept of fertile functionings. Which functionings play 
such a role is the subject of empirical studies, and a normative theory 
cannot develop its claims without considering such knowledge; it has to 
work with the best available evidence and must also acknowledge vari-
ations in different contexts. What is fertile in one case does not neces-
sarily have this effect in another one, even if it is reasonable to assume 
that some functionings, health, for example, are likely to have a fertile 
effect almost universally. 
 Second, and very closely connected to the notion of fertile func-
tionings, are ‘corrosive disadvantages’, which are also introduced and 
analyzed by Wolff and de-Shalit (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 121). Here 
the idea is that some disadvantages have negative impacts on many 
other aspects of life, leading to a variety of drawbacks. Again, such disad-
vantages might be relevant for the well-being of a child; for instance, 
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when lack of decent living conditions directly translates into social 
problems. They also serve, however, as an important category for future-
oriented analysis. Corrosive disadvantages have a middle- and long-
term impact on a child’s life, and their negative effects often become 
clear only when they are put into a life-course perspective. It is of great 
moral importance that children enter their lives as adults in a condi-
tion where enough significant life chances are still available for them. 
Consequently, moral harm is done not only insofar as children experi-
ence suffering and neglect in childhood but also when the way they 
live their childhoods reduces valuable options they find as adults. Take, 
for example, the case of physical abuse, experienced by many children. 
Its immediate damage is, of course, severe and its impact on the child’s 
well-being disastrous. However, the full picture of its moral harm can be 
evaluated only if we take into account its impact on the child’s future 
life, in relation, for instance, to health problems, social status, economic 
well-being and a range of psychiatric disorders (Lanius, Vermetten and 
Pain 2010; Widom et al. 2012; Currie and Widom 2010), all of which 
reduce a person’s well-being, including the faculty of self-government 
and the effective pursuit of a life plan. In our argument about the 
injustice of child poverty, which we will develop in detail in the next 
chapter, it will therefore also be crucial to look at aspects of children’s 
lives that have particularly positive or negative effects in the long run. 
Naturally, such an endeavor is connected to empirical knowledge, and 
indeed we will argue that philosophical theories about justice have to 
work closely with empirical analyses that add substance to purely theor-
etical considerations. As in the case of fertile functionings, finding out 
which disadvantages are indeed corrosive is not a purely philosophical 
matter. On the contrary, identifying and clarifying the causal relations 
between disadvantages is mainly an empirical task. The same is true for 
studying and understanding how patterns of disadvantage arise, why 
they persist and which factors contribute to the fact that they can even 
be transferred from one generation to another. 
 Fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages are related in many 
ways. However, it is important to separate them on a conceptual level and 
to stress that there is more to the distinction than acknowledging that 
one and the same functioning can have good or bad effects, depending 
on its realization or absence (Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, 134). To illustrate 
this point, it suffices to note that, in many situations of disadvantage, it 
is not enough to eliminate the causes of the problem, including disad-
vantages considered corrosive. In many cases, something additional is 
needed to effectively overcome the difficult situation. Take, for instance, 
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the case of someone who has an alcohol addiction. It is easy to imagine 
that this problem is a corrosive disadvantage, leading to many negative 
consequences; ending the addiction alone is not a guarantee that many 
of the experienced disadvantages disappear. It might be necessary for 
the person to develop a new sense of self-worth and self-efficacy – fertile 
functionings, which are not directly related to the experienced disad-
vantages – to succeed in life. On the other hand, the absence of many 
fertile functionings does not always lead to disadvantages. A sense of 
humor, to take Wolff and de-Shalit’s example, is certainly of help in 
many ways to deal with difficult situations. But its absence probably has 
relatively few other negative effects and should not, in typical circum-
stances, be counted as corrosive. 
 Third, a look at the concept of evolving capabilities and the inter-
relation of different functionings and capabilities in their formation 
stresses the importance of  functionings . As described by Ballet, Biggeri 
and Comim, the process of capability expansion always starts by an 
initial set of archived functionings and has to take into account which 
functionings will be realized during the development process, as well. 
Wolff and de-Shalit also deliberately write about fertile  functionings (and 
not capabilities), characterizing corrosive disadvantages first and fore-
most in relation to achieved functionings. In their theory, they do not 
use the concept of evolving capabilities, and their focus is not mainly 
on children, but this observation is relevant nonetheless. The reason 
for this is that the ability to choose for oneself and to determine one’s 
life is dependent on many preconditions, and a certain level of overall 
well-being typically has to be achieved so that choice in a meaningful 
sense can be exercised. In the terminology of the capability approach, 
this means that the category of functionings must not get neglected and 
that they provide valuable insights in the distribution of disadvantages 
in a society. We would like to emphasize that, in the case of children, it 
would be generally wrong to give them only the capabilities to achieve 
certain levels in different dimensions of well-being. What matters is that 
they actually lead good lives and not merely that they have the options 
to do so if they want to. In regard to children, Nussbaum prefers such a 
perspective as well: 
 If we aim to produce adults who have all the capabilities on the 
list, this will frequently mean requiring certain types of functioning 
in children, since, as I have argued, exercising a function in child-
hood is frequently necessary to produce a mature adult capability. 
Thus it seems perfectly legitimate to require primary and secondary 
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education, given the role this plays in all the later choices of an adult 
life. Similarly, it seems legitimate to insist on the health, emotional 
well-being, bodily integrity, and dignity of children in a way that 
does not take their choices into account; some of this insisting will 
be done by parents, but the state has a legitimate role in preventing 
abuse and neglect. Again: functioning in childhood is necessary for 
capability in adulthood. The state’s interest in adult capabilities gives 
it a very strong interest in any treatment of children that has a long-
term impact on these capabilities [ ... ]. (Nussbaum 2000, 89–90) 
 For children, however, functioning may be made the goal in many 
areas. Thus I have defended compulsory education, compulsory health 
care, and other aspects of compulsory functioning. (For example, I 
support an age of consent for sexual intercourse, so that children’s 
bodily integrity is protected whether they like it or not.) Compulsory 
functioning is justified both by the child’s cognitive immaturity and 
by the importance of such functioning in enabling adult capabilities. 
(Nussbaum 2006, 172) 
 Where does that leave us in the question of the right currency of justice 
for children? The restriction of children’s autonomy is, as we see, not 
only a reaction to their limited competencies and skills but also justi-
fied by the need to protect them, their development and their future 
life chances (Noggle 2002; Archard 2003). It is hence a part of justice for 
children, and giving children too much autonomy over their lives too 
early would expose them to great risks. It is very likely that these chil-
dren, once they have grown up, would make serious accusations and 
blame their parents and the state for having let them down by allowing 
them to quit school at the age of seven, by not getting healthy food 
because they preferred junk-food or by not going to the dentist and 
subsequently having serious health issues. Children cannot use capabil-
ities in the way adults can, and they do not gain the same amount of 
value from having a choice when they are very young. A toddler does 
not have an increase in real freedom and does not see the value in being 
presented with many potentially valuable options – her needs are more 
focused. The risk of overburdening children by letting them decide is also 
to be considered. We see good arguments that claim that functionings, 
instead of capabilities, are to be preferred, but over the course of child-
hood and as children develop into more and more autonomous beings, 
capabilities become more important and finally take over. The develop-
mental perspective of Nussbaum is only one important aspect, and the 
issue of autonomy and being protected as a child matter equally. We 
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claim that functionings are the right currency of justice for children not 
solely because this will lead to the development of adults with certain 
capabilities but also because functionings represent what children need 
in order to have a good childhood, since they cannot make all decisions 
for themselves. One of the main reasons for preferring capabilities over 
resources is that people are given real freedoms, but for children real 
freedoms matter less, at least until a certain point in their development. 
This is not to say that freedoms do not matter at all for children, but 
they have to be interpreted in a suitable way, taking account of the fact 
that full autonomy is not the right category for thinking about chil-
dren’s choices. However, so far, we have described these concepts only 
as formal categories without specifying their exact content. In order to 
apply the capability to the problem of justice, something more must be 
said about this issue, and one needs to take a stand regarding (a) which 
functionings and capabilitities matter for social justice and (b) to what 
degree or threshold must they be secured in order to achieve social 
justice. In the next sections, we will address these questions in turn. 
 1.2 Selecting functionings and capabilities for children 
 The next task to further develop our concept of justice for children is to 
select functionings – for older children, capabilities – that are relevant 
for assessments of justice. Sen has never identified a comprehensive list 
of functionings and capabilities, either for adults or for children, that 
could be used as the basis for a theory of justice. On the contrary, he 
has brought forward some reasons why he is skeptical about such an 
endeavor (Sen 1993; Sen 2004b). He argues that a predefined list of what 
is valuable to human life ignores what people actually value and might 
be overly paternalistic. Furthermore, it goes against the ideal of public 
deliberation processes that Sen sees as the best and the legitimate way 
to answer value questions. Finally, he suggests that moral questions are 
notoriously difficult to answer and that this insight, too, speaks against 
the definition of a full list. Throughout his works, he frequently refers 
to some examples of capabilities he believes to be supported by a wide 
range of moral and political positions, which he terms ‘basic capabil-
ities’. However, his remarks on this subject remain only exemplary, and 
all in all, he refrains from substantial claims when it comes to value 
questions on an abstract and universal level detached from concrete 
contexts and socioeconomic circumstances. His version of the capability 
approach is therefore best understood as an ‘analytical device’ that can 
be used for different ends. In particular, Sen reminds us that evaluative 
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exercises have to incorporate a variety of diverse concerns and dimen-
sions. In doing so, he also explicitly stresses the many (causal) relation-
ships between different functionings and capabilities and emphasizes 
how important empirical work is for the subject matter of political phil-
osophy. From his point of view, the capability framework serves to clarify 
what is at stake in public reasoning, helping to make social evaluations 
open and transparent. However, it cannot, a priori, solve moral disa-
greements (Sen 2005, 157). Nonetheless, Sen is confident that there will 
always be enough intersections between different reasoned approaches, 
providing guidelines for actions that lead to the enhancement of justice 
(Sen 2009). 
 While Sen sees this ‘undertheorization’ of the capability approach 
as a specific strength, others have raised doubts about it. Most import-
antly, it has been argued that without some specifications of objectively 
valuable functionings and capabilities, the capability approach does not 
have any normative force, especially if one wants to apply the notion 
of social justice in a global and multicultural context (Nussbaum 2003; 
Arneson 2006; Nussbaum 2011, 69–75). In this line of thought, different 
lists have been proposed and discussed by philosophers and researchers 
who work empirically, but none of these lists seems to satisfy all critics. 
We agree that it will not be possible to have one list for all purposes 
and that it is important to specify the items according to certain goals 
and contexts. In addition, there will always be discussions about the 
adequacy of fully specified lists, if they include everything that is valu-
able or if they miss important information. However, a critique of child 
poverty needs to take up a position at least on some of the crucial elem-
ents for children’s lives; only then will it be possible to inform and guide 
a society on the design of its institutions and on its policy decisions 
broadly construed. But fulfilling this task does not rely on an exhaustive 
and fully specified list of capabilities, be they deduced from philosoph-
ical argument or from the outcome of ideal deliberation processes. Much 
can be achieved with pragmatic and preliminary lists, and our treatment 
of the injustice of child poverty in the next chapter will be a good occa-
sion to prove this point. But before we present the list we see as suitable 
for our purposes, let us briefly review two influential suggestions as to 
what such a list might look like in the case of adults. 
 The most prominent list is certainly Nussbaum’s, which distinguishes 
ten central human capabilities. She argues that her list is grounded on 
the idea of a life worthy of human dignity, which in turn draws on 
the intuition that every person is a needy and social creature capable 
of reasoning. The central human capabilities are defended as universal 
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and prepolitical entitlements, which every state has to guarantee for its 
citizens. According to Nussbaum, her list appeals to very fundamental 
values shared by many different moral and religious doctrines (although 
for different reasons), and it can be, over time, the object of an over-
lapping consensus in the Rawlsian sense. She is also very clear that in 
providing these capabilities to citizens, she does not mean to push them 
into a set of specific functionings. The choice to realize a specific life 
remains with each and every individual. Before presenting the list, it 
must also be noted that her understanding of capabilities is broader 
than Sen’s. While Sen defines them as real opportunities, for Nussbaum 
they also include talents, internal powers and abilities. Sen’s conversion 
factors are therefore already integrated in her concept of capability itself 
(Robeyns 2003, 75). In our view, this is more of a conceptual issue than 
one of substance, but it explains to some extent the ways they charac-
terize and write about this concept – and these conceptual ambiguities 
have certainly provoked some misunderstandings in the literature. The 
list reads as follows (Nussbaum 2011, 33–34):
 (1) Life . Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; 
not dying prematurely or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not 
worth living. 
 (2) Bodily Health . Being able to have good health, including repro-
ductive health, adequate nourishment and adequate shelter. 
 (3) Bodily Integrity . Being able to move freely from place to place; to be 
secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic 
violence; to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction and choice 
in matters of reproduction. 
 (4) Senses, Imagination and Thought . Being able to use the senses, to 
imagine, think, and reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly 
human’ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate educa-
tion, including but by no means limited to literacy and basic math-
ematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and 
thought in connection with experiencing and producing works 
and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical and so 
forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees 
of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic 
speech and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleas-
urable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain. 
 (5) Emotions . Being able to have attachments to things and people 
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve 
at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, 
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gratitude and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional devel-
opment blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability 
means supporting forms of human association that can be shown 
to be crucial in their development.) 
 (6) Practical Reason . Being able to form a conception of the good and 
to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. 
(This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious 
observance.) 
 (7) Affiliation . 
 A.  Being able to live with and for others, to recognize and show 
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of 
social interaction, to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting 
this capability means protecting institutions that constitute 
and nourish such forms of affiliation and also protecting the 
freedom of assembly and political speech.) 
 B.  Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being 
able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to 
that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on 
the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, reli-
gion, national origin. 
 (8) Other Species . Being able to live with concern for and in relation to 
animals, plants and the world of nature. 
 (9) Play . Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
 (10) Control over One’s Environment . 
 A.  Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices 
that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation 
and the protections of free speech and association. 
 B.  Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable 
goods) and having property rights on an equal basis with 
others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis 
with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and 
seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exer-
cising practical reason and entering into meaningful relation-
ships of mutual recognition with other workers. 
 Another example of a concrete list of valuable capabilities is the one 
offered by Ingrid Robeyns (Robeyns 2003), who distinguished fourteen 
dimensions for evaluating gender inequality. Her list is based on a meth-
odology that involves four criteria: First, the selection process and the 
selected functionings or capabilities must be explicitly formulated so 
that they can be openly discussed, criticized, defended and, if needed, 
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modified. Second, there is a criterion of methodological justification. 
The method used to generate the list must be clarified and scrutinized. 
Furthermore, it must be defended as to why it is appropriate for the issue 
at hand. Third, lists can be formulated at different levels of generalities, 
and an individual has to decide, according to the aims she pursues, at 
what level she works – reaching from ideal theory to pragmatic lists 
constrained by the given circumstances. Fourth, norms of exhaustion 
and nonreduction should be met: The capabilities on the list should 
include all elements that are important and should not be reducible to 
other elements. Her list is as follows:
 Life and physical health: being able to be physically healthy and (1) 
enjoy a life of normal length. 
 Mental well-being: being able to be mentally healthy. (2) 
 Bodily integrity and safety: being able to be protected from violence (3) 
of any sort. 
 Social relations: being able to be part of social networks and to give (4) 
and receive social support. 
 Political empowerment: being able to participate in and have a fair (5) 
share of influence on political decision-making. 
 Education and knowledge: being able to be educated and to use (6) 
and produce knowledge. 
 Domestic work and nonmarket care: being able to raise children (7) 
and to take care of others. 
 Paid work and other projects: being able to work in the labor market (8) 
or to undertake projects, including artistic ones. 
 Shelter and environment: being able to be sheltered and to live in (9) 
a safe and pleasant environment. 
 Mobility: being able to be mobile. (10) 
 Leisure activities: being able to engage in leisure activities. (11) 
 Time autonomy: being able to exercise autonomy in allocating (12) 
one’s time. 
 Respect: being able to be respected and treated with dignity. (13) 
 Religion: being able to choose to live or not to live according to a (14) 
religion. 
 As one can see, there are several similarities between Robeyns’s and 
Nussbaum’s lists, but that is not the point of interest for us. We are 
concerned with justice for children, and what is apparent is that neither 
Nussbaum’s nor Robeyn’s list is suited for them in every aspect. Let us 
discuss a few of the problematic cases: Nussbaum included the ability 
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to move freely on her list, something that is, for good reasons, limited 
for children. It would be highly problematic if that capability would 
be granted to children at all ages, as it would put them at high risk. 
The same is true for the capability of practical reason and that children 
should be able to plan their own lives. This is certainly not possible in 
the same way as it is and should be for adults. Likewise, political partici-
pation, having the right to seek employment and to hold property are 
highly problematic for children, especially younger ones; these are not 
proper capabilities for them. If we think in terms of functionings instead 
of capabilities, which is more adequate for young children, these items 
on the list become even more problematic. Other capabilities are suit-
able for children, like health and education, but they should be inter-
preted in terms of functionings rather than capabilities, and they have 
to be adapted in regard to the actual development stage of the child. 
Basic competencies and knowledge in literacy, math and science are a 
good thing for a child of school age, but for the first months of life, chil-
dren need to achieve other functionings first and have certainly other 
needs. The same inadequacies can be found in regard to Robeyn’s list, 
but that is no wonder, since she drafted it not as a universal list but one 
with a particular topic in mind: namely, gender injustices; more specif-
ically for adults, not young boys and girls. Being able to work in the 
labor market is for many children more a threat than a unit of justice; 
being able to raise children is a very problematic issue for teenagers, and 
there are many good reasons to assume that reproductive health during 
adolescence also includes family planning and being protected from 
unwanted pregnancy. What we would like to make clear is simply that a 
list for children has to look different than a list for adults, even though 
there are some very important overlaps. We now want to present and 
discuss six criteria for selecting functionings and capabilities that matter 
for children for the issue of social justice:
 A functioning or capability that is used for an analysis of injustice (1) 
has to reflect a truly important dimension of a child’s well-being or 
well-becoming; in this sense, it has to be child-specific. Justice for 
children is concerned with things that really matter for them and 
not with supplements or ‘extras’. As we have seen, the category of 
functionings is at first a formal one, and in theory, one could make 
it a question of justice if a child is able to whistle or stand on her 
head. This would, however, be a distortion of the concept of justice, 
which should look at functionings that make a substantial difference 
to a child’s well-being and well-becoming. The genuine importance 
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of a functioning for the well-becoming is best defined in relation to 
its contribution to the achievement of one or more other important 
capabilities as an adult. In our view, most approaches used to generate 
the lists found in literature (including the ones by Nussbaum and 
Robeyns) already incorporate in one way or another such ‘signifi-
cance criteria’, and the dimensions they identify are typically truly 
important for a good human life; notwithstanding, they do not 
address the particularities arising when looking at children, and as a 
consequence and quite naturally, they do not tell anything specific 
about the well-being and well-becoming of children. In addition, 
we would like to emphasize that we see the notions of well-being 
and well-becoming as basic ones for normative reasoning. Hence, 
we deliberately depart here from Nussbaum, who suggests that her 
list can be justified based on the notion of human dignity and a 
life worthy of it. There are three reasons for this decision.  Firstly, 
there is a certain ambiguity inherent to the notion of dignity: it is 
something all humans have and not something one can reach or 
fall short of. It is therefore nothing that can be a goal of justice in 
itself. Dignity can indeed be violated, and living conditions may be 
indecent, but the people whose dignity is violated and who have 
to live in such ways still have their dignity. By using the concepts 
of well-being and well-becoming, on the other hand, we want to 
highlight from the beginning that we are dealing with something 
aspired to, a goal that should be reached but that a lot of children 
are denied. Each and every child is born with equal dignity, but not 
all have the same chance to achieve well-being and well-becoming. 
Secondly, we understand dignity as a minimum concept, one that 
does not entail the full scope of justice. Justice encompasses a living 
in dignity but demands more. This is especially important if justice 
is applied in modern affluent societies and welfare states that have 
already reached a high level of development and welfare. It seems 
plausible that two children can both be treated with dignity but 
have a fairly unequal level of well-being and well-becoming, which 
should be criticized as unjust. Thirdly, well-being and well-becoming 
are developmental and dynamic concepts, while dignity is a more 
static concept. It is also obvious that well-being and well-becoming 
demand different things for children and adults, while it is less clear 
how to spell out the same using the notion of dignity. Justice for 
children is necessarily concerned with these issues of development 
and with the task to weigh the current and the future well-being of 
a child against each other. 
44 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
 Still it should be made very clear that human dignity is an important 
part of children’s lives, of their well-being and well-becoming. Looking 
at what some researchers, including Nussbaum herself, have deduced 
from the concept of human dignity, many similarities can be observed, 
and it seems possible to interpret dignity and well-being in a way that 
they are more or less the same. Yet our shift to well-being and well-
becoming is a signal that what matters for children is more than dignity, 
dignity being undoubtedly an important part. 
 The selection of a functioning that matters for justice should be (2) 
based on the best available (empirical) evidence. Research on the 
well-being and well-becoming of children is a multidisciplinary task 
involving a variety of perspectives, methodologies and research para-
digms (Graf and Schweiger 2015). Specifying functionings for the 
purpose of social justice must necessarily involve a close dialogue 
with developments in the relevant fields and the knowledge of the 
physical, mental and social needs of children. This point entails that 
lists of functionings have to be adapted, modified and redefined if 
new evidence is available; indeed, results of the last decades show 
that the new knowledge coming up makes a substantial difference 
(Ben-Arieh 2010; McAuley and Rose 2010). In this regard, the list we 
will suggest does well, since it was generated with expert knowledge 
and specialists of different fields; nonetheless, it is clear that the 
list must be constantly scrutinized and connected to results gained 
by the scientific community. One final remark should be made in 
this context: While it is important to select functionings on the 
best evidence available, one should not expect a scientific method 
that will lead to a clear and uncontroversial result. In fact, the 
multidisciplinary approach we suggest is likely to lead to ongoing 
controversies about fundamental issues of children’s well-being and 
well-becoming, which have to be confronted continuously and with 
the necessary intellectual honesty. 
 Selecting functionings for the purpose of characterizing children’s (3) 
well-being and well-becoming in relation to social justice has to 
take into account if their (re)distribution is possible and feasible. 
In particular, their distribution must be influenceable by the insti-
tutional design of a society. In fact, this claim has to be at the heart 
of any approach that looks at distributions of well-being and well-
becoming from a social justice perspective. Here, some difficult 
questions arise that are closely connected to a general critique of 
the capability approach as it was stated by some resourcists and that 
Social Justice for Children – A Capability Approach 45
we will mention later on in this chapter in our assessment of the 
sufficiency principle as defended within the capability approach. 
Some resourcists argue that functionings and capabilities are not the 
right metric for justice exactly because it is unclear what distributing 
them means and because it is not obvious that the basic structure of 
a society can have an influence on them. Functionings and capabil-
ities, so the argument goes, might be a good metric for conceptu-
alizing human well-being, but claims of  justice have to rely on a 
different metric, and some sets of resources do, in their point of 
view, a better job in this regard (see Kelleher 2013). We agree that 
a theory of justice that operates within a functioning or capability 
metric has to face these distributional concerns and that there might 
be cases where a functioning is important for the well-being of a 
child but is not the subject of a justice-based claim. For instance, if 
a child has a serious accident and subsequently suffers permanent 
damage, for example, in cognitive and motor domains, it is likely 
that she will never be able to enjoy some of the functionings that 
other children can still reach without a problem. This fact is not, 
however, per se a problem of justice. Sometimes there are limits to 
what can be achieved, and there are limits to which kinds of support 
one is entitled to; we will address this point in the context of how a 
sufficiency principle should be interpreted so that both the demand 
side and the supply side are taken into account. Impairments and 
disabilities must be surely included in reasoning about justice as well, 
and it is certainly the duty of a just society to enable persons with 
disabilities the access to a broad range of functionings and capabil-
ities as far as possible (Nussbaum 2006). In many cases, however, 
there are limitations to what is feasible – there are ‘tragic fates’ that 
have to be recognized by a theory of justice. But these distinctions 
and refinements should not lead us astray from the fact that many 
important functionings and capabilities are capable of being influ-
enced by the way a society arranges its institutions. Social scientific 
evidence increasingly suggests that many aspects of human life are 
fundamentally shaped by the environment and social relations, as 
well as by the distribution of goods and rights. Hence, how a society 
is organized and how it regulates its institutions have an immediate 
impact on the functionings and capabilities of its members, and 
therefore many of them fulfill these criteria. Philosophy, too, has 
to work closely with other scientific disciplines, since this empirical 
work transcends its scope; the clear tendency is that certain aspects, 
such as health – which John Rawls, for example, still considered a 
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natural primary good and hence not subject to social distribution – 
are now seen by many political philosophers as highly influenceable 
by social factors. Health justice is a blooming research field, and we 
agree that the evidence that great injustices are happening in this 
regard is overwhelming. These few considerations illustrate that a 
variety of functionings and capabilities are socially influenceable. 
Certainly, they are not distributable, as are money and other material 
goods, and in individual cases people will not be able to achieve 
them even with good institutions in place. However, a society can 
still provide the general framework for a just distribution, and it can 
do its best in order that its institutional design secures, at least to a 
very high degree, that every child can actually enjoy the function-
ings in question. 
 The concept of justice demands that the functionings taken as the (4) 
basis for the respective evaluations are, at least to some extent, 
objectively determinable and not merely subjective. They should 
not depend primarily on the assessments, experiences and evalua-
tions of the subjects in question. In other words, what is important 
is not mainly that someone feels or thinks that she suffers from 
an injustice but that there are good external and intersubjectively 
comprehensible reasons that an injustice is happening. This set of 
criteria is relevant both for children and adults and connects to 
the arguments capability scholars usually bring forward to criti-
cize subjective metrics of justice as defended, for example, by util-
itarians. The subject’s preferences are malleable and adapt to the 
circumstances it is used to, introducing distortions in its percep-
tion and evaluation of the situation. Claims of justice must there-
fore be aware of this danger and take these ‘adaptive preferences’ 
seriously. In the case of children, this aspect is of particular rele-
vance and must not get neglected. For such reasons, happiness is 
not a good guide for justice for children, and it seems more suitable 
to take mental health as an indicator (Cabezas, Graf and Schweiger 
2014). Furthermore, objectively determinable functionings allow 
comparing the well-being of children in a meaningful way, and they 
make changes and improvements traceable and perceivable by other 
members of society. Such information is indispensable for a concept 
of justice that can guide the design of institutions and policies. It 
needs ‘hard’ and accessible criteria for the evaluation of personal 
advantage. If not, measures for (re)distributing functionings and 
capabilities cannot be justified toward others, and it is unlikely that 
they are supported by the public. Objective measurability also limits 
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the possibility of cheating, which, again, has a positive effect on 
public acceptance of a just regime. 
 The selection of functionings has to include children’s own views. A (5) 
concept of children’s well-being and well-becoming cannot ignore 
what aspects are relevant to children themselves, how they perceive 
their lives and where they set their priorities. Respecting children and 
their agency is tantamount to choosing such an approach, and there 
is overwhelming evidence that children are capable of expressing 
their point of view if they are given appropriate opportunities to do 
so. Different settings and methodologies can be used, adapting them 
to specific age groups and cultural contexts (Lansdown and UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre 2001; Camfield, Woodhead and Streuli 
2009; Percy-Smith and Thomas 2010). As a consequence, subjective 
experiences and the children’s point of view are of great importance 
in the selection process of relevant functionings, although we want 
to stress that their consultative function has to be a priority. This 
point might seem to be in opposition to the one before, where the 
objective accessibility was emphasized. However, this is not the case 
because the selection process has to be separated from its outcome. 
Of course, subjective assessments are relevant for the process, but 
the fact remains that the functionings resulting from it have to be 
measurable – at least to a considerable part – objectively if they have 
a role to play in a concept of justice. Furthermore, taking seriously 
the child’s point of view has a dimension that goes beyond the 
useful information if often generates. The respect a society owes its 
children entails that they have to be granted a ‘right to be heard’. 
As we have argued above, it is generally not reasonable to give chil-
dren full authority over their own circumstances. But they certainly 
have their own views from an early age on, and giving them the 
opportunity to express them is of value independently of any instru-
mental considerations (Archard and Skivenes 2009). 
 Finally, the fertility or corrosiveness of a functioning – in the sense (6) 
introduced earlier on – should be taken into account. According to 
their positive or negative effects on the development and achieve-
ment of other functionings and capabilities, different weights can 
be given to different functionings in the context of justice theory. 
Especially for children, these concepts have to be considered a 
priority because childhood is the phase of every human being’s life 
where the foundation for well-being and well-becoming is laid and 
where the fertile or corrosive effect of a functioning (or its absence) 
has long-lasting consequences. 
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 Finally, we will discuss a list that so far presents one of the best avail-
able approaches to children’s well-being from a capability perspective. 
Mario Biggeri and his colleagues (Biggeri 2003; Biggeri and Mehrotra 
2011; Biggeri and Libanora 2011; Biggeri and Santi 2012) proposed a 
pragmatic and empirically informed approach to selecting functionings 
and capabilities for children that are important to their well-being and 
well-becoming. They worked with two types of procedures, which we 
explain in what follows. 
 Biggeri and his colleagues took up Robeyn’s suggestion and carried out 
a procedure to conceptualize a child-sensitive list of capabilities in the 
following way: In a first phase, a group of child experts (including UNICEF 
officers, psychologists, sociologists and NGO practitioners) selected, on 
the basis of their knowledge and experience, relevant capabilities for the 
evaluation of child well-being. Since the well-being of children is a concern 
for many stakeholders and different scientific disciplines, such an inter-
disciplinary and interprofessional approach seems to be required. There 
is a need to include theoretical and empirical as well as ethical reasoning 
to comprehensively grasp the different dimensions at stake, something 
that can be achieved only through a dialogue involving a broad range of 
experts. In the second phase, the reasons for the choices were explained 
and the inclusion of each capability was justified, relating them to other 
works on the capability approach, particularly those of Nussbaum and 
Robeyns, and to literature on children’s issues as published by the UN 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the United Nations (UN). Again, methodological concerns suggest 
this proceeding, taking into account the most important documents 
already developed in the field of the well-being of children, relating them 
conceptually to the capability approach and seeking valuable links and 
mutual improvements. In the third phase, an appropriate level of abstrac-
tion of the different items was chosen in order to make them generally 
applicable to children as a group while still including the uniqueness of 
each child. Finally, the list was rechecked both to include all relevant 
dimensions for analyzing the well-being of children and for nonreduc-
tion, meaning that none of the domains should be reducible to another. 
As a result, the following list emerged (Biggeri and Mehrotra 2011, 51): 1 
 Life and physical health: being able to be born, be physically healthy (1) 
and enjoy a life of normal length 
 1  The items marked with * have to be interpreted in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child. 
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 Love and care: being able to love and be loved by those who care (2) 
and being able to be protected* 
 Mental well-being: being able to be mentally healthy (3) 
 Bodily integrity and safety: being able to be protected from violence (4) 
of any sort 
 Social relations: being able to be part of social networks and to give (5) 
and receive social support* 
 Participation: being able to participate in and have a fair share of (6) 
influence and being able to receive objective information* 
 Education: being able to be educated (7) 
 Freedom from economic and noneconomic exploitation: being able (8) 
to be protected from economic and noneconomic exploitation* 
 Shelter and environment: being able to be sheltered and to live in (9) 
a healthy, safe and pleasant environment 
 Leisure activities: being able to engage in leisure activities (10) 
 Respect: being able to be respected and treated with dignity (11) 
 Religion and identity: being able to choose to live according to a (12) 
religion and identity or to choose not to do so* 
 Time autonomy: being able to exercise autonomy in allocating (13) 
one’s time* 
 Mobility: being able to move (14) 
 We agree that this list in fact represents central aspects of the well-being 
of children on a general and abstract level. It represents many of the 
core elements also found in other approaches to this topic and brings 
together different fields of discourse. It also fulfills the six criteria we 
have proposed. All of these functionings and capabilities (according to 
the child’s maturity and competence) are based on research, are object-
ively determinable (at least to some extent) and are highly influenced 
by social arrangements, and many of them are fertile. We believe this 
list is best understood as a pragmatic and empirically informed selection 
of the functionings and capabilities that matter for the well-being and 
well-becoming of children; it is based on broad consensus backed up by a 
wide range of experts from different fields (academic and nonacademic), 
giving the selection a high grade of credibility that extends beyond 
purely philosophical arguments. If it is in fact exhaustive, as Biggeri and 
his colleagues suggest, the question is certainly a disputed, not easily 
answered one. However, it does not seem to be necessary to have a clear 
and final stance on this issue in order to provide a theory of justice for 
children that is able to give a fundament for the evaluation of a society’s 
practices and institutions and to guide its development for the better. 
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We therefore also disagree with Robeyns’s fourth criterion (exhaustion 
and nonreduction), since it is too demanding and not necessary for all 
purposes and applications. 
 The identified functionings and capabilities are formulated at an 
abstract level and must subsequently be specified according to the rele-
vant cultural and social contexts. Thus, they include both context-sen-
sitive and context-transcending features alike: In order to give concrete 
meaning to them, they have to be related to existing norms and prac-
tices, taking a great deal of diversity into account. A child’s social rela-
tions and friendships, for instance, cannot be conceived the same way 
in a rural region in western Africa, in a favela in Rio de Janeiro and in a 
wealthy region in London or Paris. There is, however, a universal core 
to them that reflects central features of how children can flourish, not 
leading to a complete relativism on what social relations of children 
should look like. Isolation or interactions based on physical or psycho-
logical violence or categorical subordination, for example, are wrong 
independent of context. Similar considerations are true for all the other 
dimensions, which always have to be interpreted in accordance with 
local beliefs and circumstances without losing sight of their defining 
features. 
 The composition of the list recognizes that functionings and capabil-
ities usually develop over time, giving the well-becoming aspect an 
important role. In fact, many of the items have to be interpreted taking 
the age and maturity of the child into account in order to understand 
their concrete meanings, an insight that is intuitively plausible and a 
cornerstone of current thinking about childhood and children’s partici-
pation. This also means that it is crucial to give children age-appropriate 
opportunities to exercise choices and to make use of freedoms, even 
if they should not be as ample as those of adults and controlled in a 
way that they do not jeopardize important functionings. Children are 
social agents from an early age on, and it is important for them to make 
their own decisions. Hence, freedom is also a central category for chil-
dren, but it should be of course exercised in an adequate environment, 
conducive to the development of more and more rational and reason-
able decision making, leading to a steady improvement in a person’s 
global autonomy. Looking at children in this way and characterizing 
them as subjects of evolving capabilities (and not just as ‘sites’ where 
functionings get realized) fits well with a new ethical attitude toward 
children that sees them no longer exclusively as recipients of services 
or passive beneficiaries of adults’ care or care of state institutions but 
as the subjects of rights and active participants in their development 
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and in the life of the community (Lansdown and UNICEF Innocenti 
Research Centre 2001). Such an approach to children’s development 
also makes clear that the concepts of functionings and capabilities, 
which are often clearly separated on a conceptual level, are in practice 
deeply entangled. Certain functionings have to be secured so that real 
choices can be made, and the situation of children illustrates this point 
further: as evolving agents, they rely on certain levels of health, educa-
tion and social inclusion in exercising their choices – not only in terms 
of accessible opportunities but of actually realized functionings. Thus, 
for many social evaluations, it is reasonable to make functionings the 
most important category of analysis, especially when children are the 
target group. In the next chapter, we will also show that a focus on 
choice and freedom is often not the best way to scrutinize and evaluate 
the injustice of child poverty. Without downplaying their competencies, 
skills and agency, in many contexts it is basic to look at what has been 
effectively achieved and not at the options that are available to them. It 
matters, for instance, that children are in fact well nourished, not that 
they are capable of being so. 
 A few provisos are necessary: Firstly, we do not claim that this list 
is finished. It is open for discussion and further scrutiny, and other 
researchers using different methods or working on questions in a 
different context will produce slightly different lists. Secondly, the simi-
larities to the lists of Nussbaum and Robeyns suggest, as we have stated 
before, that some functionings and capabilities are important for both 
children and adults. Thirdly, this list is still very vague and needs to be 
further specified in order to be able to be applied in different contexts. 
Nonetheless, it is a start, and we will use this list, more specifically 
some of the functionings and capabilities on it, to further examine 
the injustice of child poverty in the next chapter in more detail. We 
position ourselves therefore with a rather pragmatic approach within 
the mentioned discussions about adequate lists for theorizing justice. 
We do not aim for completeness; nevertheless, we are confident that 
on this basis we will be able to build a strong case that child poverty 
profoundly violates what social justice demands. Before we can do that, 
however, we have to discuss the issue of the rule or principle of justice 
we want to endorse. 
 1.3 Sufficiency and equality 
 In the last section, we have argued that functionings (and, if applicable, 
capabilities) should be seen as the best currency of justice for children. 
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In addition, we have proposed some criteria for selecting functionings 
and capabilities for children and presented a list that can give guidance 
for our purposes in this book. We have also discussed that justice should 
put priority on fertile functionings, which enable the development and 
achievement of other functionings and capabilities, and that the detec-
tion and alleviation of deprivations that constitute corrosive disadvan-
tages should be prioritized. In this section we address the question of 
the rules and principles of justice and, hence, how these functionings 
and capabilities should be distributed among the children in a society 
and how much of these they are entitled to; that is to say, the question 
of putting a threshold on each functioning and capability below which 
a child is deemed to live in injustice. There is a long-running dispute 
between scholars about the right rule of justice, and the main options 
disputed are equality and sufficiency (or priority) or a mixture of these 
(Casal 2007). Some philosophers also advocate the use of more than 
one principle of justice; David Miller, for example, argues for a tripartite 
model of the principles of need (which can be interpreted in terms of 
sufficiency), desert and equality (Miller 1999). The capability approach 
is usually in the sufficiency camp (Arneson 2006; Anderson 2010), 
although Nussbaum recognizes the importance of equality, arguing that 
thresholds have to be specified in a way that does justice to the equal 
human dignity of every human being. This, she claims, leads to the 
conclusion that, for some capabilities, a sufficient level coincides with 
equality – for example, in voting rights. We do not want to recapitu-
late the whole debate here, for example, the criticism of Thomas Pogge 
(Pogge 2002; Oosterlaken 2012), but rather just jump in and argue for 
our version of sufficiency, which is not so far away from Nussbaum’s 
although with a few alterations. 
 Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2011) demands that every human is entitled 
to all the central capabilities on her list up to certain thresholds, under 
which truly human functioning is no longer possible. Hence, the goal of 
justice, though not of the minimum justice Nussbaum has in mind, is 
not for everyone to have the same or the highest level of capabilities but 
for everyone to be secure in having enough for a decent living. Justice 
also forbids trade-offs between basic human capabilities; if a person falls 
below a threshold in one capability, it is not enough to compensate her 
by allowing a higher level in another dimension. Each capability on the 
list is of equal value, and a shortfall in one of them is enough to consti-
tute an injustice. She also acknowledges, as we ourselves do, that the 
determination of the thresholds for her capabilities is not a purely philo-
sophical task but involves empirical knowledge from other disciplines as 
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well as public deliberation. The ten capabilities on her list should guide 
policies in each country, but it is the responsibility of each country to 
set an adequate threshold. Unfortunately, Nussbaum is rather vague and 
only arbitrarily discusses certain capabilities and their possible thresh-
olds. In her view, for some capabilities, the threshold should be set in 
a way that leads to equality so that each human is basically entitled to 
the same level in that capability (e.g., liberal rights), while for other 
capabilities the threshold can be set lower and hence allows a certain 
degree of inequality (e.g., in housing and material living conditions). 
To her, granting each human each capability above this threshold level 
is a partial and minimal requirement of what justice demands, admit-
ting that there are various ways a just society can deal with inequalities 
above the threshold. However, they have to be arranged in a way so 
that  equal respect and concern are guaranteed for all citizens. According to 
Nussbaum, this implies that each and every capability must be secured 
up to a certain level and that they should never be assessed from a 
trade-off perspective:
 [ ... ]  all ten of these plural and diverse ends are minimum requirements of 
justice , at least up to the threshold level. In other words, the theory 
does  not countenance intuitionistic balancing or trade-offs among 
them. The constitutional structure (once they are put into a constitu-
tion or some other similar set of basic understandings) demands that 
they  all be secured to each and every citizen, up to some appropriate 
threshold level. In desperate circumstances, it may not be possible 
for a nation to secure them all up to the threshold level, but then it 
becomes a purely practical question what to do next, not a question 
of justice. (Nussbaum 2006, 175) 
 How can we, how should we interpret Nussbaum´s rule of sufficiency in 
regard to children in rich countries? She does not give a clear answer; it 
often seems as if she views the capability approach as mainly concerned 
with poverty in poor countries and the severe harm there. We wish to 
specify some important aspects. 
 In rich countries, a higher level of well-being and well-becoming is (1) 
obviously achieved for many children; the possibilities to realize a 
good life are much better than in most other countries in this world. 
Still, certainly not all children achieve the same level of well-being 
and well-becoming, and some even fall short of what justice demands 
in terms of minimal thresholds in these countries. Furthermore, we 
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agree with Nussbaum that it is important to focus on a particular 
problem in a particular context in order to be more specific about 
where thresholds should be set. For our approach in this book, this 
means that it is reasonable to first investigate the situation in rich 
countries in some detail before we extent our theory to global justice 
in the last chapter. The fact that rich countries have already reached 
high levels in many aspects and that welfare states do a partly good 
job to alleviate poverty and to secure a certain level of well-being 
and well-becoming for all children implies that we need to work 
with a different kind of threshold and minimal conditions of justice. 
Still, it is important to also have an absolute minimum in mind, 
since in rich countries, too, there are some cases in which we can 
find severe poverty and other forms of hardship like homelessness, 
exploitation, child trafficking, child hunger and prostitution. In 
general, however, we are concerned with ‘relative’ poverty, as we 
will discuss in the next chapter. The adequate thresholds under such 
circumstances can be set according to two principles: on the one 
hand, we have to ask what is possible in these states and what can 
they provide for children without violating other claims of justice. 
This speaks against too high standards for assessing justice for chil-
dren, because we can never provide all children with a maximum 
in well-being and well-becoming for at least two reasons (Arneson 
and Shapiro 1996; Archard 2004, 62–63; Mills 2003): First, it is too 
demanding for those responsible for the upbringing of children. 
As important as it is to concentrate on children and to recognize 
them as equal sources of moral concern, we should not forget that 
we live in societies where everyone matters from a moral point of 
view. Maximizing the well-being and well-becoming of children 
in a strict sense would certainly lead to a disadvantage for other 
members of society and put unreasonably high burdens on them. 
Justice certainly does not imply the self-abandonment of all adult 
members in order to maximize the well-being and the life chances 
of children. Second, it is very difficult to understand what it even 
means to maximize the well-being and well-becoming of children. 
When it comes to well-being, it just seems unfeasible to say exactly 
what a perfectly good childhood looks like. There are just too many 
opinions about this, both in science and in commonsensical views, 
and any full definition will be ideologically charged. Regarding the 
well-becoming aspect, things are at least as difficult. Growing up is 
always connected to trade-offs, and some options to well-becoming 
can be held open only at the expense of denying others. Since there 
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are definitely many valuable but noncommensurable options as 
to how to live one’s life as an adult, maximizing well-becoming is 
probably not even a coherent idea. We see, therefore, that questions 
concerning the well-being and well-becoming of children are deeply 
entangled with general considerations about the good life. And 
since we agree with the diagnosis of political liberalism that there 
is no objective way to fully determine the nature of the good life 
(Nussbaum 2001; Rawls 2005), we also reject the mentioned ideas 
about maximization. On the other hand, we are always concerned 
with context-sensitive thresholds that are specified according to the 
living standards in that society. This reflects partly what is possible 
in a state but targets a different issue; namely, that it is important 
for justice for children that children do not fall behind for arbitrary 
reasons and that determining the adequate threshold by looking at 
the level that typically is achieved in that society is essential. For 
example, if most children in a society are able to acquire a certain 
level of knowledge and if that knowledge is used for further educa-
tion or in the job market, it is reasonable and feasible to demand 
that all children be brought up to that level. This does not imply 
that each and every child should become a scientist but that each 
and every child should finish primary and secondary school and 
that all children that do so should be on more or less the same 
level. Finally, justice for children in modern welfare states always 
has a forward-looking perspective. As technology and livings stand-
ards grow and as we gain more knowledge on children’s lives and 
health, we naturally can provide for them better; as a consequence, 
demands of justice also improve. In a historical perspective, this is 
quite obvious: the standards of justice for children 150 years ago 
were different; we did not know about many illnesses or about how 
they were transmitted and cured and we were still at the beginning 
of building public infrastructure like railroads, electricity and clean 
water in all places. Hence it was simply not possible to have all chil-
dren grow up and live under the conditions we can easily secure 
for them nowadays and are seen as ‘normal’ today. Of course, the 
requirements for participating as an equal in the society one is part 
of have changed considerably, too. The knowledge and education 
needed for practicing full citizenship in a modern society today is 
different from what was necessary fifty or sixty years ago. And since 
this feature of political participation is usually given much weight 
by capability theorists (Anderson 2010; Nussbaum 2006; Sen 2009), 
the relevant thresholds have to be adapted accordingly. Another 
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example would be life expectancy, something important and a good 
indicator for social inequality. Today life expectancy in all rich coun-
tries is much higher than it was a few decades ago; while we do not 
know whether it will further increase or not, it is clear now that, 
should it increase, it must do so for all and not just for a few – this 
will thus translate into claims of justice. If we know, for instance, 
that a new vaccination can increase the likelihood of getting older 
because it prevents several forms of cancer, then all children have 
a claim to get that vaccination (given that the medical knowledge 
is clear and that it really helps all without great risk of severe side 
effects). Justice for children is hence also a progressive concept. 
 This leads us to the second point. The threshold levels demanded (2) 
by justice in rich countries must always be specified by considering 
both the well-being and the well-becoming of children, which 
we would like to grasp via the concept of  equality of opportunity to 
well-being in adulthood. Justice for children, as we stated before, is 
concerned not only with what actual functionings and capabilities 
a child has but also with what functionings and capabilities she can 
have as an adult and over her life course. That is why injustices 
during childhood are particularly severe; they influence a person’s 
well-becoming negatively and violate the claim of these children to 
sufficient options for future well-being. We have not discussed what 
the well-being as an adult encompasses, but it would be possible to 
come up with a preliminary list using the same, although adapted, 
criteria we presented and assigning the idea of practical reason or 
autonomy a more important role; such a list would perhaps look 
the same as Nussbaum’s or Robeyns’s. In any case, some important 
functionings and capabilities we have showed to matter for both 
children and adults will be on that list, such as health, education 
and social relations. The state should have a strong interest to give 
each child the same chance to achieve functionings and capabilities 
that matter as an adult, which necessarily implies giving many func-
tionings to children. If we want to secure health in adulthood, for 
example, we need to be concerned with health during childhood, 
and it is unjust that adults are impaired in their health because they 
suffered from health issues otherwise preventable or curable during 
childhood. Likewise, the state has a responsibility to provide each 
and every child with the education needed to achieve well-being 
as an adult. Without specifying in detail which capabilities and 
functionings are necessary for a concept of adult well-being, being 
able to find a decent job, to make reasonable political decisions and 
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to have a certain degree of health, literacy and knowledge of one’s 
own body are certainly among them. Harry Adams’s take on justice 
for children, for example, is oriented toward what children need in 
order to develop into autonomous adults (Adams 2008). We agree 
with most of his conclusions, particularly in regard to the import-
ance of early childhood, but a sole focus on autonomy seems too 
narrow. Autonomy, as the capability approach is well aware of, is an 
important aspect of the well-being of adults, but it is not the only 
thing that matters, and justice for children must be concerned with 
many other aspects, as well. 
 Our third point relates to Nussbaum’s claim that equal respect has (3) 
to be shown for each and every member of society – a category that 
obviously includes children. But whereas respecting an adult is to 
a large extent tantamount to respecting her choices and life plans, 
the situation for children is different. We suggest that showing 
equal respect and concern for children should mean that a society 
is equally concerned with every child’s well-being and well-be-
coming. This does not mean supplying every child with the same 
set of resources but rather supporting them with the (material and 
immaterial) means required for achieving the necessary thresholds, 
a commitment lying at the heart of the capability approach: 
 In defining the meaning of equal rights for different groups, a 
capability approach also insists that we start with an understanding 
of how groups and individuals differ in their requirements, given 
both physical and cognitive differences and also differences of social 
starting point. Indeed, it is precisely on account of the importance 
of context in determining what people are able to do and be that the 
capability approach has been defended as superior to resource-based 
approaches: two people may be given the same amount of some 
all-purpose resource such as wealth or income but differ in their real 
capabilities, whether because they have different physical needs or 
because they start from different social positions. Children, in many 
cases, will also be clearly different from adults in the support they 
require from the state in order to develop and enjoy their capabil-
ities. (Dixon and Nussbaum 2012, 561; footnotes omitted) 
 We would also like to employ the distinction between demand-
side and supply-side sufficiency here as proposed by David Kelleher 
(Kelleher 2013): So far sufficiency was presented in a way that exclu-
sively looked at those whose functionings and capabilities lie below 
a certain threshold, and it was claimed that, as a consequence, they 
are entitled to treatment that raises them above the crucial level. 
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Such an account might suitably be called demand-side sufficiency 
view. One could also defend, however, a more differentiated ‘ supply-
side view’ of sufficiency, which consists of two levels: First, bearers 
of justice-based entitlements must give reasonable consideration 
for those who suffer from capability failures (interpreted in terms 
of not reaching certain thresholds); second, they must take actions 
balancing the moral reasons to help and the ‘other claims on the 
person’s possible actions (involving other rights and freedoms, but 
also altogether different concerns that a person may, inter alia, sens-
ibly have)’ (Sen 2004a, 339–340). In other word, they must give 
 sufficient attention to inequalities in the distribution of capabilities, 
and they have the duty of justice to intervene, taking into account 
their own circumstances and the other entitlements and obligations 
they have. This supply-side perspective is especially helpful for two 
reasons: it opens up possibilities of how extreme cases should be 
addressed from a capability perspective, and it explicitly introduces 
the issue of responsibilities, which has been rather neglected in 
the capability approach so far. Still, we would like to stress that a 
supply-side view has its dangers, and one must be careful to avoid 
misusing or instrumentalizing it in order to find excuses why the 
advantaged members of society do not have an immediate respon-
sibility to act against poverty and inequality. In particular, it is 
important to note that the urgency to act attributed to the supply 
side is intertwined with the needs of the demand side. The stronger 
the suffering and injustices among the side of the disadvantaged, 
the stronger are the reasons for the supply side to neglect personal 
interests and to make sacrifices and efforts toward an improvement 
of the general situation. In this sense, the demand-side perspective 
remains an essential part of a capability approach to justice, even 
if there are clear and almost logically given limitations to it. On 
the one hand, it focuses on the victims of injustice and prioritizes 
their claims. This gives them the weight they deserve because, in 
the end, they are what matters. A supply-side view must be aware of 
the danger it poses; namely, being used by those better-off to avoid 
their responsibilities. In a public deliberation about how much is 
enough, victims of injustices are most likely in a weaker position to 
argue for the demand-side view, from which they will profit most 
in comparison with those in a more favorable position, who argue 
for the supply-side view. On the other hand and more importantly, 
how much those who are better-off can be reasonably demanded 
to give, that is the determination of the extent of the supply-side 
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responsibilities, cannot be separated from the demand side, but is 
rather to be conceived as the just answer to it. Only the demand-
side view can provide the necessary information for the supply-side 
view, and not the other way around. If a child is severely deprived, 
then the justified demands are higher than if that child needs fewer 
resources to reach the just minimum in capabilities and function-
ings. On the basis of this demand-side information, the supply side 
view can be brought in. This means that the state and other agents 
of justice are responsible for putting efforts into each child according 
to what she needs in order to achieve functionings and capabilities 
important for well-being and well-becoming. The state has to show 
equal concern for all children’s needs and the particular conversion 
factors they require, whether it be providing public transportation 
to schools in rural areas, securing accessibility to education for chil-
dren with disabilities, or giving ill children the necessary treatment 
and allowing their parents to care for them, for example, via a paid 
leave from work. 
 The issue of setting an adequate threshold must also be discussed. It (4) 
is important to see that the distinction between selecting function-
ings and capabilities and setting thresholds for them is not always so 
clear and that it is best to conceptualize the latter as a form of specifi-
cation of functionings and capabilities. Setting a threshold is the task 
to replace one general description of a functioning or capability by a 
more specified one but also in terms of functionings and capabilities. 
For example, the threshold for being politically included and being 
able to participate can be specified in terms of being allowed to vote 
and to be voted into office. This threshold is nothing more than 
a specification that also uses the terminology and the underlying 
concept of functionings and capabilities. All thresholds discussed by 
capability theorists are, in fact, such specifications; in some empir-
ical research, this also means the translation of a functioning or 
capability into a functioning of having certain goods. In such cases, 
the capability approach in practice gets very close to resourcist 
approaches, since it uses resources or rather the functioning to have 
certain resources as thresholds and specifications. It is more accurate 
to think of setting a threshold that can be specified using different 
functionings and capabilities. The threshold for being educated can 
then, for example, be going to school for a certain number of years, 
learning certain skills and knowledge determined by experts, being 
allowed to pursue further education on the basis of educational 
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achievements, for instance, and being allowed to pursue certain 
occupations based on that education. All these different function-
ings and capabilities can be used together to specify what the general 
functioning and capability of education encompasses and thus 
which level children should reach. Such specifications are necessary 
to put justice to work in policies. To state that each and every child is 
entitled to be educated is a phrase that might read well in a constitu-
tion, but it is not possible to evaluate the success of a certain policy 
or to criticize a state for failing its children on the basis of such a 
general statement. One has to know what it means to be educated 
and what the thresholds are. Here again, it is clear why the concepts 
of well-being and well-becoming are more suited for the task than 
the concept of dignity – a failure to educate all or some the children 
in a state can violate their well-being and in particular their well-
becoming without being a violation of their dignity. 
 What becomes clear when setting a threshold in this way is that 
another distinction gets blurry; namely, that between function-
ings and capabilities, on the one hand, and the conversion factors 
needed to achieve them, on the other hand. In the case of educa-
tion, for example, it is very plausible to assume that compulsory 
schooling for a certain number of years is a conversion factor for 
being educated and not the functioning itself. Nussbaum seems to 
understand it in such a way herself, as she writes that it is up to 
debate whether compulsory education should last for twelve years, 
claiming that under the given circumstances, nine years of schooling 
is not enough. In our view, this reflects pragmatic issues and the fact 
that many conversion factors have some value in themselves and 
are not to be used only instrumentally. To finish school is important 
because it implies that the children have gained certain knowledge 
and skills and because the official degree itself is of value in the labor 
market or in the pursuit of higher education. For pragmatic reasons, 
it is sometimes easier to determine conversion factors, which, again, 
are often resources. In regard to health, for instance, most empirical 
research uses thresholds like a child receiving certain vaccinations, 
which is surely not a specification of health itself but a means to 
achieve and sustain health. It is simply easier to measure than health 
itself, and it is also easier to design a policy based on the claim that 
each and every child should get certain vaccinations. 
 One more thing is extremely important: If setting a threshold always 
implies specifying a general functioning or capability into a set of more 
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concrete functionings and capabilities, then this also implies at least 
three more important insights. First, not each and every child will be 
able to reach these thresholds. If we take education as an example, it is 
likely that we can grant each and every child certain years of schooling 
and that we can help them to acquire some knowledge and skills as well, 
but we can never make sure that all children reach the same level in all 
skills and knowledge. This does not mean, however, that the threshold 
has to be a different one for children with or without disabilities, for 
example. If the threshold embraces that each and every child should 
acquire a certain level in reading, writing and mathematics, including 
a certain set of knowledge about a range of topics, then this threshold 
will not be reached by many children with cognitive disabilities. This 
does not imply that we should lower the threshold for children with 
disabilities, but it rather signals that justice is limited with respect to 
tragic differences between humans we cannot alter – an argument that 
Nussbaum has developed in more detail (Nussbaum 2006). Second, it 
is evident that thresholds have to be sensitive to subjects and, to some 
extent, to the contexts they are applied to, as well. We have just denied 
that thresholds should be different for children with severe disabil-
ities and for those without, but it is still important to have different 
thresholds for different age groups based on the general level of compe-
tence and skills. Hence, the thresholds should allow us to monitor the 
development of the child adequately. Consider health: Pediatrics need 
to define what can be considered a normal development and what are 
distortions that need to be treated, a major health issue for young chil-
dren (Gardner 2015). If there is one general threshold for all children, 
such development issues cannot be detected because it is unclear which 
level of development should be reached at the age of two and which at 
the age of eight. The health threshold must be, on the contrary, set and 
specified in a way that is sensitive to what level a child should reach at 
what age (with certain room for individuality for sure). Otherwise, the 
threshold cannot be used in any meaningful way in the design of health 
policies. Such issues of setting adequate thresholds are certainly a task 
for which philosophers without an extra expertise are not suited; what 
we can do is emphasize that such tasks are essential and, at the same 
time, intertwined with normative and political issues. A third insight is 
that the capability approach suggests a step-by-step procedure for social 
justice assessments: in a first step, general functionings and capabilities 
have to be selected, and in the next step, they have to be specified, 
choosing adequate thresholds that then allow the implementation and 
evaluation of concrete policies. It is possible to evaluate certain living 
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conditions of children as unjust solely on the basis of this second step, 
since the standard of evaluation and the respective benchmark would be 
otherwise too blurry. This also gives a first methodological answer to the 
question that Nussbaum leaves open; namely, how to choose thresholds 
in particular contexts. 
 We also want to combine the sufficiency rule with a priority view in (5) 
regard to children in general and, in particular, in relation to child 
poverty. In a joint article with Rosalind Dixon, Martha Nussbaum 
discusses two reasons for such a priority view in respect to all chil-
dren (Dixon and Nussbaum 2012): cost-efficacy and vulnerability. 
By vulnerability they refer to the dependency of children on adults, 
and by cost-efficacy they mean that investing in children saves huge 
costs the state would have to invest in adults; for example, a vaccin-
ation that costs only a few cents can prevent the development of a 
disease that demands hundreds of thousands of dollars to be treated. 
The vulnerability of children, which we already discussed in length, 
implies that the state has the responsibility to step in if parents or 
other caregivers cannot provide for children because they cannot 
do it for themselves. Cost efficacy, Nussbaum argues, is also relevant 
in regard to fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages. The 
capability approach demands that each and every human is entitled 
to develop and realize certain important functionings (in the case 
of young children) and capabilities (in the case of adolescents and 
adults) and to invest in a fertile functioning that helps to do what 
can save huge costs later on. The same is true for corrosive disad-
vantages, which undermine the development and achievement of 
these important functionings and capabilities. Nussbaum and Dixon 
cite nutrition, children’s health and education as examples of such 
an investment in fertile functionings (or to avoid corrosive disad-
vantages), which should be prioritized by the state. That provides 
a good reason to tackle child poverty with a high priority. We want 
to move from the idea of a priority view toward children in general 
to the idea of prioritizing certain functionings and capabilities on 
the same grounds, or, to put it differently, of prioritizing the allevi-
ation of particular injustices. Such a prioritizing has three elements: 
it asks how important a certain functioning or capability is; how 
severe and widespread its deprivation is; and how it can be over-
come and what means are needed to secure justice in relation to that 
dimension. As we will show over the course of the next chapters, 
child poverty fulfills these three criteria (it affects functionings and 
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capabilities with a high priority, is widespread and can be overcome 
without unfeasible efforts) and hence should be tackled with a very 
high priority. This view is compatible with the idea of a moderate-
sufficiency view that was developed by Richard Arneson (Arneson 
2006). This view implies (a) prioritizing the gains in well-being of 
those who are below the threshold, (b) that those who are further 
below the threshold are to be prioritized and (c) that losses or gains 
in well-being above the threshold are important but that losses or 
gains below the threshold are to be prioritized. For children living in 
poverty, this has four implications worth stressing: First, children in 
poverty should be prioritized over children not in poverty, and the 
state or other agents of justice should provide them with the conver-
sion factors they need, giving them priority over those that children 
need to achieve well-being higher than the threshold. For example, 
if the state can either make some elite universities better or remake 
the education system so as to enable poor, disadvantaged children to 
reach a level of educational sufficiency (in welfare states this could 
mean producing more or less equally educated children after the 
designated years of compulsory schooling), the state should priori-
tize the latter. Second, the moderate sufficiency view also implies 
that children are to be prioritized over adults due to the long-lasting 
consequences of injustices suffered during childhood. For this argu-
ment it is necessary to include a temporal dimension in the concept 
of well-being. The gains in well-being for children will be higher than 
the gains of older adults because the children will live longer. Also 
the losses below the threshold are more likely to be higher if chil-
dren are not prioritized. As we will argue in the next chapter in more 
detail, poverty during childhood is very likely to heavily affect the 
whole life course in a negative way; if sufficiency is concerned with 
securing a certain level of well-being, not at a single point in time but 
over the life course, then it has to give priority to dealing with injus-
tices that have longer-lasting effects on well-being. A third conclu-
sion based on the priority view is important for global justice, but we 
want to mention it here also: severe child poverty in poorer coun-
tries should be tackled with a higher priority than less severe child 
poverty in welfare states, but not primarily at the expense of the chil-
dren in poverty in welfare states but – if any expense is necessary at 
all – at the expense of adults who have a high well-being above the 
threshold. This follows from the rule to prioritize more severe child 
poverty over less severe and to prioritize children before adults. 
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 These five points illustrate what justice for children in rich countries 
demands. We will not be able to set a specific threshold for all the 
important functionings and capabilities that matter for the well-being 
and well-becoming of children, but the thin concept employed by us 
revolves around giving all children equal opportunity to later well-being 
and making sure that they reach the highest level of well-being possible 
given the state’s level of development. In modern welfare states, we have 
seen unprecedented progress over the last 150 years, partly with severely 
damaging side effects (climate change and resource exploitation) and at 
the cost of other countries. These issues should not be downplayed, and 
global justice should indeed be concerned with them and what conse-
quences they should have for the design of justice in rich countries. It is 
perhaps necessary to adjust some dimensions of well-being, fundamen-
tally rethinking the current consumerist orientation that requires ever 
more products at a cheaper price. In general, we assume that the func-
tionings and capabilities we presented as important will hold even if the 
thresholds within them, hence the specified functionings and capabil-
ities into which we translate them in a specific context, should vary; 
we certainly allow for the possibility that due to the demands of global 
justice, thresholds will have to decrease in rich countries in order to 
increase around the globe. Unfortunately, dealing with real-life justice 
and problems encountered along the way is sometimes messy and blurry 
(this is an accusation Nussbaum has often had to face). For our case, the 
case of child poverty in modern welfare states, we argue that we cannot 
come up with a definite list or definite thresholds for the items on that 
list, but this is not needed in order to fulfill an important philosophical 
duty; namely, to criticize this injustice. We will discuss this final point 
before moving on to examine child poverty and its effects on the well-
being and well-becoming of children. 
 1.4 Conclusions 
 How can we criticize any injustice based on the concept of justice we 
have outlined so far? We have a preliminary list of functionings and 
capabilities and an underdetermined distributional rule for specifying 
the thresholds children are entitled to a as a matter of justice. This rule 
is underdetermined because the setting of thresholds of functionings 
and capabilities demands not only a high amount of interdisciplinary 
knowledge and expertise but the in-depth examination of particular 
issues and contexts; both aspects are highly complex, and we will not 
be able to sufficiently deal with them in this book. One could assume 
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that, with these tools, we are not very well equipped to examine child 
poverty and to criticize it as unjust, an objection we would like to 
counter on four grounds, which get support from other applications of 
the capability approach for different purposes, for example, the one by 
Robeyns mentioned above (Robeyns 2003): Firstly, in order to criticize 
an injustice, we do not need a fully comprehensive concept of justice 
with a definite list and fully specified thresholds. Knowing that some 
functionings and capabilities are of high value for children is enough to 
judge it as unjust if they fall short of them for arbitrary and changeable 
reasons. Hence, a critique of child poverty can already start and be of 
value if it can be shown that child poverty interferes with the entitle-
ments of the affected children to even just one important functioning 
or capability. Furthermore, it is enough to argue that children fall short 
either in one or more functionings or capabilities that matter for their 
well-being as children or in those that matter for their well-becoming 
and well-being as adults. Child poverty or any other injustice is unjust 
as soon as it interferes with either well-being or well-becoming, and it 
does not have to affect both, although the case is stronger if it does. In 
fact, we will argue that child poverty is a corrosive disadvantage because 
it usually deprives children not only of important elements of their well-
being but also of their well-becoming. 
 Secondly, thresholds can already be applied for criticizing child 
poverty if they are only partially specified. We have argued that setting 
a threshold in a dimension means to determine functionings or capabil-
ities on a less general level. How concrete this description must be 
depends, as Robeyns argued, on the task at hand. For our purposes, we 
do not think that it is useful to examine, for example, a particular part of 
the education system in a particular country, say the primary school in 
the United Kingdom. We are more concerned with the injustice of child 
poverty on a more general level that spans across all modern welfare 
states and abstracts from the many differences that clearly exist between 
these countries. For that general level, we do not need to specify the 
functionings and capabilities we will use on a highly detailed level, 
acknowledging that they cannot cover all important aspects. As we 
will show in the next chapter, these thresholds already serve to detect 
important violations of justice. 
 Finally, the specification of a threshold is relative to what is possible 
in a given country. In the next chapter, we will use a negative approach 
and concern ourselves with how child poverty affects the well-being 
and well-becoming of children in regard to important functionings and 
capabilities, using as a benchmark how they fare in comparison with 
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other nonpoor children in that country. It is possible, although not 
plausible, that we miss an important aspect of injustice by this approach, 
because it could be the case that all children, poor and nonpoor, are 
below the threshold of what is possible and hence live in injustice. In 
order to determine that, we would need a different approach than the 
one we use and to pursue another inquiry. For our goal of criticizing 
child poverty, we are content with showing that it fulfills the criteria 
of not bringing these children up to the threshold that is possible in 
that state, and that level is well displayed by the fact that the majority 
of children reach it. It is hence for arbitrary reasons, namely for being 
poor, that some children do not reach that threshold in some important 
functionings and capabilities, which qualifies as unjust. The goal of the 
next chapter will be to build that case based on a close examination 
of empirical knowledge regarding three functionings: health, education 
and social inclusion. This empirical work does not show us that these 
three are so important that each and every child is entitled to reach a 
sufficient level of them; this work was done in this chapter. We will 
simply show that under the assumption that these three, health, educa-
tion and social inclusion, are relevant for justice, empirical research 
indicates that child poverty is unjust – both in relation to the well-being 
and the well-becoming of children. 
 The fourth ground is that we are concerned with a group-based 
injustice when we criticize child poverty. We will make clear in the next 
chapter that we are not claiming that each and every child in poverty 
suffers from the deprivations we examine. Rather, we are concerned with 
these children as a particular social group in which many individuals 
are suffering from deprivations that can be traced back to their shared 
feature, namely being poor, which they cannot be held responsible for 
and cannot change themselves. Robeyns has criticized gender inequal-
ities in many functionings because they cannot be plausibly attributed 
to different preferences (Robeyns 2003). For children this is even more 
obvious: poor children seldom wish to be in ill health or less educated, 
and more strikingly, it is certain that they lack a capacity to realize a 
preference for good health or education unless other persons and insti-
tutions provide them with care and other conversion factors. 
 Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view 
a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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 The Injustice of Child Poverty 
 In the previous chapter, we sketched a theory of social justice for children 
based within the capability approach. We argued that, as a matter of social 
justice, each and every child is entitled to reach a minimum threshold of 
certain important functionings and capabilities, which are essential to her 
well-being and well-becoming. Furthermore, we have suggested that in the 
case of children, a focus on achieved functionings is often more adequate 
from a social justice perspective than a focus on capabilities. However, this 
assumption has to be understood in relation to the age and competence 
of the child, respecting her agency from an early age on. As children move 
through childhood, as they mature and develop, choice and autonomy 
become more and more important, and social justice reflects this by 
shifting its focus from achieved functionings to capabilities. 
 Our aim in this chapter is to analyze the detrimental effects of child 
poverty on some important functionings (and capabilities for older and 
more competent children). On the one hand, we will use the concept 
of ill-being, which we define as the complete lack of achievement or 
insufficient achievement of at least one functioning that is essential 
to the well-being of children. On the other hand, we will describe the 
injustice of child poverty by referring to ill-becoming, which means that 
child poverty hinders the sufficient achievement of at least one of the 
important capabilities that define adult well-being. This means that we 
have two separate arguments to justify why child poverty is unjust: (a) it 
violates the justified claims of children to well-being and (b) it violates 
the justified claims of children to well-becoming. Even if we claim that 
the injustice of child poverty is proven sufficiently as far as it affects one 
important functioning or capability, we will show that, in fact, child 
poverty is best understood as having multiple and interrelated effects. 
 This chapter explores the ill-being and ill-becoming of child poverty in 
regard to physical and mental health, social inclusion and education. It 
OPEN
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will show that all these functionings can reasonably be taken for evalu-
ations regarding social justice since they fulfill the criteria necessary for 
such an endeavor, as developed in Chapter 1. With our focus on these 
functionings, we claim neither that they are more important than others 
nor that child poverty affects them alone nor even that child poverty 
affects them primarily. On the contrary, our choice is a pragmatic one, and 
we hope to find broad agreement that these functionings are suitable for 
an examination of the injustices related to child poverty. We do not have a 
definite list; the one we presented and discussed in the previous chapter is 
just a first suggestion and an example of how such a list can be developed; 
since we claim that the injustice of child poverty is sufficiently shown if 
one important functioning cannot be achieved, it is also not necessary 
to provide a fully comprehensive examination of child poverty and its 
effects on all functionings to which children are entitled as a matter of 
justice. Nonetheless health, inclusion and education are all part of the list 
of Biggeri and his colleagues, and they are also included in many other 
lists of functionings and capabilities, for example, the ones of Nussbaum 
and Robeyns, as well as other conceptualizations of well-being of children 
(Amerijckx and Humblet 2014). Furthermore, they are relevant for both 
children and adults. They are not ‘intrinsic goods of childhood’ that would 
be of value only to children, but their particular form and the thresholds 
that should be used differ between children and adults. To be able to read 
and write sufficiently will be a good threshold for a child, but if an adult 
only reaches the same level of education, she will certainly be disadvan-
taged in many other areas of her life. In particular, health and education 
are also good examples for evolving capabilities and fertile functionings, 
and their achievement is essential to a person’s future well-being in terms 
of functionings and capabilities. We will show that health (including 
both a physical and mental dimension), social inclusion and education 
are affected by child poverty in a way that the entitlement of children to 
well-being and well-becoming is violated. We will also show that these 
functionings are entangled and influence each other. For the most part 
our examination will be concerned with the functioning of these four and 
not the capability to be healthy, educated and included. We have argued 
at length why a focus on functionings is necessary in regard to children; 
another reason is the difficulty in measuring them in terms of capabilities. 
The studies we will present are all concerned with functionings and do not 
show if these children, also older ones, lack health, education or inclusion 
because of their own choices. Rather they show us the social determination 
of these functionings, which cannot be captured by referring to choice and 
autonomy, especially not for children and adolescents. 
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 Before we address these claims, we would like to note two things. First, 
our argument is not that each and every child affected by poverty expe-
riences it in the same way and suffers, for example, from ill health due to 
poverty or lacks education because of it. What we do claim instead is that 
in most – nearly all – cases, children living in poverty suffer from nega-
tive effects on at least one functioning they are entitled to as a matter of 
justice, and that this overwhelming majority is enough to justify evalu-
ating it as unjust. We are concerned that children living in poverty suffer 
disadvantages compared with nonpoor children, and for this inequality 
there is no sufficient justification. Children, poor or not poor, cannot 
choose their parents or where they grow up and live, and they cannot 
choose to realize health, education or inclusion or other functionings 
and capabilities without being supported by others. It is also not plaus-
ible to assume that poor parents would prefer their children to suffer 
from these deprivations if they could choose differently. Again, our 
approach claims that well-being and well-becoming can be defined to 
a large extent objectively, with the consequence that we evaluate child 
poverty in a first step regardless of how it is subjectively experienced by 
those children themselves. In a subsequent step, we will come back to 
that issue and show how such subjective evaluations and the articula-
tion of the subjective experiences of child poverty can further expand 
our critique. For the time being, we will focus on what can be said from 
a third-person standpoint using objective measures. 
 Second, we do not make strong claims about causal relations on child 
poverty and its connection to the functionings we explore in detail. We 
rely here on the available evidence brought forward by poverty research 
in other disciplines such as sociology, economics, psychology and medical 
research. For our claim, it is sufficient that poverty plays some substantial 
role in causing these deprivations regardless if other causes are also involved. 
Here, one can also point to the many studies confirming a relationship 
between poverty and child neglect as well as child abuse (Besharov and 
Laumann 1997; Gilbert et al. 2009), which obviously have very bad conse-
quences for the children affected. But also here the causal relationships 
are difficult to grasp, a fact that also poses a challenge to the important 
issue of identifying the most important agents of justice for children in 
poverty, a subject we will address in a later chapter. We do acknowledge 
that from a policy perspective, it is important to untangle these causal 
relations in order to prioritize the effort on those that have the most detri-
mental effects. We are confident that the literature we will discuss here 
points in the direction that child poverty is in fact an important cause for 
the suffering of children in many other dimensions as well. 
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 We are primarily interested in the injustice of child poverty, not in 
exactly how many children are affected by it or how best to count them. 
This implies necessarily that we are not much interested in how many 
children actually suffer the deprivation of one or more important func-
tionings – for example, health – due to their poverty. It is enough for 
our argument that more children in poverty suffer these deprivations 
than their nonpoor peers for the reason that they are poor. Even if just 
a few children live in poverty and hence do not get what they are enti-
tled to as a matter of justice, it is an injustice that deserves criticism and 
needs to be tackled. However, we still hold that it is valuable to take the 
breadth and depth of an injustice into account in order to prioritize it. 
We also acknowledge that it is possible to reach this same conclusion 
from many different perspectives; for example, on the basis of the costs 
that child poverty creates for society, which has been estimated in the 
USA to be as high as 500 billion dollars each year (Holzer et al. 2008). 
 2.1 Concepts and measures of child poverty 
 Before we examine the injustice of child poverty, we must discuss at least 
some aspects of the concept of poverty itself and present some data on 
how many children in welfare states are living in poverty. We do not 
and cannot aim to give a full overview of all the different debates in the 
different disciplines concerned with child poverty, but rather we aim to 
develop a basic understanding of the main aspects of child poverty. Because 
child poverty is mainly an issue of social sciences and not philosophy, we 
will need to focus on what is of significance for the purpose of our book 
and the following questions of social justice. Many questions that arise 
in poverty research are similar to those we discussed in regard to defining 
the functionings and capabilities that should be objects of justice. All 
approaches to child poverty need to define some goods, resources, activ-
ities or capabilities and functionings. They also need to define thresholds 
for these items, and then they need to determine who is counted: the 
individual child or the household. The last point is of particular import-
ance because children usually live with adults and are heavily dependent 
on them (and their resources), and so, attempting to reflect this fact, child 
poverty is often measured on the household level. Moreover, the most 
commonly used indicator for child poverty is still income, and because 
children themselves do not have any relevant income in modern welfare 
states due to their not working, child poverty is measured using the family 
or household income. Before sketching the relevant measures in the USA 
and the European Union (EU) and the concept of social exclusion, we 
wish to outline the concept of poverty in general. 
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 Poverty research has come to agree mostly that poverty has to be 
defined differently and measured according to the welfare and develop-
ment level of the state that is researched. For this reason, the distinction 
between absolute and relative poverty has been often used in order to 
mark that relative poverty reflects things that persons need in a particular 
society (to live a normal or decent live), while absolute poverty refers to 
minimum standards necessary to survive or under which life is at least 
severely impaired (Alcock 2006). This distinction is, indeed, of some use, 
but it is also one of the key features of the capability approach that the 
same amount of basic goods and resources can yield different outcomes 
in different environments and for different persons depending on their 
needs and capacities. This applies to both relative and absolute measures. 
And even if there is some consensus about the goods, activities or capabil-
ities and functionings that should be used to define relative and absolute 
poverty, the question of what thresholds for absolute and relative poverty 
should be set remains unanswered. We will see that in welfare states, 
setting the poverty line at 50 or 60 percent of the equivalent median 
income or understanding material deprivation as the enforced lack of 
two, three or four essential goods is often an arbitrary decision. 
 Another problematic issue in all poverty research in modern welfare 
states is whether thresholds are based on the median income or on 
deprivation measures defined according to what is seen as normal in 
a society: one criticism is that poverty is mixed with (mere) inequality 
and so thresholds are not able to capture poverty’s essence. For example, 
Amartya Sen has criticized Peter Townsend, stating that, according to his 
relative measure, in a society where everyone has two Cadillacs, those 
able to afford but one Cadillac would be counted as poor (Sen 1983). 
Sen considers this a dissolving of the concept of poverty, which should 
be kept to cover those cases where people are really suffering from the 
deprivation of basic goods or capabilities and functionings that can and 
need to be defined in an absolute way. We agree with Ruth Lister that 
much of the debate between Sen and Townsend was not fruitful, but 
its core is still a challenge for poverty research in welfare states and, 
indeed, any philosophical examination of poverty in rich and highly 
developed contexts (Lister 2004, ch. 1). Sen’s criticism has some merit 
and, if approved, would lead to acknowledging that child poverty in 
such an absolute sense is fortunately a rare thing in modern welfare 
states. Most children have at least some basic form of shelter, access to 
health care and nutrition and are protected from hunger. Opinions that 
relativize poverty as not being ‘real’ poverty are also not uncommon in 
the public and among poor people themselves (Beresford et al. 1999). 
Our answer to this challenge is twofold but in no way new. 
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 On the one hand, we stress that every definition of poverty is always 
dependent on a normative background theory about what is needed for a 
decent or minimum life, something we will never be able to capture from 
empirical research alone. It is obvious that all human beings have certain 
biological needs, but it is also obvious that these alone are not enough 
to determine poverty (in fact, the concept of poverty would more or less 
coincide with the concept of health as it is often understood). One is able 
to survive for a long time in pain and hunger and without shelter or any 
social relations; should we claim that such a life is not deemed a life in 
poverty, it would say a lot about the moral status of our world. As we said, 
relative measures are not simply arbitrary and not solely interested in 
inequality, either; they are based on some kind of reasoning about what 
is a decent or ‘normal’ life in a particular society or state. On the other 
hand, it is not an either-or situation. To care about relative poverty does 
not imply that one should not care about absolute poverty and vice versa. 
An interest in absolute poverty does not make relative poverty less severe 
for those who suffer from it, even if we do know that many more severe 
forms of poverty exist in this world. We do acknowledge that there are 
questions of priority, which are also relevant for global justice and policy 
decisions, but this does not mean that we should not care about relative 
poverty and that it is not necessary to research what kinds of hardship 
and poverty exist in affluent societies and modern welfare states. 
 With these thoughts in mind, we will now discuss the official poverty 
measures in the USA and in the European Union. We will see that the issues 
of definition, determining indicators and setting thresholds are present 
and that no measure is and maybe never will be perfect and able to provide 
us with all the information about the breadth and depth of poverty. 
 The poverty thresholds used by the US Census Bureau are money 
income thresholds based on the minimal cost of food needs and adjusted 
for family size and age (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 2014). It uses income 
before taxes; capital gains and noncash benefits (such as public housing, 
Medicaid and food stamps) are not included. The poverty thresholds were 
developed in 1963 and 1964 by Mollie Orshansky, using US Department 
of Agriculture food budgets designed for families under economic stress 
and data about what portion of a family’s income was spent on food 
(Fisher 2002). The thresholds are annually modified using the consumer 
price index, but they do not reflect the level of welfare or income in the 
USA. In that sense, the official poverty line in the USA is absolute. The 
relevant annual thresholds in 2013 were $11,888 for a single person and 
$16,057 for a household with one adult under sixty-five and one related 
child under eighteen (see Table 2.1 for all the thresholds for 2013). There 
is no distinct measure for children; child poverty rates are determined 
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by counting how many children live in poor households. The poverty 
thresholds do not account for the differences in housing and living costs 
between areas but are applied nationally. That is of importance because, 
with the exact same amount of money, a family in a cheaper area can 
be much better off than a family with more income but living in a more 
expensive area. 
 Based on this calculation, there were about 45.3 million poor people 
in the USA in 2013 – about 14.5 percent of the population. This is one 
of the highest numbers in the fifty years that poverty has been measured 
in the USA, although the situation stabilized after sharp increases in the 
years 2007 to 2011, and the poverty rate went down in 2013 for the first 
time since 2006. Young people and children are more affected by poverty 
(for details, see Table 2.2); the poverty rate for children under eighteen was 
19.9 percent (or 14.7 million children), while the poverty rate for people 
aged between eighteen and sixty-four was 13.6 percent and for persons older 
than sixty-five it was 9.5 percent. The poverty rate for children younger 
than six years old is even higher, reaching 22.2 percent (down from 25.3% 
in 2010), which accounts for 5.2 million young children living in poverty 
(Table 2.3). People living in institutional group quarters (such as prisons 
and nursing homes), college dormitories and military barracks and those 
without conventional housing (who are not in shelters) are not included 
in these numbers. Neither are unrelated children under the age of fifteen 
included, which means that children in foster care are not surveyed. 
 The European Union uses two different measures for poverty in 
general that also apply to children (Atkinson and Marlier 2010). On the 
one hand, it employs a relative at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is 
set at 60 percent of the equivalent median income in a country. This 
threshold is relative and changes according to the average income. As 
 Table 2.3  Poverty status of related children under 6 years of age in the USA 
Year Poor Percent
2013 5,231 22.2
2010 6,037 25.3
2005 4,784 20.0
2000 4,066 17.8
1995 5,670 23.7
1990 5,198 23.0
1980 3,986 20.3
1970 3,561 16.6
 Note: Numbers in thousands 
 Source: US Census Bureau, www.census.gov 
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a result, the poverty threshold for a single person living in Austria, for 
instance, has increased over the years from an annual income of €10,200 
in 2005 to €12,791 in 2011; for a household with two adults and two 
children under fourteen, the poverty threshold was an annual income 
of €22,681 in 2005 and €26,861 in 2011. In Greece, on the other hand, 
where the average income has decreased due to the economic crisis, the 
poverty line has decreased from an annual income of €7,178 in 2010 to 
€5,708 in 2012. If a household disposes of less income than that, all of its 
members are described as ‘at risk of poverty’. These poverty thresholds 
are also relative in another sense; since they are national poverty thresh-
olds benchmarked against the median income in a specific country, 
the at-risk-of-poverty thresholds are very different in each member 
state of the European Union. Just to give a few examples, for 2011 the 
at-risk-of poverty threshold was as high as €12,186 annual income in 
the Netherlands, while in Greece it was €6,591, in Bulgaria only €1,749 
and in Slovakia €3,784. This means that a person with €10,000 annual 
income living in Vienna (Austria) is counted as being at risk of poverty, 
but if this person moves a hundred kilometers to live in Slovakia, she is 
no longer counted as poor unless her disposable income has changed. 
Using such national poverty thresholds obviously has certain advan-
tages, because they are sensitive to the different income levels and to 
that extent also reflect differences in the living costs in the member 
states of the European Union. These different poverty thresholds also 
show the existing inequality in these dimensions. 
 On the other hand, the EU also measures poverty as material depriv-
ation by referring to a list of goods and services that are deemed essential. 
The background idea for such a list was developed by Peter Townsend, 
who argued that poverty is an issue of being unable to do and have what 
is normal or standard in a society (Townsend 1979). He claimed, however, 
that poverty is always context-sensitive: there is no useful measure that 
applies to all contexts. Still, he also insisted that poverty is not only about 
survival and basic goods or capabilities and functionings but also about 
doing and having what a given society considers standard. Although 
Townsend asserted that he wanted to separate poverty and inequality, 
he ended up, as can be seen, connecting them more closely. As we will 
discuss, material deprivation is also close to concepts of social exclusion, 
whose wider focus tries to capture the important dimensions of what it 
means to be part of a particular society (Nolan and Whelan 2010). 
 Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to 
be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of 
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diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and 
amenities which are customary, or are at least widely encouraged or 
approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are 
so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or 
family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, 
customs and activities. (Townsend 1979, 31) 
 The current list of goods and services used to measure material depriv-
ation in the EU is as follows: a household cannot afford to (1) pay its 
rent or utility bills, (2) keep its home adequately warm, (3) face unex-
pected expenses, (4) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second 
day, (5) enjoy a week’s holiday away from home once a year, (6) have 
a car, (7) have a washing machine, (8) have a color TV, (9) have a tele-
phone. A person is counted as being materially deprived if she lives in 
a household that, for financial reasons, cannot afford at least three of 
these nine items; a person who cannot afford four or more of the items 
is considered severely materially deprived. 
 Two things are important in order to understand the concept of material 
deprivation: the items on the list are determined by asking the popula-
tion whether they are, indeed, perceived as really necessary possessions 
(and using some statistics to validate them). The background idea is that 
every item should (a) reflect the lack of an ordinary or minimal living 
pattern common to a majority or large part of the population in the 
EU and most of its member states; (b) allow international comparisons 
(i.e., convey the same information value in the various countries and not 
relate specifically to a “national” context); (c) allow comparisons over 
time; and (d) be responsive to changes in the living standard of people 
(Fusco, Guio and Marlier 2013). These items are thus also context-sensi-
tive and relative and can and do change over time. Access to the Internet 
and having a PC are items that can be expected to be on that list soon. 
One of the proposals for a new material-deprivation measure is to have 
thirteen items on the list: five ‘personal’ items (things the person cannot 
afford but would like to have) and eight ‘household’ items (things the 
household cannot afford) (Guio, Gordon and Marlier 2012). Not being 
able to afford four of these renders one materially deprived. The five 
personal items are being able to replace worn-out clothes with new (not 
secondhand) ones; owning two pairs of properly fitting shoes, including 
a pair of all-weather shoes; being able to spend a small amount of money 
each week on oneself without having to consult anyone; having regular 
leisure activities and getting together with friends or family for a drink 
or meal at least once a month. The eight household items are replacing 
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worn-out furniture; having a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian 
equivalent every second day; meeting unexpected expenses; taking a one-
week annual holiday away from home; avoiding arrears (mortgage or 
rent, utility bills, hire purchase / installment plan commitments); having 
a computer with an Internet connection; keeping the home adequately 
warm and having a car or van for private use. 
 The items on this list are not the result of any normative reasoning like, 
for example, the items on Nussbaum’s list, and they do not aim to reflect 
things people are or should be entitled to as a matter of social rights in 
the EU or its member states. Hence, this list also does not converge with 
any right to have items that would trigger any obligation on the side 
of the state, although it can be used to guide social policies. A second 
important thing to consider is that this list of items is the same for all 
member states of the EU and is therefore absolute in contrast to the 
at-risk-of-poverty lines, which are determined using national standards. 
So the monetary poverty line and the measure of material deprivation 
provide researchers and policy makers with different kinds of informa-
tion. A look at the respective statistics makes that point clear: while in 
2011 the monetary poverty rate was between 9.8 percent in the Czech 
Republic and 22.2 percent in Bulgaria, the rates of material deprivation 
differ much more. In Bulgaria, the country with the highest rate of 
materially deprived people in the EU, the rate was 60.1 percent in 2011, 
while in Sweden, the country with the lowest rate, it was 4.2 percent (for 
more details, see Table 2.4). It is also possible, as is done, for example, 
in the national statistics in Austria, to combine both measures and to 
differentiate four groups: those who are neither at risk of poverty nor 
materially deprived, those who fit onto either one category or the other 
and, the last and most disadvantaged group of people, those who live in 
households that are both at risk of poverty and materially deprived. The 
official statistics in Austria call the last group of people ‘manifest poor’. 
 In the European Union, official statistics measure child poverty by 
counting the children in households that are at risk of poverty or materi-
ally deprived as well. The at-risk-of-poverty rate is higher for children 
under eighteen than for the age group between eighteen and sixty-four 
(see Table 2.5). In 2011, 19.3 percent of the children (6.3 million children) 
under six years were living in at-risk-of-poverty households compared 
with 16 percent of persons between 18 and 64 (51 million persons). It is 
worth noting that the numbers differ significantly between the member 
states of the EU, and even rich countries have high numbers of child 
poverty; for example, Germany (15.6% of children under six at risk-of-
poverty) and Sweden (15.7% of children under six at risk of poverty). 
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 Table 2.4  Rate of material deprivation and at-risk-of poverty rate in Europe 
2005 2008 2011
Material 
deprivation
At-risk-of-
poverty
Material 
deprivation
At-risk-of-
poverty
Material 
Deprivation
At-risk-of-
poverty
EU (27 
countries)
20 16.4 17.5 16.5 18.4 16.9
New member 
states (12)
47.5 18.9 35.4 17.3 34.1 17.5
Euro area 
(18 
countries)
13.8 15.3 13.9 16.1 15.4 16.9
Belgium 13.3 14.8 11.6 14.7 12.9 15.3
Bulgaria : 14 55 21.4 60.1 22.2
Czech 
Republic
22.7 10.4 16.2 9 16.1 9.8
Denmark 7.6 11.8 5.4 11.8 6.9 13
Germany 11 12.2 13 15.2 12.4 15.8
Estonia 26.6 18.3 12.4 19.5 21.5 17.5
Ireland 11.2 19.7 13.6 15.5 22.7 15.2
Greece 26.3 19.6 21.8 20.1 28.4 21.4
Spain 11.9 20.1 10.8 20.8 13.2 22.2
France 13.2 13 13.1 12.5 12.4 14
Italy 14.3 18.9 16.1 18.7 22.3 19.6
Cyprus 31.2 16.1 24.9 15.9 29.8 14.8
Latvia 56.8 19.4 35.7 25.9 49 19
Lithuania 51.7 20.5 22.2 20 35.1 19.2
Luxembourg 3.9 13.7 3.5 13.4 4.7 13.6
Hungary 39.7 13.5 37.1 12.4 42.2 13.8
Malta 15.2 14.3 13.7 15.3 17.1 15.6
Netherlands 7.5 10.7 5.2 10.5 6.6 11
Austria 8.3 12.3 13.7 12.4 9.5 12.6
Poland 50.8 20.5 32.3 16.9 26.4 17.7
Portugal 21.2 19.4 23 18.5 20.9 18
Romania : : 50.3 23.4 47.7 22.2
Slovenia 14.7 12.2 16.9 12.3 17.2 13.6
Slovakia 42.6 13.3 27.8 10.9 22 13
Finland 10.8 11.7 9.1 13.6 8.4 13.7
Sweden 5.7 9.5 4.6 12.2 4.2 14
United 
Kingdom
12.5 19 11.3 18.7 13.3 16.2
 Source: Eurostat, www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
The measure of material deprivation (and severe material deprivation) 
is also interesting in this regard. In total, more than 3 million children 
under the age of six were living in severely deprived households in the 
EU in 2011, as were nearly 9.5 million children under eighteen and more 
than 28 million persons between the age of eighteen and  sixty-four 
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 Table 2.5  At-risk-of-poverty rate in Europe, by age 
under 
6
under 
18 18–64
under 
6
under 
18 18–64
under 
6
under 
18 18–64
Geo/time 2005 2008 2011
EU (27 
countries)
19.1 20.0 14.7 19.0 20.4 14.7 19.3 20.8 16.0
New member 
states (12)
25.4 26.4 17.6 20.1 23.1 15.4 20.7 24.0 16.5
Belgium 20.2 18.1 12.0 17.1 17.2 12.2 21.7 18.7 12.9
Bulgaria : 18 12 26.1 25.5 17.0 27.7 28.4 18.2
Czech 
Republic
17.6 17.6 9.4 11.3 13.2 8.3 12.5 15.2 9.1
Denmark 13.5 10.4 11.0 9.3 9.1 11.3 8.5 10.2 13.1
Germany 11.1 12.2 11.9 15.1 15.2 15.4 15.6 15.6 16.4
Estonia 23.3 21.3 16.8 13.0 17.1 15.0 14.7 19.5 18.0
Ireland 17.8 23.0 16.0 14.4 18.0 13.4 13.9 17.1 15.1
Greece 18.8 20.4 17.1 21.5 23.0 18.7 21.3 23.7 20.0
Spain 22.1 26.0 16.4 25.1 28.2 17.3 25.1 29.5 20.8
France 14.3 14.4 11.6 15.0 15.6 11.6 18.0 18.8 13.5
Italy 21.7 23.6 16.4 23.0 24.7 16.3 24.5 26.3 18.5
Cyprus 13.5 12.8 11.1 14.1 14.0 10.8 13.0 12.8 11.5
Latvia 19.6 22.0 18.2 21.5 23.6 19.4 20.4 24.7 20.2
Lithuania 24.1 27.2 19.0 19.3 22.8 16.8 18.5 25.2 20.2
Luxembourg 21.5 20.2 12.8 20.3 19.8 12.9 20.8 20.3 13.1
Hungary 19.6 19.9 13.2 19.5 19.7 12.0 21.2 23.0 13.6
Malta 14.5 17.6 11.4 18.3 20.4 12.0 18.6 23.0 13.1
Netherlands 14.4 15.3 10.2 12.7 12.9 9.9 14.7 15.5 10.5
Austria 14.7 14.9 11.1 14.5 14.9 10.9 15.9 15.4 11.0
Poland 27.5 29.3 20.4 19.6 22.4 16.3 19.7 22.0 17.1
Portugal 20.4 23.7 15.9 16.3 22.8 16.3 18.7 22.4 16.2
Romania : : : 26.3 32.9 20.0 28.2 32.9 21.0
Slovenia 11.5 12.1 10.4 10.4 11.6 10.5 14.7 14.7 11.7
Slovakia 15.7 18.9 12.7 17.8 16.7 9.5 21.1 21.2 12.4
Finland 11.9 10.0 10.5 13.3 12.0 11.8 13.3 11.8 12.8
Sweden 9.8 10.2 9.1 13.4 12.9 11.2 15.7 14.5 12.5
United 
Kingdom
25.3 22.9 16.2 24.0 24.0 14.7 18.1 18.0 14.1
 Source: Eurostat, www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
(see Table 2.6). While Denmark has very low rates (1.9% of children 
under six), other countries such as Bulgaria and Romania have rates of 
severe material deprivation of children as high as 40 percent. It cannot 
be said, though, that material deprivation of children is nonexistent in 
many rich countries of the EU: in Germany, more than 700,000 children 
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 Table 2.6  Number of people in severe material deprivation in Europe, by age (in 
thousands) 
under 
6
under 
18 18–64
under 
6
under 
18 18–64
under 
6
under 
18 18–64
Geo/time 2005 2008 2011
EU (27 
countries)
3,379 11,668 32,500 2,926 9,404 26,341 3,122 9,470 28,113
New member 
states (12)
1,814 6,800 19,941 1,230 4,348 12,968 1,195 4,025 12,384
Belgium 70 197 419 50 165 377 73 187 382
Bulgaria : : : 159 521 1,823 171 584 1,977
Czech 
Republic
65 293 744 41 156 447 48 149 405
Denmark 17 46 122 12 30 69 7 39 97
Germany 169 783 2,565 334 955 3,147 249 737 3,066
Estonia 9 35 98 4 13 38 5 22 80
Ireland 33 94 110 28 78 156 36 117 218
Greece 66 195 795 60 200 720 106 322 1,072
Spain 148 439 1,098 168 446 1,040 135 434 1,459
France 256 812 1,972 318 859 2,065 362 929 1,984
Italy 274 779 2,372 328 985 2,712 424 1,299 4,141
Cyprus 6 22 57 5 17 43 7 26 65
Latvia 39 163 529 22 76 231 37 116 410
Lithuania 63 245 661 31 83 244 23 96 346
Luxembourg 1 3 5 0 1 2 0 1 5
Hungary 150 536 1,434 145 417 1,145 157 536 1,501
Malta 2 6 13 1 5 11 2 6 18
Netherlands 48 126 250 25 82 161 27 104 293
Austria 18 58 162 44 118 346 33 86 210
Poland 692 2,709 8,216 341 1,305 4,317 310 934 3,165
Portugal 74 200 539 45 234 607 65 222 511
Romania : : : 446 1,613 4,180 398 1,426 3,944
Slovenia 3 15 65 4 19 90 6 20 82
Slovakia 65 261 768 31 122 399 30 110 389
Finland 11 42 132 11 34 121 10 35 116
Sweden 14 72 125 12 38 83 8 28 74
United 
Kingdom
367 1,022 1,892 259 831 1,767 390 906 2,099
 Source: Eurostat, www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
under the age of eighteen are severely deprived; in France, more than 
900,000. The numbers and rates for ‘normal’ material deprivation are 
even higher. 
 Besides measuring child poverty with the indicators used for the whole 
population, the EU has also started to develop child-specific measures, 
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adapting the material-deprivation index, and to define specific goods 
and services for children (Guio, Gordon and Marlier 2012). A final list 
of eighteen items was developed, composed of thirteen children’s items 
(also collected on the household level) and five household items. The 
children’s items are (1) some new (not secondhand) clothes; (2) two 
pairs of properly fitting shoes, including a pair of all-weather shoes; (3) 
fresh fruits and vegetables daily; (4) one meal with meat, chicken, fish or 
vegetarian equivalent daily; (5) books at home suitable for the children’s 
age; (6) outdoor leisure equipment; (7) indoor games; (8) a suitable place 
to do homework; (9) regular leisure activities (sports, youth organiza-
tions, etc.); (10) celebrations on special occasions; (11) possibility of 
inviting friends around to play and eat from time to time; (12) partici-
pation in school trips and school events that cost money; (13) one-week 
annual holiday away from home. The household items are (14) replace-
ment of worn-out furniture; (15) avoidance of arrears (mortgage or rent, 
utility bills, hire purchase / installment commitments); (16) a computer 
and an Internet connection (enforced lack; i.e., cannot afford but would 
like to have); (17) keeping the home adequately warm (enforced lack); 
(18) a car or van for private use (enforced lack). The EU does not use this 
list to actually measure child poverty, but it might do so in the future as 
the pressure to gather knowledge about child poverty rises. 
 A different approach is used by UNICEF, which also developed meas-
ures for children’s well-being in rich countries (UNICEF IRC 2013, 2012). 
UNICEF distinguishes the following six dimensions: material well-
being, health and safety, educational well-being, family and peer rela-
tionships, risky behaviors and subjective well-being. The indicators 
for material well-being were very close to the poverty measures used 
by the EU and reflected both income poverty and material deprivation. 
Income poverty was captured by the relative child poverty rate (percent 
of children living in households with equivalent incomes below 50% of 
national median) and the child poverty gap (distance between national 
poverty line and median incomes of households below poverty line); 
material deprivation was captured by using an index of child depriv-
ation (percent of children lacking specific items) and a family affluence 
scale (percent of children reporting low family affluence). The use of 
both income poverty and material deprivation is based on the insight 
that being income poor does not necessarily say much about the actual 
living conditions of a child because other factors are also relevant. The 
index of child deprivation used fourteen items, a child being deemed 
to be deprived if she lacks at least two of them: (1) three meals a day; 
(2) at least one meal a day with meat, chicken or fish (or vegetarian 
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equivalent); (3) fresh fruit and vegetables every day; (4) books suitable 
for the child’s age and knowledge level (not including schoolbooks); (5) 
outdoor leisure equipment (bicycle, roller skates, etc.); (6) regular leisure 
activities (swimming, playing an instrument, participating in youth 
organizations, etc.); (7) indoor games (at least one per child, including 
educational baby toys, building blocks, board games, computer games); 
(8) money to participate in school trips and events; (9) a quiet place 
with enough room and light to do homework; (10) an Internet connec-
tion; (11) some new clothes (i.e., not all secondhand); (12) two pairs 
of properly fitting shoes; (13) the opportunity, from time to time, to 
invite friends home to play and eat; (14) the opportunity to celebrate 
special occasions such as birthdays, name days, religious events, and the 
like. The second component of material deprivation was the affluent 
family scale, which was measured by the responses to four questions the 
children were asked: (1) Does your family own a car, van or truck? (2) 
During the past twelve months, how many times did you travel away 
on holiday with your family? (3) How many computers does your family 
own? (4) Do you have your own bedroom? The results for the children’s 
material well-being dimension reveal that the eastern European coun-
tries show the highest rates of both components of material deprivation, 
while the Scandinavian countries fare much better (for more details, see 
Table 2.7). The USA, Germany and Canada are found in the middle. 
Besides calculating the rankings of OECD countries with significant 
information in each dimension, UNICEF also calculated an overall score 
for each country that was not an aggregate of indicator scores per se. 
Rather, the overall score was an average of how each country ranked 
across all six dimensions. One interesting and maybe surprising result 
was that the USA was in the fourth last overall place and only Lithuania, 
Latvia and Romania had a worse overall score. The low ranking of the 
USA was also due to its having the second highest child poverty rate. 
 Besides these large-scale surveys, there are uncountable smaller studies 
that use different approaches, methods and indicators we cannot 
present here. It is important to note, though, that there is a growing 
consensus about the fact that child poverty is a multidimensional 
phenomenon that cannot be adequately captured by a single measure 
alone or smaller studies, as the EU and UNICEF also acknowledge. This 
leads to the extended lists that combine monetary thresholds with 
deprivation indicators. While this is certainly progress, some researchers 
call for even more multidimensionality and demand the inclusion of 
health, education and emotional well-being (Minujin et al. 2006). We 
already mentioned that more differentiation regarding the dimension 
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 Table 2.7  Child well-being in rich countries 
Overall 
well-being 
(average 
rank)
Material 
well-being
Health 
and 
safety Education
Behaviors 
and 
risks
Housing 
and 
environment
1 Netherlands 2.4 1 5 1 1 4
2 Norway 4.6 3 7 6 4 3
3 Iceland 5 4 1 10 3 7
4 Finland 5.4 2 3 4 12 6
5 Sweden 6.2 5 2 11 5 8
6 Germany 9 11 12 3 6 13
7 Luxembourg 9.2 6 4 22 9 5
8 Switzerland 9.6 9 11 16 11 1
9 Belgium 11.2 13 13 2 14 14
10 Ireland 11.6 17 15 17 7 2
11 Denmark 11.8 12 23 7 2 15
12 Slovenia 12 8 6 5 21 20
13 France 12.8 10 10 15 13 16
14 Czech Republic 15.2 16 8 12 22 18
15 Portugal 15.6 21 14 18 8 17
16 United Kingdom 15.8 14 16 24 15 10
17 Canada 16.6 15 27 14 16 11
18 Austria 17 7 26 23 17 12
19 Spain 17.6 24 9 26 20 9
20 Hungary 18.4 18 20 8 24 22
21 Poland 18.8 22 18 9 19 26
22 Italy 19.2 23 17 25 10 21
23 Estonia 20.8 19 22 13 26 24
23 Slovakia 20.8 25 21 21 18 19
25 Greece 23.4 20 19 28 25 25
26 USA 25.8 26 25 27 23 23
27 Lithuania 25.2 27 24 19 29 27
28 Latvia 26.4 28 28 20 28 28
29 Romania 28.6 29 29 29 27 29
 Source: UNICEF Office of Research (2013). ‘Child Well-Being in Rich Countries: A Comparative 
Overview’, Innocenti Report Card 11, UNICEF Office of Research, Florence. 
of space is needed. Calculations of relative income poverty will come 
to different results in different regions; housing costs, for example, are 
usually higher in urban regions, and even within them, at the neigh-
borhood level vast differences can exist. Another issue is the level of 
application of deprivation measures like the ones discussed. The know-
ledge one can extract for the EU is that deprivation is much higher in 
eastern member states than, say, in Germany and Austria, but what the 
data we presented does not show is that within these two countries, 
one can easily find significant differences between regions and neigh-
borhood. It is not a surprise that there are many regions in Germany 
where material deprivation among children is nearly nonexistent, while 
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in other regions it is a more prevalent issue. Besides space, the dimen-
sion of time needs to be acknowledged; how long a person is poor and 
during which phase in the life course, for example, during childhood, 
and whether poverty is a returning issue is highly relevant information. 
The dynamics of poverty are crucial and underexplored, which can also 
be attributed to the lack of data (Addison, Hulme and Kanbur 2009). 
Time is also relevant in the sense that it is valuable information to know 
if certain phases of life are particularly prone to poverty, as is the case for 
childhood. It is puzzling that members of society regularly deemed as in 
need and worthy of particular protection and support, called by politi-
cians ‘the future of a society’, are more often living in poverty. 
 Before examining the injustice of child poverty, we need to point out 
two further aspects in relation to the aims and scope of this chapter. Firstly, 
we will focus on child poverty and studies that examine it in welfare 
states such as the countries of the European Union, the USA and, in some 
cases, Canada and Australia. We will, however, exclude the poorer states 
of the EU, such as Bulgaria and Romania, from our examination. The 
main reason is that, although such countries are members of the EU and 
certainly higher developed than many other countries in this world, they 
are still not on par with the richer states in the EU or the USA. The data 
we presented before on the breadth and depth of child poverty in these 
countries shows that sufficiently. Evidence shows that in highly devel-
oped countries severe forms of child poverty also exist but fortunately 
on a smaller scale (Weinreb et al. 2002). Secondly, despite this focus, we 
are confident that our conclusions are applicable to many more coun-
tries and contexts of child poverty. It holds generally that child poverty 
negatively affects the functionings children can achieve and the capabil-
ities they can develop during childhood and in later life. This is in no 
way a problem exclusive to rich countries; in fact, evidence convincingly 
suggests that the problems are even greater and more severe in poorer 
countries in Europe and, indeed, everywhere else in the world. Still, child 
poverty in Romania and Bulgaria is less severe and widespread than it is in 
many African or Asian countries. It should be kept in mind that, using the 
monetary measure alone, the poor in richer states would be the middle 
class in others and among the affluent in many more. 
 2.2 The Ill-Being and Ill-Becoming of child poverty: 
physical and mental health 
 We have presented five criteria a functioning needs to fulfill in order to 
count as one children are entitled to it as a matter of justice: (a) it must 
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reflect a truly important dimension of children’s well-being or well-be-
coming (which means that it is important for the achievement of one 
or more other important capabilities as an adult); (b) its choice must be 
based on the best available (empirical) knowledge about children’s lives 
and development; (c) the functioning can be distributed in a meaningful 
way and can therefore be secured by the institutional design of a society; 
(d) it must be objectively determinable and not merely subjective; and 
(e) it must also take into account children’s own views. 
 We have also offered a sixth criterion that allows the selection of func-
tionings of particular importance because they are fertile and have positive 
effects on the development and achievement of other functionings and 
capabilities. For most of these criteria, there is only little dispute if they 
support physical and mental health, which is certainly an important part 
of children’s well-being and well-becoming. The central role that health 
plays is based on broad scientific knowledge. Furthermore, children them-
selves value their own health, although this is dependent on a certain 
level of maturity and competence. Health, at least many aspects of it, is 
objectively measurable, both physical and mental health. The claim that 
health, perhaps especially mental health, is something that can be secured 
for everyone on the basis of the institutional design of a society is, on 
the other hand, more problematic. Health is surely influenced by other 
factors as well, such as genes and the natural environment, which are to a 
lesser extent alterable; likewise, temporary phases of ill health are a normal 
aspect of life. There will always be ill health, early death and suffering 
that cannot be prevented; the argument here is not that health is totally 
controllable, like, say, the distribution of a specific toy, but that it is, to a 
sufficient extent, socially determined (Marmot and Wilkinson 2003). 
 Different pathways for this social determination have been discussed, 
and a recent review stressed the connection between education and 
health, working conditions and health, neighborhood conditions and 
health, income and wealth and health, and race and health (Braveman, 
Egerter and Williams 2011). All of these influence health to a great 
extent and are the subject of public concern, especially as they are alter-
able. Evidence now points in the direction that child poverty is one 
of the social factors that severely influences health. Thus, even if, on 
the individual level, there are many cases in which society cannot do 
much to secure health for children or secure that they become healthy 
adults, the influence of social factors on health is still large enough to 
claim that they should be changed accordingly and that ill health due 
to unnecessary factors is unjust. Again, for older children we have to 
add that they can – at least to some extent – choose not to be healthy 
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or risk their health because they prefer to realize other options, such 
as smoking or engaging in risky sports. It seems also clear that health 
counts as valuable for the current well-being during childhood as well 
as the well-being as an adult. It is therefore not a child-specific function 
in the sense that adults are not entitled to it as a matter of justice – at 
least in the form of having the real freedom to be healthy. In any case, 
concerning younger children, it is clear that they should actually be 
healthy and that giving them the choice to decide for themselves is not 
a realistic and morally permissible option here. 
 Moreover, health is a fertile functioning and ill health, a corrosive 
disadvantage. Some reasons for this claim are closely connected to the 
research about the relation between poverty and health, which we will 
discuss later, but in general it is reasonable to view health as fertile 
because it influences nearly all other functionings and capabilities chil-
dren can reach. Sridhar Venkatapuram has offered a view of health from 
a capability perspective that is best understood as the ability to achieve 
valuable functionings and capabilities (Venkatapuram 2013, 2011). 
Health functions here as a kind of supercapability from which all other 
capabilities and functionings are more or less dependent. Viewed from 
the perspective of ill health, this claim can be interpreted as follows: in 
the most severe form of ill health, which leads to death, it is obvious 
that no other functionings or capabilities can be achieved and that it 
is corrosive in an absolute sense. However, we do not want or need to 
defend such a strong claim here; indeed we are fine with the notion of 
health as an important and fertile functioning that positively influences 
the achievement of other functionings and capabilities both during 
childhood and adulthood. For example, studies have shown that health 
in childhood influences the socioeconomic status in later life (Palloni 
2006). WHO, too, endorses such an understanding in its definition of 
health as a resource for everyday life (Williamson and Carr 2009), and 
it should be obvious that the health status of a child profoundly influ-
ences central aspects of her life, such as going to school and learning and 
playing and meeting friends. The lack of health per se is not automatic-
ally a violation of social justice, but if it is the result of preventable and 
changeable social causes, this aspect becomes effective. At this point we 
make the connection between child poverty, health and social justice. 
 Health is also corrosive in the sense that it affects the family members, 
especially the close caregivers of the child who is not healthy. We cannot 
explore this aspect in any detail, but we would like to at least mention 
that being healthy or being ill goes beyond the individual person in such 
a condition. Especially forms of chronic ill health as well as disabilities 
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demand much from caregivers, even preventing them from achieving 
some important functionings and capabilities themselves. The intersec-
tion between poverty and health is also clear here: if a family or parents 
do not have the resources to pay for professional help and care, they 
are dependent on the state and a health care system to support them. 
Otherwise, the chronic illness of a child can easily become a corrosive 
disadvantage for the parents and other family members. 
 Two more things have to be added here. The first one is related to 
defining health. We do not have a comprehensive definition, being 
aware of the difficulties to define health and its counterpart ill health or 
disease; debates in the literature do not yield, as far as we can see, to one 
unanimous conclusion (Venkatapuram 2013; Ereshefsky 2009). We are, 
however, convinced that we do not need such a definition for our argu-
ment. We will present studies that show how child poverty affects various 
indicators of health in terms of diseases and maladies that children are 
more likely to suffer from if they are poor. We will also show that child-
hood poverty leads to ill health in later life and a higher morbidity and 
mortality. These arguments do not need to rest on a definite conception 
of health but make use of the very plausible assumption that to suffer 
from certain diseases is a strong indicator of ill health. Furthermore, we 
want to stress again that the threshold against which we measure the 
effect of child poverty on the functioning of health as well as the other 
functionings we analyze are concerned with the inequality between poor 
and nonpoor children on the population level. It is unjust if children 
who are poor are more likely to be ill, even though certainly not all poor 
children are ill because of their poverty and ill health is something that 
is also common among nonpoor children. The insights we will present 
point in the direction that child poverty affects the health of many of 
these children and more so compared with their nonpoor peers, and 
this comparison shows that being healthy or having ill health is not 
an individual issue alone but rather a social one. The fact that nonpoor 
children have in general better health also shows that the state is in fact 
in a position to do better for those children in poverty. 
 The second one is that we choose to distinguish between physical and 
mental health because both are indeed equally important, but the latter 
is often neglected. In most examinations on why health is an issue of 
(social or global) justice, particularly in regard to the relation of poverty 
and health, the clear focus lies on physical health and on such issues 
as vaccinations and access to health care, sanitation and clean water in 
order to prevent severe illnesses that still kill millions of people, adults 
and children alike. 
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 We understand the reason for this focus – physical health is without 
any doubt a more severe and pressing problem in many places in this 
world, and it usually leads in a more direct or faster way to death than 
mental illness. On a global scale, the priority on physical health can 
therefore be justified in the context of social justice in modern societies, 
which have already reached a higher level of welfare and health even 
for many children in poverty and where child mortality from prevent-
able illnesses is fortunately rather rare. One can and should not dismiss 
mental health but rather acknowledge that children have a right to be 
physically and mentally healthy. Mental health issues are on the rise and 
are a significant burden for the individual who suffers from a mental 
health problem and her family, and on the epidemiological level, it is 
a great challenge for health care systems, the economy and the state 
(Prince et al. 2007; Wittchen et al. 2011). 
 The complex nature of mental health presents a further challenge: it is 
far less explored than physical health. In some dimensions, there is a clear 
and close connection between mental health and subjective well-being 
as well as happiness, which seems to stand in the way of making mental 
health an issue of justice in the same way as physical health (Cabezas, 
Graf and Schweiger 2014). We are aware of these issues as well as of the 
fact that mental health cannot be fully explored without leaving room 
for subjective evaluations and how children actually feel; we will explore 
some related issues in more detail when we come to see how children 
experience poverty. First, however, we will stick to the ‘hard’ medical 
and psychological evidence that already reveals important aspects of the 
relationship between child poverty and mental ill health. 
 Having these considerations in mind, what can we say about the effect 
poverty has on children’s health – as children and as the adults they will 
become? The medical evidence is clear: poverty during childhood affects 
many different aspects of the health of children, and it has long-ranging 
effects on adult health as well. 
 Let us elaborate this point by first looking at mental health. Poverty 
during childhood has been found to precede anxiety disorders, depres-
sion, post-traumatic stress disorder and academic underachievement 
(Nikulina, Widom and Czaja 2010; Santiago, Wadsworth and Stump 
2011); it has been shown to be detrimental to cognitive outcomes and 
to affect brain development, leading to behavioral disorders as well (Kim 
et al. 2013; Welsh et al. 2010). The reasons for these influences are still 
disputed, and many mediating mechanisms have been discussed. A recent 
overview of the evidence regarding the influence of childhood poverty 
on mental, emotional and behavioral health in the USA has proposed 
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the distinction between individual, relational and institutional factors 
(Yoshikawa, Aber and Beardslee 2012). Important factors found include 
the influence of family poverty on parenting stress, depressed parental 
mood, marital conflict and household violence; all of these correlate 
with neglect and reduced parent investment in the child. The lack of 
cognitively stimulating materials and experiences appears to contribute 
in particular to differences in cognitive development, which also affects 
the benefit children can obtain from schooling and further education. 
Neighborhood poverty, again, is related to an insecure environment, the 
quality of schooling and the availability of youth programs; exposure 
to these stressors may overwhelm children and influence their neural 
development. Studies that observed the influence of childhood poverty 
on adult mental health also found it to be correlated to a range of 
mental health problems and psychological disorders (Evans and Cassells 
2014; Gilman et al. 2002; Najman et al. 2010). This evidence on the ill-
being and ill-becoming due to child poverty makes clear that poverty 
heightens the risk of growing up in an adverse environment but that 
lack of money alone is not the cause for mental ill health. Rather, we 
must look at what is often caused by the combination of a low socio-
economic status and the lack of a comprehensive welfare system; namely, 
stress and insecurity, which affect families and children living in these 
circumstances in such a negative way. Evidence also shows that children 
in low socioeconomic level families show self-harming behavior such 
as overdose and self-injury, which, in turn, shows that poverty takes 
a high toll on the minds of children and adolescents (Ayton, Rasool 
and Cottrell 2003). While it is true that children in rich families might 
also develop mental ill health due to all the above-mentioned reasons, 
living in poverty makes it much more likely. Likewise, it is a problem of 
justice because poverty can be prevented. The effects of poverty during 
pregnancy have also been researched – it can act as a chronic stressor, 
and high levels of prenatal stress are suspected of negatively affecting 
the brain development of the fetus, which in turn leads to lower general 
intellectual and language abilities in toddlers (Laplante et al. 2004). 
 When it comes to physical health, studies have demonstrated many 
negative influences of child poverty on both children and adults: The 
low socioeconomic status of the mother is correlated with lower birth 
weight and preterm birth, both significant health risks for the infant 
(Dunkel Schetter and Lobel 2011). A recent study found that the effects 
of childhood poverty are especially predictive of cardiovascular disease 
and type II diabetes and that they appear in large part to be biologic-
ally embedded, such that later improved life circumstances have only a 
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modest ameliorative effect (Raphael 2011). Another study followed 9,760 
participants biennially from 1992 through 2006. Its results suggest that 
early-life socioeconomic experiences directly influence adult chronic 
disease outcomes for coronary heart disease (CHD), diabetes and stroke 
(Nandi et al. 2012). Asthma, too, seems to be influenced by the socio-
economic status of the child (Williams, Sternthal and Wright 2009). 
Due to these health risks, people growing up in poverty have a higher 
mortality rate and die younger than their nonpoor peers (Galobardes, 
Lynch and Smith 2004); child mortality itself is linked to socioeconomic 
position (Pritchard and Williams 2011). The pathways are, again, multi-
factorial (Melchior et al. 2007): the environment is linked to a range 
of influencing factors, for example, lack of heating and poor ventila-
tion; these can trigger processes called biological embedding, by which 
experiences during early childhood alter the neurological and physical 
development (Hertzman and Boyce 2010; Hertzman et al. 2010). Risky 
behaviors that become chronic, possibly influencing adult health, are 
another mediating mechanism. Moreover, children who grow up poor 
often stay poor as adults, and this adulthood poverty is a major influ-
ence on adult health and mortality. In a recent review Dennis Raphael 
described how childhood poverty has cumulative effects on health and 
translates into adulthood:
 Cumulative effects are illustrated by findings that the longer children 
live under conditions of material and social deprivation, the more 
likely they are to show adverse health and developmental outcomes. 
These can be cognitive deficits that contribute to lack of school readi-
ness for children (e.g., physical health and well-being, social compe-
tence, emotional maturity, language and cognitive development, 
and communication skills and general knowledge) upon entering 
the education system. Cumulative adverse experiences during early 
childhood predispose children towards learned helplessness where 
children feel unable to act effectively upon their world. Such help-
lessness is a strong determinant of health in general and a precursor 
of adopting health threatening behaviours. (Raphael 2011, 25) 
 It is not always possible to disentangle these influences, which can lead 
to vicious circles over the life course. Child poverty leads to ill health, 
and both can contribute to lower educational outcomes; lower educa-
tional outcomes, in turn, lead to a lower socioeconomic position in 
later life, which, again, is related to several factors that can contribute 
to ill health. This cycle is then passed on to the next generation, to 
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children who are once again born poor and have fewer life chances and 
a higher risk of staying poor and being less healthy. An example of how 
child poverty affects physical health, affecting as a consequence other 
important functionings, is the issue of obesity. It is now well established 
that childhood poverty increases the probability of being obese, an effect 
that can already be observed in very young children and babies (Conrad 
and Capewell 2012). Obesity is therefore not a lifestyle choice of these 
children but the result of the environment they are born into (Johnson, 
Pratt and Wardle 2011). Obesity during childhood is connected to a wide 
range of further health risks, being linked, in particular, to cardiovascular 
disease and diabetes but also to mental health problems, such as depres-
sion (Levine 2011; Pizzi and Vroman 2013). Again, we by no means wish 
to deny that obesity during childhood also happens in well-off families 
but rather opt to reinforce the idea that more children in poverty are 
affected due to their being poor, which is sufficient for our claim that 
child poverty violates the claims of these children to be healthy. In an 
older review, Richard Reading presented good reasons why poverty is, in 
fact, the cause for ill health and health disparities in a society, reasons 
that still hold: research is consistent; the relation between poverty and 
child health can be found in every country; there is historical evidence 
that shows this relation is not new; there is an incremental relation; 
and the relation between health and poverty has been shown for many 
different forms of material and social deprivation (Reading 1997). 
 In conclusion, the evidence we presented here shows that child 
poverty and physical and mental health are connected; child poverty 
influences it negatively and has negative effects on adult health as well. 
It undermines the equality of opportunity to well-being. Epidemiological 
studies, however, can give an insight as to the extent of the problem. A 
recent estimation for the USA concluded that approximately 245,000 
deaths in the year 2000 were attributable to low levels of education, 
176,000 to racial segregation, 162,000 to low social support, 133,000 to 
individual-level poverty, 119,000 to income inequality and 39,000 to 
area-level poverty (Galea et al. 2011). Another study suggests that in the 
European Union, 700,000 deaths and 33 million prevalent cases of ill 
health were caused by socioeconomic inequality (Huisman et al. 2013). 
We cannot put a definite number on the injustice of ill health caused 
by child poverty, but statistics attest that millions of children are living 
in poverty in modern welfare states. If there is sufficient evidence that 
many of them are ill simply because they are poor and that being poor 
puts them at a higher risk of becoming ill than their nonpoor peers, 
it is enough to criticize this situation as unjust as well as to claim that 
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these societies are failing the demands of justice for children. They let 
children down on their justified claims to well-being and well-becoming 
and deprive them of a fertile functioning, which in turn affects the 
achievement of other important functionings and capabilities. 
 One might counter our conclusion about the relation between health 
and poverty by pointing to parents and families, shifting the blame 
from the institutional design of society to them. They choose to live 
under such circumstances and bring children into the world, and they 
do not move to better neighborhoods, give them better food and care or 
take them to regular medical checkups. Child poverty is, indeed, in most 
cases also family poverty (important exceptions are orphans in state care 
and unattended minor refugees) and the parents’ living conditions and 
socioeconomic status do have significant influence on their children. 
We will address this issue in the next chapter, where we will analyze the 
role of close caregivers and their responsibilities toward children in some 
detail and refute the argument that parents and families are the primary 
agents for securing social justice for children. For now, we would like to 
point to the fact that parents and families in poverty usually have very 
limited options to influence the health of their children due to struc-
tural deficiencies, a fact that is to be taken into account when conceptu-
alizing their responsibilities. Parents’ behaviors are partially determined 
themselves by socioeconomic position and how one grows up and is 
socialized, a claim supported by considerable evidence (Pinderhughes 
et al. 2001; Russell, Harris and Gockel 2008). 
 2.3 The Ill-Being and Ill-Becoming of child poverty: 
social inclusion and education 
 The next two functionings we would like to explore are social inclu-
sion and education. Again, we see good reason that they should pass 
the test and fulfill the five criteria we laid out above and also the sixth, 
which puts higher priority on fertile functionings and the prevention 
of corrosive disadvantages. Both are important for the well-being and 
well-becoming in the sense that they are both essential for an adult as 
well. They can be measured objectively with the usual caveats. It also 
seems not unreasonable to assume that children themselves view social 
inclusion and education as important, although maybe the latter not 
in the same way as adults think of it. Both are influenced by the insti-
tutional design of a society, and each and every child can achieve both 
functionings under the right circumstances. Even children with severe 
cognitive disabilities have a right to be educated in a way appropriate to 
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their capacities. In addition, we claim that both are fertile functionings, 
and we will introduce some arguments to bolster that assumption in the 
following. 
 We will use very broad conceptions of both social inclusion and educa-
tion, leaving the decision to further define them again to the respective 
studies we examine. We employ a negative approach, one that is satis-
fied with showing that child poverty actually negatively affects social 
inclusion and education and that children in poverty have a less of a 
chance to achieve those two functionings than their better-off peers. 
We therefore do not have a threshold for what each and every child is 
entitled to, a specific kind of education in terms of what they need to 
learn or how long they should go to school. Other specialists can answer 
these questions much better; there are probably differences between the 
respective education systems that must be taken into account. What 
seems obvious is that for children growing up and living in modern 
societies, education is not a matter of learning to read and write alone 
but also of being prepared for what a highly complex and differenti-
ated society and its social, economic, political and cultural institutions 
demand. This is the aspect of well-becoming that is always relative to the 
standards in a given context and that is also risky to some extent, given 
that we cannot foresee the future. It can be the case – there have been 
many cases in the past – that children are educated and learn things 
they cannot use because technology changes or the knowledge and skills 
are no longer useful. The content and also the threshold in education 
and social inclusion that is necessary in order to fulfill the demands of 
social justice is therefore highly context sensitive and evolving. Studies 
on the future of education show this in an impressive manner (Redecker 
et al. 2011). Furthermore, we are not able to set different thresholds for 
different ages, although it is something that would be equally neces-
sary to effectively guide policies. Such a more in-depth examination of 
education and child poverty, one that analyzes different age groups and 
different contexts (states or regions), is surely a worthy venture, which, 
however, goes beyond the limited scopes and aims of our treatise. 
 We will begin with the functioning of social inclusion, using, as we 
have just stated, a very broad understanding of it. Social inclusion is 
closely connected to material resources, on the one hand, and to the 
public infrastructure (in a broad sense), on the other hand. It encom-
passes being able to do and have things that are viewed as essential or 
normal in a society and that are necessary to keep up social relations 
with people outside one’s own family. Such an approach to social inclu-
sion (or its counterpart, social exclusion) is now used in many different 
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contexts, but the concept has also been criticized for being too vague 
and for being unclear about what it wants to capture due to, among 
other reasons, the existence of so many different definitions available; 
a recent review names eighteen different definitions (Morgan et al. 
2007). Many approaches share striking similarities with deprivation 
measures as originally proposed by Townsend, but instead of looking 
at goods (which dominate the lists of both the EU and UNICEF), they 
also consider such other contexts of participation and inclusion as 
employment, politics and decision-making and culture and leisure. The 
benchmark used to define these contexts or activities is the same as with 
deprivation indicators: what is essential or normal in a specific society. 
For example, Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud defined four dimen-
sions for adults in the United Kingdom, which can probably be viewed 
to cover all modern welfare states: (a) consumption, (b) production, (c) 
political engagement and (d) social interaction. They have also set four 
corresponding indicators: (a) equivalent household net income under 
half median income, (b) not employed or self-employed, in education or 
training, looking after family, (c) nonvoter, not a member of community 
organizations and (d) lack of someone who can offer personal support 
(Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud 2002). Two things become obvious 
when considering this approach: one activity (consumption) is, again, 
measured using income, and two of the others go certainly beyond what 
many would understand as poverty (political engagement and social 
interaction). Surely people can lack the last two without being (materi-
ally) poor for various reasons. 
 The concept of social inclusion/exclusion has been less often applied 
to children; we suppose that this reflects the (implicit) assumption that 
children are less active than adults (or that there are fewer important 
contexts in which children should be included). On the contrary, we 
want to make the point that children can be included in or excluded from 
many different contexts that matter for them, their well-being and their 
well-becoming: school, political participation, leisure and friends, health 
care, social services, rights, a safe and clean environment, among others. 
Such contexts matter highly to children (Ridge 2002). The social inclu-
sion/exclusion paradigm offers valuable insights into understanding child 
poverty and its effects on the well-being and well-becoming of children. It 
highlights the relations between the different dimensions of social life; for 
example, between material goods and income and other forms of partici-
pation. It also shows that income alone is often not enough for one to be 
(fully) included in a society, since other factors like ethnicity, age, educa-
tion, employment and health are equally important and lead to exclusion 
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processes. This certainly has implications for social policy: benefits alone 
will not be enough to solve the problem of social exclusion. The fact that 
social exclusion is a relational concept poses another issue and shows that 
social relations are of utmost importance. Inclusion and exclusion are 
processes that unfold through the interactions within certain social envir-
onments and contexts and reshape the opportunities persons have. There 
is a link between the main assumption of the capability approach, namely 
that capabilities and functionings are dependent on different conversion 
factors, and this relational dimension of social inclusion/exclusion. Being 
excluded means to be cut off from important conversion factors other 
people have access to as well. Social inclusion/exclusion is also more of 
a process than a static concept (Millar 2007). One is included through 
activities, doing certain things on a regularly basis and being part of social 
groups. Social inclusion is therefore not a functioning one can acquire 
at a certain point in time and keep without putting constant effort into 
it. Social inclusion has also a spatial dimension; where children live and 
how their neighborhood and environment look have a great influence on 
what they can do and have and on what kind of relations they can have 
to other people (MacDonald and Marsh 2005). 
 Social inclusion has two sides, an internal and an external one. The 
external side can be evaluated by looking at what children in poverty are 
actually doing and having; the internal side, on the other hand, has an 
emotional aspect and refers to the actual feeling and knowing that one 
is included and accepted. The concept of respect and the functioning 
of being respected as a human of equal worth, which we will discuss 
later in this chapter, also comes into play here. Both the internal and 
external dimension of social inclusion are fertile: the internal dimension 
is closely related to self-efficacy and other positive self-relations of self-
trust and self-esteem, which in turn are fertile for the development and 
achievement of other capabilities and functionings – children that have 
them are more likely to explore their potentials and try to succeed. The 
external dimension of social inclusion is fertile because having social 
relations and being accepted and recognized by others and in the social 
world one lives in gives a child much more valuable options and makes 
it easier to realize them. Social inclusion is important if a child needs 
help; for example, if she struggles at school or if she has problems with 
her parents; it is important in later life because it can provide networks 
and is a form of social capital that has been shown to be beneficial espe-
cially for economic status (Pichler and Wallace 2008). 
 Hence, social inclusion in capability terms refers to the ability to 
achieve functionings and capabilities as a child that are viewed as 
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essential in the target society and to be respected as a human of equal 
worth. Therefore, social inclusion/exclusion is a relational concept that 
cannot be defined without reference to the target society. This has two 
implications: at first, social inclusion has intrinsic and instrumental 
value for children, but it is a neutral concept in relation to its specific 
content in a specific context. 
 We are aware that our claim that children have a right to be included 
as a matter of justice runs the risk of being interpreted as if we supported 
the existing capitalistic shaping of society and those behaviors and 
norms that it demands (Bowring 2000). This would be highly problem-
atic, since it would mean that we support a social, political and economic 
formation that is one of the main causes of child poverty itself. While 
the claim that children are entitled to be included holds, being some-
thing of the utmost importance for their well-being and well-becoming, 
this does not imply that we are not critical of many social practices that 
children want to be part of or that they are actually included in. Social 
inclusion can also imply adhering to racist, sexist or ableist behaviors and 
attitudes and fitting into a strict social hierarchy. Such social inclusion 
is still beneficial for children because the costs of not fitting in are very 
high, but it is also obvious that such exclusionary patterns of inclusion 
are highly problematic from a moral point of view and affect negatively 
all of those excluded by these practices. It is disputable whether social 
inclusion can ever function without certain excluding mechanisms, but 
there are certainly forms and modes of inclusion that are less problem-
atic than others. Likewise, children are in a very weak position to stand 
up against the societal norms they are confronted with, and demanding 
that they be critical and strong enough to withdraw from consumerist 
behaviors would overburden them. 
 Furthermore, social inclusion happens on different levels and can 
take many different forms. To be included in a specific group may come 
at the cost of exclusion from other groups. For example, children and 
adolescents can be included in a street gang and experience many of 
the positive functions of inclusion through this, but by doing so, they 
more or less willingly choose not to be included in the larger society in 
all aspects. Deviant and criminal behavior is simultaneously the ticket 
into one group and out of the societal mainstream. On the other hand, 
there are differences between states and cultures within states. Being 
socially included in Germany might imply having and doing different 
things than being included in the United States of America, even if there 
are certain similarities between all highly developed societies. What we 
claim is that child poverty distorts opportunities for these children to 
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be socially included in the society they live in; this holds for all modern 
societies. One of the main reasons is that inclusion and money are 
closely related, and as general features of all modern societies, inclusion 
reflects this capitalistic consumerist culture. 
 For now, we want to focus on the external side of social inclusion, 
which has been largely researched since poverty research itself moved 
from one-dimensional measures of income poverty to the concept of 
social exclusion and material deprivation. Social exclusion may be due 
to a number of different reasons, and lack of money is, although very 
significant, just one of them (Tisdall et al. 2006). Money buys member-
ship in societies in which inclusion has high costs: cell phones, toys, 
clothes, leisure activities, sport clubs, trips, going out, eating at the mall 
and inviting friends. However, money is not the single factor for social 
inclusion; living conditions, social status, appearance, race and ethnicity, 
gender, health, education and disability also count. Not all of these are 
influenced by child poverty (or are a defining part of it), but most are. 
Children living in poverty have less access to transportation to come and 
go and meet friends, and their neighborhoods are less secure and provide 
less space for them to play safely and in a clean and welcoming envir-
onment. Children are also less often included due to the stigmatizing by 
others and prejudices against them, as when they are accused of being 
lazy, unclean or deviant. The shame that children in poverty feel can also 
lead to processes of self-chosen exclusion and to isolation and loneliness. 
Children with health problems or disabilities need more resources to be 
able to take part in many activities, resources that are often missing from 
families in poverty. Poor neighborhoods, poor health and poor inclusion 
go together (Cattell 2001). The social inclusion of children in poverty 
is more difficult for all these reasons, and many of them are not able 
to realize this important functioning in an adequately qualitative way. 
When we described ways to measure poverty, we presented data demon-
strating how children in low-income families were more likely to face 
problems when trying to be socially included; the data were measured 
by the access to child-related social goods and activities that (partly) 
constitute what it means to fit in and belong to a society. If they are 
missed, children feel left out – and with good reason: they are actually 
not included in a comprehensive understanding. Similar findings have 
been reported using different methodologies and measures for particular 
countries in Europe as well as the USA, Canada and Australia (Kahn and 
Kamerman 2002; Phillips et al. 2013). 
 There is an abundance of literature on education from a capability 
perspective (Hart, Babic and Biggeri 2014; Walker and Unterhalter 2010). 
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Most of the available empirical evidence on the relation of child poverty 
and education focuses either on cognitive skills or on schooling and 
academic achievement. Education is, however, more than that; the value 
of education is poorly reflected if one looks only at schooling and subse-
quently at the relation between formal education and other socioeconomic 
characteristics, a relation that is important and, in particular, relevant for 
the intergenerational transmission and reproduction of poverty. 
 Education here means any kind of learning and acquiring of skills and 
knowledge, and in this broad sense it is the condition and grounding 
of many other functionings and capabilities. The good command of 
one’s mother language is necessary for inclusion in the society and the 
interaction with other people; it is necessary to acquire further know-
ledge and skills and to achieve further capabilities and functionings. 
If one knows how to read, one can acquire all kinds of information 
available in that language. If one knows how to ride a bike or how to 
swim, one has obviously more choices of leisure activities and of getting 
from one place to another at one’s disposal. Acquiring manners and 
social skills, so-called soft skills, becoming acquainted with the customs 
and habits of one’s culture and society, make it a lot easier for one to 
appear in public, to interact with other people, to feel ‘at home’. Soft 
skills have become ever more necessary in the fast-changing economy 
of modern societies, in which formal education is just one aspect of 
qualification. Not only do children learn throughout childhood – yes, 
childhood can be characterized as life’s main learning phase – but the 
societal framing of childhood is that it should be a protected phase for 
learning and acquiring skills necessary for the child’s well-being as an 
adult. Education points, in particular, toward an understanding of child-
hood as a preparatory stage. Besides this orientation toward adulthood, 
education has certainly an intrinsic and instrumental value for children 
themselves as well, one that is also empowering and gives them more 
options and freedom as they mature, learn and become able to do more 
things. Still concerning education, we would like to argue that children 
are entitled to realize it as a functioning and that it would be wrong and 
unreasonable to advocate for it in the form of a capability. Children 
have an entitlement to actually learn and acquire necessary and fruitful 
skills and knowledge they need for their further flourishing. A child does 
not need the capability to choose whether she wants to learn a language 
and to write and how basic mathematics works for her well-being and 
well-becoming but actually needs to acquire them on a sufficient level. 
 It is interesting to note here that our advocacy for the actual realiza-
tion of education during childhood will almost certainly lead to the 
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result that in adulthood, too, people have it as a functioning, not only as 
a capability. Other important functionings or capabilities can be altered 
in later life, perhaps even denied. One can hurt herself or choose to 
destroy one’s health, one can choose to live a life in isolation or one 
can choose not to engage in politics, but it is very unlikely that one 
can choose to unlearn. If a child is educated and learns to read, write 
and acquire other knowledge and skills, it will be the case that at least 
some of them, maybe the most basic and important ones, will stick. A 
person might forget what she learned in biology and physics, but to 
count and make basic calculations or speak in one’s first language are 
hard to unlearn or willingly forget. Therefore – and we consider this a 
positive – education is a functioning that, if properly acquired in child-
hood, stays with one for the whole life course, unless severe mental 
illness or dementia destroys it. This points to another beneficial func-
tion of education; namely, that others are not able to destroy it so easily 
either and that it can aid in overcoming adverse situations, whether it be 
a personal crisis, life event or the rise of an oppressing regime. 
 Research about the relation of education and poverty is striking. 
Children in poverty fall behind in academic achievement very early, 
and their cognitive skills are less well developed. Recent studies confirm 
that this inequality becomes stronger during childhood and that chil-
dren who grow up in poverty acquire a lower formal education than 
their nonpoor peers (Engle and Black 2008). Poverty influences school 
readiness, drop-out and attendance habits (Zhang 2003; Welsh et al. 
2010). School is, for poor children, a less comfortable experience than 
it is for their nonpoor peers, and they struggle more often to get along 
(Horgan 2009). Sufficient evidence suggests that teachers treat chil-
dren from poor families worse and that the grades of children are influ-
enced by that (Ladd 2012; Auwarter and Aruguete 2008). Without any 
doubt, these effects on education during childhood also affect the later 
life of these children. It is much more difficult to catch up and acquire 
educational attainment as an adult, simply because there is much less 
support to invest the time needed, because the education systems are 
still designed in a way that supports linear biographies and because 
adults generally are slower in acquiring skills and knowledge. Some 
doors to education are more or less closed forever due to early develop-
ments and failings in achievements. The reasons for these low results 
of children in poverty are, again, manifold, and research has not estab-
lished a single best explanation (Ferguson, Bovaird and Mueller 2007). 
We have already mentioned that the home environment and whether it 
is stimulating or not plays a crucial role in the development of cognitive 
The Injustice of Child Poverty 101
and emotional skills. Parenting style and parents’ expectations of what 
they think their children can achieve are another factor associated with 
education outcomes. Such negative influences of parents on the educa-
tional achievements and development of their children is not the result 
of less interest in their children and in most cases also not the result of 
willing neglect, but the result of the parents’ own limitation due to their 
poverty and own knowledge. Sometimes it also reflects their own expe-
riences during childhood with teachers and in school. Other equally 
relevant factors are the health of the child and whether she has to be 
absent from school often due to health problems, as well as whether the 
parents have enough time and resources to support their child (Fiscella 
and Kitzman 2009). 
 Both teachers’ perceptions and expectations and the school itself play 
an important role as well. Children from poor families are more likely to 
go to schools that are worse equipped, have more children with social 
and behavioral problems and a less stimulating learning environment. 
These factors reinforce each other, and children in poverty grow up 
with fewer conversion factors that would help them realize their poten-
tial. According to the research of Chris Power and Clyde Hertzman, the 
corrosive disadvantage of child poverty in relation to education can be 
characterized as follows (Hertzman and Power 2003): Circumstances 
in the early years of life influence the cognitive, social and behavioral 
skills needed for readiness for school. Children who are not ready for 
school are more likely to experience low expectations of teachers, lose 
confidence, have difficulties making friends and face repeated academic 
failure. Readiness for school also influences school attendance and 
educational performance; these are important for educational achieve-
ment. Both home characteristics (material circumstances, parental 
involvement with and aspirations for their children) and school char-
acteristics are important. Feeling disengaged with and unsupported by 
school plays a role in developing health-damaging behaviors, such as 
cigarette smoking, and in developing sources of identity based around 
peer relationships and youth culture. 
 While psychologically important, these identities can result in behav-
iors such as nonattendance and law breaking, which further damage 
educational prospects. Early parenthood, too, can be an important 
source of identity but one that makes it harder to stay on at school 
and gain qualifications. Leaving school and not going on to education, 
training or employment leaves young people vulnerable to unemploy-
ment, with paid work restricted to unskilled and semiskilled jobs. These 
jobs are characterized by low payment and job insecurity, which may 
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bring further health costs in terms of higher rates of absence due to sick-
ness, disability and coronary heart disease. The environment of home 
and neighborhood can place further strains on physical and mental 
health. In consequence, poor adult circumstances take an additional 
toll on health, in part because they are implicated in the maintenance 
of health behaviors linked to chronic diseases such as coronary heart 
disease and cancer that underlie inequalities in health in adult life. 
 We now want to turn our attention to one important aspect of the well-
becoming of children and their inclusion as adults. An essential part of the 
social inclusion of adults, different from that of children, is that they are 
able to provide for themselves and their families through paid work and 
labor. Modern societies are also working societies in the sense that work 
and labor are highly valued, a major source for self-esteem, self-respect and 
self-worth and the main source of income and wealth, which in turn trans-
late into a variety of resources and goods. Work and labor are, so to speak, 
the main source to access important conversion factors for the majority 
of the population, being intrinsically valuable for many. These positive 
functionings of work and labor explain why their absence has such harsh 
consequences for many and why unemployment is one of the main sources 
for ill-being. One of the theories that tries to capture this relationship is 
Marie Jahoda’s (Jahoda 1981; Jahoda 1982) who distinguished manifest 
(income) and latent (time structure, social inclusion, goals, identity and 
status, activity) positive functions of employment. From them, she derived 
why unemployment is such a harsh experience, one that takes high tolls 
on the physical and mental health, social inclusion and private life of 
the unemployed. The usefulness of Jahoda’s model has been empirically 
tested over the years, and recent studies confirm that unemployment has 
such a detrimental effect on mental and physical health and social inclu-
sion because it leads to a deprivation of the manifest and latent functions 
(Paul and Batinic 2009). Only a few people are adequately equipped to 
effectively cope with involuntary unemployment, especially over a longer 
period of time. Unemployment also affects the lives of children whose 
parents are unemployed and who are confronted with the stress that their 
parents experience and the stigma of unemployment they have to battle, 
which seems to directly affect the child’s health. 
 We do not have a definite answer as to whether having paid employ-
ment is of such importance that it should be considered a capability that 
each and every one is entitled to as a matter of justice or whether the 
important thing is not having a paid job but rather having the oppor-
tunity to take care of oneself and those one cares about. We do not 
want to explore this issue here, although we still hold that the effects 
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of child poverty on the material and economic well-being in later life 
and the ability to participate in the labor market is of importance. We 
acknowledge that children are born with different talents and different 
natural internal capacities that will also influence what they can become 
in later life, but such natural differences cannot be held responsible for 
the differences in employment outcomes we can find in many modern 
societies. Findings suggest rather that employment opportunities – and 
with them also opportunities to gain a certain social status and income 
and wealth – are heavily influenced by the socioeconomic position of 
the parents. Again, we find here that the equality of opportunity to well-
being defined as important functionings and capabilities is not realized 
for all children, but those who are poor have it much harder and are 
significantly disadvantaged. The main causes for unemployment on 
the side of the individual are low-level formal education, health issues 
and, as we are able to witness today, age: right now, millions of young 
people across Europe are jobless as a consequence of the economic 
crisis. Both education and health are related to childhood poverty, as 
we have shown, and it is therefore not surprising that it is more likely 
for children from poor families to experience labor difficulties when 
they are older. Recent statistics convincingly underpin this claim: in 
the USA, the unemployment rate of persons with an academic degree 
(bachelor’s, master’s, professional or doctoral) ranges between 4 and 
2.2 percent; for persons with less than a high school diploma it reaches 
11 percent. Earnings are also highly correlated to formal education (see 
Table 2.8). The same results can be found in the European Union, where 
17.9 percent of the persons whose highest finished level of education is 
 Table 2.8  Education, unemployment and earning in the USA 
Education attained
Unemployment rate in 
2013 (%)
Median weekly 
earnings ($)
Doctoral degree 2.2 1.623
Professional degree 2.3 1.714
Master’s degree 3.4 1.329
Bachelor’s degree 4 1.108
Associate’s degree 5.4 777
Some college, no degree 7 727
High school diploma 7.5 651
Less than a high school 
diploma
11 472
 Note: Data are for persons 25 and over. Earnings are for full-time wage and salary workers. 
 Source: Current Population Survey, US Department of Labor, US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_001.htm 
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less than primary, primary or low secondary education are unemployed, 
compared with 8.6 percent of those with high secondary and postsec-
ondary (nontertiary) education and 5.6 percent of those with a finished 
tertiary education. Employment status, material resources, education, 
health and social inclusion are closely entangled and influence each 
other (Gallie, Paugam and Jacobs 2003). They show that modern soci-
eties are not well equipped to realize equality of opportunity for well-
being for all its members and that it is especially hard for those who 
come from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
 In summary, what the empirical research shows is that child poverty 
is corrosive in regard to education and social inclusion of children, 
and both also affect the opportunities of inclusion in later life. They 
have also a wider effect on what can be called the capability to be a 
citizen with an equal standing. Elizabeth Anderson has argued that 
the capability set that people are entitled to as a matter of justice can 
be defined by looking at what they need to act as equals in a demo-
cratic society (Anderson 2010). This line of thought is similar to that 
of David Miller, who, not coming from a capability perspective, argues 
that there are two different types of equality: the first type of equality 
means equality in the distribution of certain goods (or functionings and 
capabilities), which should be equalized, and the second type refers to 
equality of social standing and the ideal of a society in which all meet on 
the same level (Miller 1999). While both are vague concepts, they bring 
forward the important idea of respect and being respected, which is 
closely connected to other important functionings and capabilities like 
self-esteem and self-worth. It is a simple fact that in modern working 
societies, social status, education, employment and income and wealth 
go hand in hand and that disadvantages during childhood that trans-
late into inequalities as an adult in these areas work against the ideal of 
equality proposed by Anderson and Miller. We should look not only at 
the outcomes of child poverty but also at the well-becoming, which is 
an equally important part of justice for children, and under the condi-
tions of a working society, children should be equipped with all neces-
sary functionings that let them become productive, equally respected 
and included citizens. 
 2.4 The subjective experience of child poverty 
 So far, we have discussed how child poverty leads to ill-being and ill-be-
coming, especially in relation to health, social inclusion and education. 
We now want to turn to the subjective experience of child poverty, how 
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children themselves view their situation and articulate it and how they 
feel about it. We have already mentioned that child poverty influences 
mental health, for example, depression. We have built our case so far on 
objective knowledge that is more or less free of subjective assessments 
and ignores how children feel about poverty and if their subjective well-
being or happiness is altered by it. The reason why we now want to give 
a voice to children that are actually living in poverty is threefold. First, 
we believe that children living in poverty have a right to be heard. We 
will explore here the difference between a consultative and an authorita-
tive view as presented by Harry Brighouse (2003) and further expanded 
by David Archard and Marit Skivenes (2009). This will also shed some 
more light on our claim in Chapter 1 that children’s views should be 
taken seriously in drafting a list of important functionings and capabil-
ities that matter for children`s well-being and to which they are entitled 
as a matter of justice. Second, we will argue that listening to children 
and taking notice of their subjective experiences deepens our under-
standing of the injustices they live with. Third, we will show that the 
way a child experiences poverty is – to a large extent – not arbitrary and 
that it therefore carries normative weight. In this context, the concept 
of humiliation will be of central importance. 
 Brighouse has argued that children should be listened to in matters 
affecting them but that they should not be granted an authoritative view 
over their own circumstances. In the end, adults have the right (and 
the duty) to act in the child’s best interest, which sometimes might go 
against the child’s will. This view is an advancement over how children 
were treated for a long time, but it still leaves them at adults’ disposal. 
The term ‘consultative view’ already implies that the child’s perspective 
has a certain value for those who have to act in the child’s interests but 
that this value is limited. Adults, in contrast, should be seen, as Brighouse 
argues, as authoritative in respect to choices that affect them, except for 
a few cases in which it is clear they are not competent enough to decide 
for themselves; for instance, when they have severe cognitive disabilities 
or mental disorders that temporarily render them incompetent. 
 Archard and Skivenes came to a very similar result after analyzing in 
detail several cases in which children’s views were heard and weighed 
in the context of legal decision-making in the domains of health in the 
United Kingdom and custody and child protection in Norway. They 
add, however, that children also have a right to be heard independ-
ently from the instrumental value that comes by listening to them (as 
they provide useful information) and that children’s views are therefore 
more than consultative. The issue we discuss in this chapter is different 
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from the context in which the distinction of consultative and authorita-
tive was developed. Brighouse, Archard and Skivenes are concerned with 
the participation of children in decision-making processes that affect 
their lives such as custody, medical treatment and probably also wider 
public matters, such as compulsory schooling. They also make use of 
the concept of best interest, which is commonly used in the children’s 
rights approach, and seek to balance the right of a child to be heard and 
to decide with the right of the child having her interests and well-being 
protected. It is not, they all agree, in the best interest of children to give 
them full command over their lives. 
 We are, however, concerned with a criticism of child poverty as unjust, 
and in most treatises criticizing certain injustices, views of the victims 
of these injustices are not decisive. The reasons to do so are very similar 
to those that resulted in opting for an objective account of justice as we 
developed it in the previous chapter. The foundational work has to be 
done more or less unrelated to how people actually feel or what prefer-
ences they have. As Sen, among others, has noted on several occasions, 
there is a need for objective measures because impoverished circum-
stances can make the victims of poverty allies of those who oppress them 
(Sen 1999; Khader 2011). Adaptive preferences demand an objective 
account of justice that has enough bite and argument on its side to 
allow for the critique of injustices, even if they are supported by those 
who suffer from them. 
 But why, then, is it important to listen to children living in poverty? 
We think that the distinctions between an authoritative view and a 
consultative view complemented by a right to be heard, introduced 
above, is particularly important here. Victims of injustices have a right to 
be heard by those who talk and write about those injustices. They have 
a right to be included in the analysis, even if that does not change how 
one designs a theory of justice and even if that does not alter substan-
tially the outcome of the philosophical work. People living in poverty 
are often treated as if they lack competence and knowledge; they are 
treated as passive objects of help, welfare and charity. They are rarely 
viewed as if they have much to contribute to overcoming their poverty 
and designing poverty-alleviation measures (Deveaux 2013). This view, 
however, has been criticized by participatory poverty research and 
poor-led initiatives for a long time now (Chambers 1997; Brock 1999). 
In fact, poor adults are often treated like children, in the sense that their 
choices and views are not seen as authoritative. 
 In summary, there are issues of inequalities in power and also in 
epistemic power, as in the power to decide who is poor and what matters 
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for being accounted poor. Children in poverty are particularly powerless, 
and their agency is often neglected. We believe that it is important to 
acknowledge that children in poverty have something to say about their 
situation and that this is of value for a normative theory about their 
lives. These children have a right to be included in the evaluation of 
their situation even if we can include them only indirectly and through 
the reception of participatory and qualitative studies of child poverty. 
This right is independent of our claim that this will enlarge and deepen 
our knowledge base and that taking into account subjective views on 
poverty, therefore, also has also an instrumental value. This right to be 
heard is a form of respect that each and every child is entitled to and is 
thus rooted in a fundamental aspect of our theory of justice for children. 
We add as well that the process of participatory work with children in 
poverty is itself valuable for these children, as it can have empowering 
effects (Pascal and Bertram 2009). It can show these children that there 
are people who care about how they live; it can offer them the experi-
ence of being heard and an awareness that their views actually matter to 
someone, if just to a researcher or research team. 
 The instrumental value of subjective views on poverty is that it can 
bring to attention issues that remain otherwise undetected and over-
looked. Children in poverty can point toward what matters most to 
them; this alone is reason enough to at least reflect carefully about their 
status in a theory of justice. Surely this is also dependent on the compe-
tence and maturity of the child, and many children might downplay 
important injustices that happen in their lives because they are not aware 
of them or because they cannot know how corrosive a specific depriv-
ation will be over the long run. It can be expected that children also 
have more to say about their actual well-being or ill-being than about 
their well-becoming or ill-becoming. The subjective experience of harm 
is focused on what is actually happening and not on what will or can 
happen in a few years from now. Their views are consultative in the best 
understanding of it: they give us more information, they help us make 
better decisions about what matters in a criticism of poverty and make 
better evaluations of their lives, and they give us an impression about 
what poverty does to children on the subjective level – how they feel it. 
Still, an injustice is an injustice even if these children do not experience 
poverty as harmful and even if they find ways to be happy and to adapt 
to their situations. This kind of information is also valuable, though. 
Another important instrumental value of first-person knowledge about 
poverty is that it can help design better poverty-alleviation measures or 
better implement them in practice. 
108 A Philosophical Examination of Social Justice and Child Poverty
 There are different approaches to listening to children in poverty 
and to giving them a place in our theory. We want to make a distinc-
tion between ‘thinking small’ and ‘thinking big’ to explore them, a 
distinction first suggested by David Hulme in an article on the situ-
ation of a poor family in Bangladesh, which he researched for more 
than twenty years (Hulme 2004). Hulme starts with the observation 
that most poverty research ‘thinks big’, in the sense that the researchers 
care mostly about statistics; that is, about how many people are poor 
and how many things they are missing and so on. He claims that while 
this thinking big is of course valuable, it is also in danger of over-
looking what poverty is on the individual or family level, how it is 
actually experienced and lived and what it does to a person and his 
or her family. This is something that cannot adequately be reflected 
in statistics that show how many millions of people are poor and how 
much income they have. Hulme claims especially that social embed-
ding and the many different dimensions of poverty are best under-
stood by ‘thinking small’; that is, by doing small-scale research that 
focuses on the story of one person or one household or one small 
community – this alone allows us to capture the breadth and depth of 
what it actually means to live in poverty. This thinking small is akin to 
the concept of ‘thick descriptions’ of poverty, in the sense that detailed 
accounts of a single story reflect the many different aspects and dimen-
sions of poverty. 
 Thick descriptions provide a window into the reality of poverty. They 
do not and cannot aim to cover varieties of poverty or give an under-
standing of different socioeconomic positions or how poverty looks in 
different regions or states. A single story of an individual or a family is 
not more than that, but it is ‘thick’, as is every individual life, and it also 
makes the injustices connected to poverty more visible and tangible. 
Thinking big as the counterpart of this kind of thinking small means 
having ‘thin descriptions’, abstract knowledge about many persons 
stripped of their individuality. That knowledge comes in statistics that 
can show us how many people live under the poverty line, how well 
they are educated and how many people live in a specific household. 
Data like this are valuable, no doubt, and are necessary to guide and 
monitor policies as they can tell us how many people moved in or out 
of poverty. The individual stories behind these numbers, however, are 
gone – why a specific individual struggles to come out of poverty, what 
problems lie in her past and what aspirations she has for herself and her 
children. Hulme is right with respect to the fact that there is no ‘either 
or’ between thinking small and thinking big, but we need both if we 
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want to understand poverty. There is also a need for thinking small and 
using thick descriptions in normative criticism of poverty and theories 
about its injustice. 
 We would like to take a third route, which we see as being somewhat 
in the middle and can perhaps be described as ‘thinking intermediate’. 
In this section, we will not discuss a thick description of child poverty, 
although we would welcome such an approach – it could certainly 
enrich the philosophical thinking about it. We will rather present know-
ledge gathered by qualitative and participatory studies that let children 
express and articulate their views on their own poverty and on poverty 
in general. Such studies give insight into important aspects of the 
subjective experience of poverty by providing many voices, not simply 
a single one or a few, as does a ‘thick description’. We will acknowledge 
what children have to say and that they have a right to be heard by us, 
but we are also able to do that on a level that allows the representing 
of many experiences from different children living in different environ-
ments and under different conditions. 
 Child poverty is a harmful experience for most children; they are 
aware of their situation and cope with it in many different ways. Some 
children are better equipped to cope than others, and some prove very 
resilient. It is therefore not surprising that the experiences of children 
living in poverty vary to a great degree. Qualitative studies on child 
poverty were recently summarized by Tess Ridge; we present here some 
of her key findings (Ridge 2011; Ridge 2009). The studies she surveyed 
cover children from five to seventeen. The first important insight is that 
children are aware of a wide range of impacts poverty has on their lives. 
Ridge presents children’s views on such issues as school, family and peer 
relations, the working situation of the parents, their neighborhood and 
public infrastructure, their economic situation and material deprivation 
and their emotions and feelings. Children also report how they try to 
cope with their situation, ignore it or retreat from social relations or 
try to support their parents and siblings. The second finding is that, 
in the view of children, child poverty has three central dimensions of 
disadvantage: material and economic deprivation, social exclusion and 
disruption or distortion of social relations, and emotional costs. Children 
worry about the family’s income; they are aware that they have fewer 
resources and goods. They value friendships but have problems making 
and keeping friends. They are the victims of bullying and of the discrim-
inating behavior of adults as well. They feel stigmatized, excluded and 
of little worth. Many children are frustrated and angry, as they have less 
than others and are afraid of how the future will turn out. 
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 Health, too, is an issue; children report that they are often sick, that they 
are cold in the winter and that heating and ventilation are often broken 
and seldom repaired. Health is also an issue because parents or caregivers 
are sick or disabled, and children are burdened with the care themselves. 
This attests, once again, to the multidimensionality of child poverty and 
how different disadvantages intersect and foster each other. Child poverty 
does not simply attack one functioning but more than one at a time, 
making it even more complicated to cope with. Other reviews of qualita-
tive literature come to the same conclusions (Attree 2006; Attree 2004); 
we would like to quote one case study here to illustrate how deprived 
living conditions, social stigmatization and health intersect:
 Eight-year-old Ben lives with his mother and two brothers in an 
overcrowded ground floor flat. Shortly after the family moved in, a 
severe damp and mold problem developed. An environmental health 
inspector has declared the property unfit for human habitation on two 
separate occasions. “It’s the smell that’s almost the worst thing. It’s so 
bad when you come into the flat” describes Ben’s mother, Sandra. The 
damp and mold is having a severe impact on the children’s health, 
which is affecting their education because they are missing school so 
often due to illness. “My oldest little boy [Ben] is having difficulties at 
school. And he’s had so much time off, so when you have lots of time 
off it makes things much worse.” The children’s mental health is also 
being affected. Ben is being teased at school because his clothes smell 
of damp, which is affecting his self-confidence. “It’s not right ... to 
be told that you smell. Kids are so cruel. [Ben] was teased for it. He’s 
seeing the child psychologist now because he has low self-esteem.” 
The condition of the house makes it difficult for him to have friends 
round to play, which is impacting on his social development. “When 
my friend comes round he says [my home] stinks and when I go to 
school this boy says my clothes stink ... but Mummy washes them” 
(Ben aged eight). (Ridge 2009, 33) 
 The third insight is that different agents in the lives of these children, 
especially peers, shape the experience of child poverty. Children in 
poverty do not merely lack specific functionings (or resources) they 
experience this lack as harmful, especially in interaction with other 
people, children and adults alike; within different institutions, the harm 
of poverty becomes pressing. These experiences add insult to injury; on 
the one hand, they are embedded in a societal climate in which poverty 
is framed to a large extent as personal failure and in which the blame 
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for child poverty is put on parents and families; it is often accompanied 
by sexism, which targets lone mothers as bad mothers, unable to keep a 
husband that could care for them and their children; the same framing 
is also prevalent in the discourse about poverty and obese children 
(Maher, Fraser and Wright 2010). Such an atmosphere is equally present 
in the experience of children, who are well aware of how they and their 
families are perceived in the public and by others. While the polit-
ical discourse claims to view children as innocent victims of poverty 
who deserve our help, the experience of many children in poverty is 
a different one. On the other hand, the experience of child poverty is 
framed in a consumerist society that entangles self-realization and iden-
tity with brands: having certain goods, wearing certain clothes, doing 
certain leisure activities (Elliott and Leonard 2004). A child being bullied 
for not having something is the collateral damage of such a culture. The 
role of peers poses several ethical challenges, as they themselves are not 
fully competent and hence also not fully responsible for their actions, 
often just reproducing cultural norms and values. 
 We now introduce the concept of ‘humiliation’ to capture the 
subjective experience of poverty by children. We do not want to include 
all aspects of poverty articulated by children as important, but, in our 
judgment, a central one. Humiliation is the counterpart to respect and 
the functioning of being respected. There is also some overlap between 
being respected and mental health in the sense that being mentally 
healthy also means achieving positive self-awareness in the form of self-
trust, self-esteem and self-respect. Humiliation has two distinct dimen-
sions: on the one hand, it can describe a certain kind of emotion and 
feeling; one feels humiliated. On the other, it can describe certain kinds 
of actions perceived as humiliating. In many cases they go hand in 
hand: a humiliating action leads to the feeling of being humiliated on 
the side of the victim. This connection is not necessary, though, and 
some actions judged by many or most as humiliating might not trigger 
the emotion of being humiliated, and in some cases, people may feel 
humiliated even if there is no sound reason. 
 Child poverty is humiliating in both senses: it is typically perceived 
by children as humiliating and it is an act of humiliation itself. Child 
poverty is a condition with which acts of humiliation by other people 
are connected, and being poor is in itself humiliating even if there are no 
such acts of humiliation by other persons. At least two questions must 
then be clarified: first, how can humiliation be defined, and second, in 
what sense can a certain living condition be humiliating in itself without 
another person committing acts of humiliation? 
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 We borrow our definition of humiliation from Evelin Lindner, who 
writes that the core of humiliation is an enforced lowering of another 
person, which attacks the dignity and self-worth of that person (Lindner 
2007). We view this in connection with respect and the functioning 
of being respected, which we have explored in the previous chapter. 
Children are respected when they are treated in a way that corresponds 
with their worth as humans. Other theorists, most prominently Martha 
Nussbaum, use the concept of human dignity to capture this (Nussbaum 
2011). Humiliation is an umbrella term that catches the many forms of 
actions that violate the entitlement to be treated as a person of equal 
worth while describing the subjective experience of a person who feels 
she is not treated as an equal by others. It is also possible, we will argue, 
that children experience this feeling and emotion of being less worthy 
than others due to their poverty, even if there are no particular acts of 
humiliation against them. This understanding is much wider than that 
of Avishai Margalit, for example, who connects humiliation with respect 
in the sense of being a part of the community of humans (Margalit 
1996). Margalit considers humiliation an act that gives other persons 
good reason to feel expelled from the community of humans, and he 
reserves the term ‘insult’ for acts that attack the self-esteem of a person. 
We prefer a wider understanding of humiliation that also encompasses 
all such acts of insult. Children in poverty are lowered by others and 
given the feeling that they are of less worth, which does not neces-
sarily imply a more drastic sense, such as no longer being viewed as 
human. The insights from qualitative studies discussed before point in 
this direction and can be captured with our understanding of humili-
ation. We have here actions of humiliation from peers and adults that 
hurt children, and we find the whole range of emotional responses and 
feelings of being humiliated that are known to have potentially severe 
consequences. 
 Growing up and living in poverty is in itself humiliating even if 
children do not encounter humiliating acts by others: it can never be 
detached from the experience of having less than others without a good 
reason. This claim is supported in the literature and what children tell 
us about how they view themselves and their lives. Having less than 
others is obvious for a child in poverty; even when no one makes fun of 
her because of it, the child knows, sees and experiences that she has less, 
that she cannot have the same clothes and toys, make the same trips 
and live in the same good buildings as others. The persistent inequality 
in all poverty makes it humiliating. This line of argument adapts the 
thoughts of Christian Neuhäuser and Julia Müller, who have argued that 
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relative poverty (of adults) is humiliating because the poor know about 
their poverty and that they have less than what is the normal standard 
in the society they live in (Neuhäuser and Müller 2011). The argument is 
not that having few goods or resources is in itself necessarily humiliating 
but that in a society in which it is normal to have certain goods, those 
who involuntarily have far fewer can experience humiliation because, as 
outsiders, they have good reason to feel less worth and less respect. The 
contingent significance of certain goods, resources or activities is rele-
vant to determining whether not having them is humiliating. We have 
briefly discussed the concept of material deprivation of Peter Townsend 
above, which defines poverty using goods and services viewed as essen-
tial in a given society, and such a relative approach to poverty is what 
brings to light why poverty is humiliating even if those who are poor 
are treated in a friendly manner. In the case of children, we would add, 
it is furthermore impossible to argue that their having less and being 
able to do less is a result of choices and bad decisions they made in the 
past. We would like to refute such a line of argument for adult poverty as 
well, but we shall leave that point aside here and refer to Neuhäuser and 
Müller, who have sufficiently argued against it (Neuhäuser and Müller 
2011). When it comes to children, it is clear that it is even worse if they 
rationalize in such a way that they begin to blame themselves for being 
poor or blame their parents and families. 
 The concept of humiliation is certainly not only a descriptive one. 
It has normative weight, and many theories of justice acknowledge it. 
The absence of (systematic) humiliation is an important aspect of any 
just society. This applies to both acts and living conditions that can be 
described as humiliating and to feelings and emotions of humiliation. 
Put in positive terms, a just society is one in which persons are treated 
with respect and assured of their equal worth as human beings regardless 
of what they do, how they live or how old or competent they are. The 
ability to be in public without being ashamed has long been recognized 
by capability theorists and also in empirical poverty research (Zavaleta 
Reyles 2007). While acts of humiliation that target this entitlement are 
more easily banned, feelings of humiliation are not controllable in that 
sense. Including them here in our criticism of poverty, thus, somehow 
opens up the door we shut on subjective assessments as benchmarks for 
justice. We claim that all the functionings children are entitled to as a 
matter of justice should be objective and that only they matter when 
uncovering and criticizing the injustice of child poverty. But using the 
concept of humiliation points to the direction that there is more than 
just the instrumental value to listen to the subjective experiences of 
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children in poverty that we have appreciated before. We want to make 
a proposal on how humiliation, in the subjective sense of a feeling, and 
the claim for objectivity can work together. 
 Firstly, it must be noted that feelings of humiliation are to a large 
extent not arbitrary. There are good reasons to assume that in the over-
whelming majority of cases in which children feel humiliated, there 
are actually acts of humiliation, or these feelings are connected to the 
experience of the humiliating condition of being poor. The qualitative 
evidence we have discussed and on which we build our case examines 
exactly these links between poverty and various experiences of humili-
ation, and it cannot be said that the feelings and emotions of these 
children are unjustified or distorted. Today we have sufficient evidence 
that shame and humiliation are, in general, features of poverty, whether 
it be in rich or poor societies, and that children and adults alike feel 
ashamed and humiliated for being poor (Walker et al. 2013). There are 
certainly cases of children in poverty feeling humiliated without such 
good reasons, and in some cases, the direct connection to poverty has 
to be questioned, but if one leaves the individual level and looks at all 
the evidence brought by different studies, one must acknowledge the 
consistency of the results. 
Secondly, another important aspect is that the expressions of feelings 
of humiliation are a very important indicator that something is going 
wrong.  The goal of justice for children is not that they will never feel 
humiliated by others or that they are always to be happy, something that 
cannot be controlled without employing unethical measures, but that 
the feelings of humiliation are not systematically attached to a certain 
social position, especially not to one that is unjust in itself. Under the 
condition that child poverty is unjust – we hope we have made a good 
case for that – the fact that these children are systematically humili-
ated and have to experience feelings and emotions of being humiliated 
adds another dimension of injustice. Justice still needs objective bench-
marks – one of which is that acts and conditions of humiliation can be 
evaluated without reference to the feelings and emotions they trigger on 
the side of the victims – but it adds more depth to our criticism, especially 
a dimension that children care about strongly. This is the third point we 
wish to make: children do not want to feel left out, excluded, ashamed, 
humiliated and denigrated. Rather, they want to be respected in spite 
of their lack of competence or knowledge to articulate it adequately. 
If we do care about justice for children and their well-being and well-
becoming, we also have to care about how they actually feel and the 
harm they experience. In some cases, as we have stated, we cannot do 
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much about the harm – some experience of harm is part of every human 
life – and in other cases we will come to the conclusion that the feelings 
and emotions of a child are misguided and do not violate her claims 
of justice; these cases, however, do not undermine the general entitle-
ment to be respected and to not feel humiliated by others or by one’s 
social position. We must adapt society in a way that such a picture is 
possible. Feelings of being humiliated, especially chronic humiliation 
through repeated experiences of humiliation, are also harmful in under-
mining self-worth, self-esteem, self-respect and the ability to have trust 
in the world (Leask 2013). All these can be described, objectively, as 
highly important functionings for the well-being and well-becoming of 
a child. 
 2.5 Conclusions 
 Children in poverty suffer from deprivation of important functionings 
and capabilities, which they experience as harmful – especially humili-
ation, which violates their entitlement to respect and self-respect is 
important here. Justice for children must also be aware of the particular 
vulnerability of children and their powerlessness in regard to many of 
the threats and dangers they face. Child poverty is one of these threats. 
Children have no real power to evade their poverty and its negative 
consequences. We believe this to be one of the aspects that make child 
poverty special and a more severe injustice than adult poverty. Adults 
in poverty also suffer from ill health, are excluded and have less access 
to education; they share many feelings and experiences articulated by 
children, but children are much less able to do anything about their 
poverty as they are more dependent. Yes, adults in poverty are, too, 
often powerless themselves and have only limited options and no voice 
and no political weight, but, for children, the situation is still different; 
it is a categorical feature of being a child to be vulnerable, and poverty 
takes advantage of that and leads to severe consequences. 
 Child poverty affects particularly vulnerable and powerless human 
beings who are largely dependent on others and need, at least in some 
important aspects, special and more comprehensive protection than 
adults. That is a normal feature of being a child and per se not a form 
of illegitimate oppression, although some features of modern societies 
do oppress children and exploit their vulnerability and powerlessness. 
Evidence about the influences and negative effects of child poverty on 
many different functionings of children – on capabilities and func-
tionings in later life, too – shows that these children are inefficiently 
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protected. They are disadvantaged for the arbitrary reason that they 
were born poor. 
 In this conclusion, we wish to mention a few limitations of our exam-
ination and issues that need further attention. We have not explored 
the extent to which the limitation of family income is in itself unjust; 
rather, we were concerned with it as a corrosive disadvantage and with 
how it spreads and affects other important dimensions of life. This corro-
siveness goes well beyond the functionings we explored; for example, a 
recent study on poverty and material deprivation in the USA concluded 
that income poverty harms all different kinds of dimensions of well-
being of children. 
 Strikingly, children in low-income families are more likely to experi-
ence each of the remaining 16 deprivations (excluding low income) 
compared to children as a whole. In many cases, the deprivation inci-
dence for these children is twice as high or higher. The incidences 
of parental unemployment and financial stress are remarkably high 
at 48% and 56%, respectively. Low-income children are also much 
more likely to suffer from a poor physical environment and live in 
sub-standard housing conditions and in unsafe or polluted neighbor-
hoods. Of great concern, too, are much higher parental incidences 
of low education and poor health, with negative consequences in 
the labor market. Finally, more than one-third of children living in 
low-income families experience low social/emotional well-being, 
compared to the already-high incidence of one-quarter among all 
children. (Ciula and Skinner 2014, 14) 
 Our focus on ‘ordinary’ poverty also led us to exclude the most disad-
vantaged children from our examination, those who live on the street 
and are homeless, unattended minor refugees and asylum seekers, illegal 
immigrants and victims of prostitution and trafficking. These children 
are not part of large-scale national surveys and counting of the poor; 
there are only estimates of how many children in modern welfare states 
have to live under these conditions. The body of research concerned 
with the health, education and social inclusion of such disadvantaged 
and even more particular vulnerable groups of children shows that 
the effects are serious (for the case of immigrants and refugees, see: 
Ruiz-Casares et al. 2010; Fazel et al. 2012; Hodes 2000; for the case of 
homeless children, see Bassuk 2010; Fantuzzo et al. 2012). The offi-
cial survey in the USA counted more than 600,000 people living on 
the street on a given night in January 2013, of whom 23 percent, or 
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138,149, were children under the age of eighteen; 6,197 of these chil-
dren were unaccompanied (Meghan, Cortes and Morris 2013). Another 
report by the National Center on Family Homelessness found that about 
1.6 million (1 in 45 children) experienced homelessness over the course 
of 2010, an increase compared with previous years as a result of the 
economic downturn (National Center on Family Homelessness 2011). 
A report from 2007, which collected insights from various European 
countries, suggested that the problem is also a significant issue, but we 
were unable to locate any accurate estimation (European Observatory 
on Homelessness 2007). Street children in eastern European countries, 
like Romania, are of particular concern, as they face many threats to 
their well-being (UNICEF 2007). The lack of knowledge about children’s 
lives under such adverse circumstances is problematic in itself, and we 
fear that this ‘invisibility’ also delays efforts to help them and make 
justice for them a reality. We were also not able to do justice to the many 
issues discussed under the concept of intersectionality, which refers to 
the intersection of different forms of disadvantage, oppression and 
discrimination (Norris, Zajicek and Murphy-Erby 2010). Again, we find 
here very disturbing evidence of how modern welfare states fail children 
on multiple levels. Race, ethnicity, disability and gender all influence 
the likelihood of being poor, and they are also independent factors in 
regard to many functionings of well-being and well-becoming. From our 
social justice perspective, this can be evaluated as the intersection of the 
violation of different claims of justice of these children. Justice for chil-
dren as we conceptualize it means that children and adolescents must 
not be discriminated against but equally respected for being humans of 
equal worth, whatever their race, ethnicity, gender or sexual orienta-
tion. The fact that poverty is more common among such children is, as 
a result, a very severe form of discrimination and injustice and must be 
condemned as such. 
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view 
a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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 3 
 Responsibilities for Children in 
Poverty 
 Children in poverty are the victims of severe injustices. They suffer 
from deprivations in important functionings and live, thus, in a state 
of avoidable ill-being and of an increased likelihood of ill-becoming. 
In this chapter, we will now turn our attention to the question of who 
is responsible for securing justice for children in poverty and why. We 
want to examine this question in more detail than just stating that the 
state and its institutions are responsible or that taking care of children is 
primarily a task for the family. We would like to go beyond such simpli-
fied answers and show what kind of responsibilities persons, collectively 
and individually, and institutions, the state and other ones, have and 
for what reasons. The capability approach in general has not dealt often 
with these questions, being first and foremost a theory about the infor-
mation that should be used in comparative quality-of-life assessments. 
It has in particular not engaged with questions of personal responsi-
bility to achieve functionings and capabilities or for closing the door on 
some of them because of bad choices. Ingrid Robeyns has made the same 
observation and traced it back to the focus of the capability approach on 
global and severe poverty. 
 There is a remarkable absence of discussion on issues of responsibility 
in the capability literature, in sharp contrast to political philosophy 
and welfare economics, where this is one of the most important 
lines of debate, certainly since the publication of Dworkin’s work 
on justice and equality. Nevertheless, whether or not one chooses 
to discuss it explicitly, any concrete capability policy proposal can 
be analyzed in terms of the division between personal and collective 
responsibility – but this terminology remains largely absent from the 
capability literature altogether. This may in part be explained by the 
OPEN
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fact that much of the work on capabilities deals with global poverty, 
where issues of responsibility seem to be less relevant since it would 
seem rather grim to suggest that the world’s most destitute people 
are individually responsible for the respective situations they are in. 
Philosophical puzzles, such as the issue of expensive tastes (for expen-
sive wine, caviar, fast cars, etc.), are simply beyond the radar screen of 
the child labourer or the poor peasant. (Robeyns 2009, 114) 
 Martha Nussbaum, who has expanded the capability approach to a 
minimal (partial) theory of justice, has not as well addressed in much 
depth the question of responsibilities, as a result of the fact that she 
understands the approach as providing guidelines for states to secure 
a minimal dignity of life for its citizens. Related questions of responsi-
bilities beneath or above the state level are not so much her concern, 
and it is unclear how responsibilities between states and beyond state 
borders should be divided to make sure that every human on this planet 
is put above the threshold in the central capabilities she selected in her 
list (Gasper 2006). She has outspokenly rejected the idea of establishing 
a world state but also argued that there is a need for principles of global 
governance, which she understands as thin and decentralized (Nussbaum 
2006). But Nussbaum also agrees – the same applies to Sen and many 
other capability theorists – that it is important to answer questions of 
responsibility. We see two main reasons for that: on the one hand, every 
concept about justice for children should be interested in the means to 
realize it, especially for children who have been shown to fall short of 
what they are entitled to. Our interest in justice is fueled by the hope 
that the clarification of these philosophical issues can also be translated 
into political change and the design of better policies, although we 
know that empirical knowledge that goes far beyond the scope of our 
book is needed to actually do that. On the other hand, every examin-
ation of the responsibilities of different agents of justice will also shed 
some light on the issue that child poverty is a socially produced and 
sustained condition. Child poverty is not natural, not something that 
cannot be changed and overcome, and the examination of responsibil-
ities underpins this claim. It is simply not enough to show that child 
poverty is unjust if this does not lead to coordinated actions; the failure 
to attribute responsibilities to specific people, individually or collect-
ively, or institutions (like the state) may also lead to diffusion, leading 
in the end to no one feeling actually responsible. In addition, we want 
to criticize the common discourse which often blames close caregivers, 
particularly mothers, for the poverty of their children. 
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 It is therefore necessary to try to name and enumerate particular “agents 
of justice” and to discuss on what grounds responsibilities can be attrib-
uted to them (O’Neill 2001; Deveaux 2013). One core question always 
concerns the relation between these agents of justice and the victims of 
the injustices in question. Why are some people, whether individually or 
as group, or some institutions responsible for changing and enhancing 
the living condition of others? In which way do they need to be connected 
to each other? For example, by living together in a country (as particu-
larists would claim), or is it enough that they are simply other humans 
sharing one world (the cosmopolitans’ position; Brock and Moellendorf 
2005)? Our account is not explicitly particularist or cosmopolitan – there 
are, moreover, so many versions of these two out there that it is hard 
to define them neatly – since we will attribute some responsibilities to 
the state and some, although far less so, to international institutions. In 
the case of child poverty in modern welfare states, the debate between 
particularism and cosmopolitanism is not so important for us: First, most 
controversies are concerned with how much responsibility can be laid 
upon richer states (and the people living within them) to support poorer 
states (and the people living within them) because the latter are over-
burdened or in a much poorer position to alleviate poverty themselves. 
In the case of welfare states, it is obvious that they are powerful, at least 
much more so than poorer states; it would not be fair to ask poorer states 
to contribute and support richer states in order to alleviate child poverty 
within them. The issue of child poverty is always an issue of redistribu-
tion within rich countries and only to a very limited extent between rich 
countries, although the economic crisis of the last years in Europe poses 
some questions in that regard (e.g., the support of Greece and Spain by 
richer countries in the EU), but we will leave these questions aside. The 
second important point in the discussion between particularists and 
cosmopolitans refers to the nature of the relations between richer and 
poorer countries. Some scholars, most prominently Thomas Pogge, claim 
that the first harm the second via one-sided trade agreements (Pogge 
2007). Virtually no one would claim that the opposite is the case and 
that poorer states have any substantial responsibilities towards richer 
states because they would unjustly gain an advantage over them. Thirdly, 
many particularists claim that the social relations within a state are of 
particular importance to justify justice and responsibilities attached to it. 
They conclude that, due to the social basis of justice, cosmopolitanism is 
not well justified. Whether or not one supports this view, child poverty 
in welfare states is without a doubt an issue that has to be tackled by that 
very state, the state and its citizens having some responsibilities. The 
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fourth issue concerns rights and institutions: there exist no social policy 
institutions on the global level and no functioning legal framework that 
would guarantee social protection from poverty. This is a major obstacle, 
and while most cosmopolitans argue that such global institutions are 
needed, most particularists contend that they will not succeed for various 
reasons. In the case of child poverty in welfare states, the situation looks 
different. Here we have states which all have at least some kind of social 
policy in place; social protection and poverty alleviation is embedded 
in certain social rights directly granted to families in poverty or chil-
dren in poverty. It is therefore much less necessary to debate whether 
global institutions are feasible and if so, in which form. Although we 
support the view that child poverty in welfare states is best tackled by 
changing the international and global institutions, most of the work 
needs to be done in welfare states themselves in terms of designing and 
implementing more inclusive social policies and allotting enough funds 
to support poor children and their caregivers. It seems likely that cosmo-
politans and particularists will come to very similar conclusions in regard 
to child poverty in welfare states, both probably agreeing to some extent 
that its alleviation is first an issue of social justice within a rich state (or a 
community of them, like the EU) and that global justice is not primarily 
concerned with it. The reduction of child poverty in richer countries is 
part of an ideal of global justice but not its primary problem. 
 Our own account will analyze the relation different agents have to 
children in poverty, and we will then try to attribute responsibilities 
based on a set of morally relevant criteria; in this sense, we will defend 
what the literature calls an agent-centered approach (Deveaux 2013; 
O’Neill 2001). Instead of focusing on one or two important agents, like 
the state and the family, we wish to distinguish more of them, including 
those with limited responsibilities. Furthermore, we wish to emphasize 
that there are some very important agents who often get neglected in 
theories of responsibilities; in this context, we point to peers and enter-
prises, for instance, which raise particularly challenging questions for 
the concept of responsibilities towards children affected by poverty. All 
this leads to the conclusion that child poverty is not only a social policy 
issue but touches many policy areas: the labor market, public infrastruc-
ture, health care, education. 
 Before we outline our own theory, let us briefly comment on one of the 
few philosophical debates that has emerged on the topic of responsibilities 
towards children and why we connect our argument only loosely to it and 
build it mainly on other approaches to responsibilities which have not so 
far addressed the specific case of children. The debate we have in mind 
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addresses whether there is a responsibility among all adult members of a 
society (parents and nonparents alike) to share the costs arising from having 
children and parenting (George 1987; Vallentyne 2002; Casal and Williams 
2004; Olsaretti 2013). This issue is a matter of controversy in the literature, 
but there seems to be a good argument in favor of the pro-sharing argu-
ment in terms of the contributions children make, on average and in the 
long run, to the welfare of a society. Most children will become taxpayers, 
support the older generations and therefore create a general benefit for the 
society in question. This again makes it reasonable that those benefiting 
from the fact that there are enough children in their society (independent 
from other relationships they have to them) have duties to secure adequate 
conditions for their upbringing (Olsaretti 2013). But for the purposes of this 
chapter, where responsibilities towards children in poverty are the focus, 
we see only limited use for this line of reasoning, first and foremost for two 
reasons. First, the responsibilities debate typically takes place in the realm 
of ideal theories of justice, assuming that having and bringing up children 
happens against fair background conditions. Such strong assumptions help 
to get to a high degree of philosophical clarity; however, it is often difficult 
to say what the arguments imply for nonideal circumstances (Sen 2009). 
We do not want to suggest that this is an impossible or useless enterprise. 
We prefer to situate our approach to responsibilities from the beginning 
in nonideal circumstances; this better fits the general orientation of our 
theory. The second, related reason is a general worry about the strategy of 
grounding moral responsibilities for children (struck by poverty or not) 
onto other agents than their parents primarily on their being “public” 
or “socialized” goods. Especially in contexts where it is unclear if some 
groups of children (e.g., those living in poverty or those with disabilities 
or chronic illnesses) will be able to contribute economically to a society it 
seems to follow from such a perspective that no one but the parents has 
a responsibility, which is an indefensible conclusion. As will become clear 
later on, one ground for attributing responsibilities to an agent is that she 
benefits from a certain situation. But this is only one aspect of a theory of 
responsibilities, and there are others which are relevant for the injustice 
of child poverty and which do not get discussed comprehensively in the 
philosophical debates just mentioned. 
 3.1 Attributing responsibilities to agents of justice 
 There are many different ways of attributing responsibilities to agents 
of justice. We begin by discussing the approach of Iris Young. In 
 Responsibilities for Justice , she distinguishes two models of responsibilities 
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(Young 2011). First, there is the liability model, which can be roughly 
described by means of two components. It (a) connects responsibility 
with directly  causing harmful outcomes and (b) assigns responsibil-
ities only to agents who perform the action in question voluntarily 
and with adequate knowledge of the situation. The liability model is 
the dominant one in legal reasoning, and it can also be considered the 
standard account of moral responsibility found in ethical theory. In this 
model, it is clear that responsibilities are assigned to concrete agents; 
there is, from this point of view, no problem for the agent-centered 
approach we want to develop. Difficulties arise, however, when we are 
confronted with structural injustices, where the causal relationships of 
causing harms are often diffuse. As Young argues, such structural injus-
tices are often the result of numerous uncoordinated individual actions, 
which, taken one by one, cannot always be deemed morally problem-
atic. Taken together, however, they might lead to consequences that 
impose significant constraints on many members of society, leading to 
inequality and poverty. 
 We can easily imagine the story of a child, Sabrina, living with her 
single mother in London. The mother, let’s call her Anne, is not well 
educated and has to make a living from insecure low-wage service jobs. 
She would like to give Sabrina a good education and a life in a calm 
neighborhood, but she struggles to pay the rent for her small flat in one 
of the most dangerous areas in London, and Sabrina has to go to a public 
school with a bad reputation. Anne spends a lot of time working and, 
due to health problems, is increasingly worried about how long she will 
be able to keep up the current situation; it is likely that things will get 
worse in the future, leading to feelings of despair and helplessness. Her 
daughter is often on her own, neglecting her schoolwork and having 
trouble developing aspirations for her future. Many more aspects of their 
situation would surely be relevant for an analysis of poverty, but what 
is important here is that it might be difficult for Anne and Sabrina to 
blame particular individuals for their difficult circumstances. Of course, 
it is possible that they are confronted with greedy and abusive employers 
and landlords, who try to take advantage of their lack of options, or with 
biased teachers who are convinced that children of single mothers will 
never be able to get to respectable academic achievements. But it is also 
conceivable that they usually find helpful persons who understand their 
situation and are willing to support them: teachers who put in an extra 
effort to motivate Sabrina or landlords who don’t have a problem if the 
rent is not always paid on time, for instance. Still, despite these morally 
praiseworthy actions and attitudes, something surely has gone wrong, 
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something that cannot directly be explained by how individuals behave 
in direct interactions with them. Anne’s and Sabrina’s lives are charac-
terized by what Young sees as  structural injustice . 
 Structural injustice [ ... ] exists when social processes put large groups 
of persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of 
the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time 
that these processes enable others to dominate or to have a wide range 
of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available to 
them. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct from the 
wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a 
state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individ-
uals and institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and inter-
ests, for the most part within the limits of accepted rules and norms. 
(Young 2011, 52) 
 For such contexts in which structural injustices exist, Young introduces 
a second account of responsibilities: the social connection model. Here, 
the central idea is that everyone participating in and contributing to 
structural processes that lead to unjust outcomes shares responsibilities 
for these injustices, even if they do not intentionally act to create the 
respective harms. Not being at fault in such a sense is not enough to be 
exempt from responsibilities. These responsibilities are essentially polit-
ical, demanding that everyone takes steps towards the transformation of 
unjust structures. Unlike the liability model, which is first and foremost 
backward looking and focuses on the identification of those who are 
actively and directly involved in causing harm, the social connection 
model focuses on the future and the importance of joint actions. On this 
account, it is not enough that a citizen follows acceptable norms and 
rules of moral conduct if she wants to be absolved from responsibilities. 
As long as the society in which she lives possesses unjust background 
conditions, she is called upon to go beyond her own interests and work 
towards a fairer society. There are also good reasons to weight the respon-
sibilities stemming from such a social connection model differently for 
different agents. In one way or another, almost every member of society 
contributes with her purchasing decisions, preferences on the job market 
or education choices to a social order with immense inequalities and 
asymmetries of power. It is, however, surely necessary to rank weights of 
responsibilities according to a variety of reasons. It is exactly here where 
an agent-centered approach fits the social connection model. Young 
introduces four different grounds, or “parameters of reasoning”, as she 
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calls them, which are relevant for balancing and weighing responsibil-
ities: power, privilege, interest and collective ability. They are related to 
the social position of an agent and can be used to identify the kinds and 
degrees of responsibilities different agents – individual and collective 
ones – have to confront structural injustices. 
 Power is relevant because agents are positioned differently in the social 
structure and have varying options for actions at their disposal. Leading 
politicians or CEOs of big companies are much closer to processes 
producing unjust outcomes and in positions to influence them than 
the unemployed or people with low-wage jobs at the company’s bottom 
rank. As a consequence, it is sensible to connect an agent’s power with 
her responsibilities. Furthermore, responsibilities should be connected 
to structural processes an agent effectively can influence. It makes no 
sense to demand actions and behaviors that are not within the reach of 
an individual; it would even go against the basic moral principle that 
“ought implies can”. 
 The category of power can be joined with two other influential ways 
of reasoning about responsibilities and duties. The first is the ability-
to-pay principle, which is highly prominent in particular in the design 
of tax systems (Gaisbauer, Schweiger and Sedmak 2013) and in recent 
discussions about climate change (Page 2008). It states that the burden 
of taxation – or any other burden – should be distributed according 
to the ability to carry the burden and to contribute to the solution of 
the problem. The ability-to-pay principle is hence often used to justify 
progressive taxation, where not only the absolute amount of taxes but 
also the tax rate itself increases according to income or wealth. Three 
distinct reasons support this principle: First, the ability-to-pay principle 
rests on the idea of the decreasing utility of wealth and income and 
that every taxpayer should make about the same sacrifice. For example, 
person A earns €1,000 per month and person B earns €5,000 per month; 
both live in Germany. If both have to pay the same amount in taxes, say 
€200, it is obvious that the living standard of person A is heavily affected 
while that of person B is nearly untouched. The case is slightly different 
if both have to pay the same tax rate; for example, 20 percent. Person A 
would again have to pay €200 and person B €1,000, but it can be argued 
that the living standard of person A is still more affected and decreased 
than that of person B. Many tax systems hence favor a progressive 
taxation, one that would make person A pay 10 percent of her income, 
which would be €100, and person B 30 percent, or €1,500. Still, the idea 
of marginal utility suggests that the €100 in taxes are maybe an even 
bigger sacrifice for person A than the €1,500 paid by person B, which is 
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a reason in favor of even higher progressive taxes. The system, however, 
already seems to be fairer than one with a “flat tax”. 
 Second, the ability-to-pay principle assumes that it generates more 
resources and funds. The total income of the persons A and B is €6,000, 
and if both paid the same absolute amount of taxes, say €200, the 
total income for the state would be €400; a tax rate of 20 percent that 
applied to both would amount to €1,200, and a progressive tax rate 
based on the ability-to-pay principle would amount to €1,600 without 
harming either A or B to an unjustifiable extent. We are aware that the 
ability-to-pay principle has its friends and foes, but we think there are 
good reasons to use it to assign responsibilities for injustices like child 
poverty: those who are able to contribute more should contribute more. 
A third supporting reason for progressive attribution of burdens based 
on the ability-to-pay principle is that it decreases inequalities. Before 
taxes, B had five times more income than person A, but after taxes, the 
inequality decreased to a ratio of about 1 to 4. 
 Another prominent principle connected to the idea of power was 
introduced by Onora O’Neill in her important article on agents of justice 
(O’Neill 2001). There she distinguished between primary and secondary 
agents of justice: primary agents have the power to assign duties and 
responsibilities to secondary agents and are in a position to use coercive 
measures if secondary agents do not comply with their duties. O’Neill 
had in mind that states are typically powerful primary agents. If they are 
weak or have failed altogether, however, as often happens in states where 
absolute poverty is prevalent, she argues that international and global 
institutions have to take on this role. However, in such cases, which are 
typical for the global poverty discourse and where conflicting interests 
exist between states, it is extremely difficult to identify institutions that 
should be seen as powerful primary agents of justice. Since we focus on 
child poverty in rich welfare states in this book, the situation is clearer 
and her argument has more force. In general, these states operate quite 
well, have command over a lot of funds and resources and the power 
to enforce most of their laws. Sometimes their powers are restricted, of 
course, but they definitely fit O’Neill’s definition of primary agents of 
justice. Hence, they have the power to set up institutions and rules that 
help to achieve justice or that can significantly influence and mobilize 
other, weaker agents – in many different contexts and particularly 
regarding structural injustices. Rich states – or in the case of Europe, the 
European Union – can introduce binding laws and policies and there-
fore provide standards that come up to the demands of social justice. 
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 There are other agents that hold considerable power over others as 
well and thus possess at least some features of primary agents of justice. 
Companies, for example, have the power to hold suppliers respon-
sible for producing under fair conditions or to provide incentives for 
employees to support the local community and do charity work. The 
wealthy members of a society often have greater influence on policies 
than the “normal” voter; it makes therefore a big difference if they lobby 
exclusively for their own interests or instead support measures empow-
ering the weaker members of society. The media constitute another 
agent, one which is often forgotten but has some real power in terms of 
influence and shaping the discourse about and attitudes towards poverty. 
It supplies people with information they have to trust and influences 
policies in campaigning for or against it. The media cannot hold anyone 
responsible for what they do or how they think about poverty, but as 
they certainly influence public opinion, they are an important agent of 
justice. 
 There are also those who benefit and who are able to live comfortable 
lives due to, for instance, the economic order of a society or the world 
as such. According to Young, such  privileges also confer responsibilities: 
those who benefit from unjust structures are morally obliged to initiate 
change. Furthermore, privileged agents can usually adapt their lifestyles 
without jeopardizing their well-being, something that also adds to their 
responsibilities. Privilege  often goes hand in hand with positions of 
power, yet this is not necessarily the case. In industrialized countries, for 
instance, broad parts of the population benefit from unjust international 
trade relations; at the same time, their power to directly alter them is 
limited and difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, their privileged position 
per se grants them special responsibilities. Of course, a full account of 
responsibilities must also look at the variety of privileges within indus-
trialized countries, which collectively profit from an unjust global order; 
there is definitely a hierarchy of privileges, and in varying degrees they 
are connected to different forms and forces of responsibilities. 
 This idea of privileges is close to the beneficiary principle (Butt 2014; 
Page 2012), which can be interpreted in at least four different ways. (1) 
People or institutions have certain responsibilities to victims of injus-
tices insofar as they voluntarily benefited from injustices as a result of 
a wrongdoing they were at least part of. In this case, the beneficiary 
principle is closely connected to Young’s liability model: the ones 
held responsible here benefited from an injustice which they at least 
partially caused, and the beneficiary principle only adds another argu-
ment. (2) People or institutions have certain responsibilities to victims 
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of injustices insofar as they involuntarily benefited from injustices as a 
result of wrongdoing they were at least part of. In this case, the one held 
responsible did something wrong but did not intend to benefit from the 
wrongdoing. For example, a company may cheat a family out of its farm 
in order to build a factory on that land, only to discover that beneath 
the land there is oil, a fact they were unaware of. Extracting the oil will 
be much more profitable than building the plant. (3) People or institu-
tions have certain responsibilities to victims of injustices insofar as they 
involuntarily benefited from the injustices as a result of a wrongdoing 
they were not part of. In this case, someone is held responsible even 
though she did nothing unjust and wrong and did not even intend to 
benefit from it; it “accidentally” happens to her. For instance, someone 
buys a house in a cheap area; after some time a rich company comes 
and pressures most other owners to leave. It develops the area, leading 
to an increase in the value of all houses there. A person who stayed in 
her house, unaware of what was going on, certainly did not plan that 
to happen and did not intend to profit; she simply stayed because it 
was her home and the general situation allowed her to. Is she in any 
way responsible for undoing this wrong or providing compensation – 
for example, by giving money to the families that had to leave? (4) 
People or institutions have certain responsibilities to victims of injus-
tices insofar as they voluntarily benefited from injustices as a result of 
wrongdoing they were no part of. For example, a person knows that a 
company is going to develop a neighborhood and that it will use illegal 
and immoral means to achieve that; she then buys a house in that area 
to profit from this wrongdoing. 
 How should we evaluate these examples from a moral point of view? 
Does it matter if someone benefited voluntarily or involuntarily or if she 
played a part in the origination of the injustice from which she bene-
fited? The first case, because of its closeness to the liability model, is not 
very controversial. Causing voluntarily an injustice one benefits from 
clearly confers a strong responsibility to the respective agent. The second 
case is mainly relevant for the extent of the responsibility in question. It 
seems reasonable that a company is responsible not only for giving back 
the land but also for paying part of the profit it made exploiting the oil. 
The beneficiary principle in this case extends the company’s obligation. 
The fourth case seems also easy to accept, since one can argue here that 
the beneficiary took part in something she knew to be wrong, even if 
she did not dirty her hands directly. The trickiest case is certainly (3): 
should someone, without doing anything wrong and without intending 
to benefit, be held responsible? On what grounds can that be? The cases 
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can be made more complicated if certain background information is 
added: For instance, the house owner who profits from the wrongdoing 
of the company planned to do the same and already established a sham 
firm but was just a few days late. Or the company is owned by the house 
owner’s brother, who wanted to help raise the house’s market value 
without telling him. In these two cases, most would agree that the house 
owner is in some sort of way responsible for trying to undo the wrong 
that happened, even though it is highly unclear how he can succeed in 
doing that. Similar examples, on a smaller scale and involving the loss 
or benefit of no more than US$1,000, have been discussed by Daniel 
Butt, who concludes that the beneficiary principle should not be legally 
enforceable on the individual level but can play an important role on 
the level of institutions or collectives, helping these types of agents 
determine responsibilities based on an evaluation of how much they 
benefited (Butt 2014). The beneficiary principle of case (3) responds to a 
certain moral intuition to owe something to those from whose suffering 
one benefits but whose extent is still to be determined. Obviously the 
house owner is neither obliged to sell his house at the higher market 
price nor give the funds to his wronged neighbors. He might, however, 
be responsible for helping them sue the company. Thus, we deal here 
with a responsibility that should not be legally enforceable but still has 
moral weight. 
 We have discussed the beneficiary principle in relation to concrete 
injustices or wrongs that happen to other persons. But as Young suggests, 
its moral force also applies to cases of structural injustices, where it is very 
difficult to disentangle who benefits and who does something wrong. 
The case of Anne and Sabrina, presented as an illustration of structural 
injustice, makes this clear. We can think of an employer, for example, 
who will give Sabrina a job in the future. He pays her a very low salary 
because of her bad education, and she has to work in precarious condi-
tions. The employer thus profits from an injustice that happened long 
before he takes advantage of poor Sabrina. He might not even intend 
to exploit her but is pressured by shareholders interested in high profit. 
He might sincerely think that giving her a low-wage job is better than 
no job at all, since she will at least be able to pay her bills and keep 
her apartment. Still, he benefits from the mere existence of people in 
vulnerable positions in the labor market, forced to take any job they 
get. Consumers who buy low-priced products because of the exploit-
ation of Sabrina’s labor benefit as well. Assuming that they do not know 
that she works under harsh conditions, what responsibilities should be 
given them? This small example illustrates how child poverty is, in fact, 
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beneficial for many people. Some of them know about the relationships 
and voluntarily take advantage of it, but there are many others who are 
unaware and would even oppose it if they knew what was happening. 
 Another relevant ground for distributing different kinds and degrees of 
responsibilities is captured by Young with the term  interests . Challenging 
unjust social structures will have a positive effect on certain groups – 
first and foremost (but not exclusively) on those who are negatively 
affected by the current inequalities and imbalances of power. It is in 
their interest that injustices are remedied and that the society they live 
in becomes a fairer one. Hence, they should also play an active part in 
these transformations; indeed, a social connection model sees them as 
agents of justice who bear responsibility for their own situation. One 
must, of course, proceed with caution here so as not to overburden 
the least advantaged members of society, attributing their weak social 
position to their own failure. But without their involvement, dedica-
tion and struggles for recognition, it is unlikely that improvements will 
occur. Furthermore, their firsthand knowledge and experience of the 
harms they suffer puts them in an epistemologically privileged position; 
it, too, generates certain responsibilities. In the case of child poverty, it 
is clear that there is also a wider interest of society and the state to alle-
viate it because of the many social and economic problems it creates. 
A society’s interest is in having children grow up to become healthy, 
productive members; this way, they are able to care for themselves and 
their own children with little state support, from which a society bene-
fits as a whole. The fight against child poverty should, hence, be driven 
by a state interest to keep the subsequent costs of benefits, unemploy-
ment, medical care and the like low. 
 Monique Deveaux has argued in a similar vein that most agent-cen-
tered approaches, in particular that of Thomas Pogge, focus on powerful 
agents and on institutions either on the national or international level 
(in questions of global poverty) and that this focus neglects the contri-
bution of the poor themselves to overcoming their poverty (Deveaux 
2013). They are conceptualized mainly as beneficiaries with very limited 
power or none at all to contribute to poverty alleviation and the realiza-
tion of justice. 
 On this framing, the designated moral agents are specifically persons 
and entities not suffering from poverty but rather responsible for 
contributing to that poverty, or thought to be capable of alleviating it 
(or both). By contrast, the would-be recipients are construed as mere 
recipients of justice, rather than as potential agents of change. [ ... ] 
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In the absence of adequate attention to perspectives and needs of the 
putative recipients of poverty reduction efforts, a focus on agents’ 
duties and capabilities risks marginalizing the role of poor communi-
ties in devising and implementing solutions to chronic poverty and 
inequality. By failing to see the poor as actual or prospective agents of 
justice, such approaches risk ignoring the root political causes of, and 
best remedies for, entrenched poverty. (Deveaux 2013, 23–24) 
 Deveaux uses the concept of agents of justice for all who can and 
should have an active role in the process of fighting injustice. This is 
further supported by insights provided by participatory approaches to 
poverty and pro-poor initiatives, as well as research on ways to empower 
the poor by taking them seriously (Drydyk 2013; Chambers 2008). 
Conceptualizing the poor as agents of justice is empowering; it acknow-
ledges that they still have the capacity to alter their lives and that they 
are not completely dominated. Furthermore, such a view entails that 
there is a responsibility on the side of other agents of justice to provide 
poor people with the means and resources – in capability terms, conver-
sion factors – they need to make choices, acquire capabilities and realize 
functionings. In the case of child poverty, children themselves have an 
interest in not being poor and not suffering from severe deprivation in 
functioning; young children, however, cannot articulate that interest, 
and older children typically do not understand the breadth and depth of 
the problems they face and their long-term consequences. Consequently, 
the main beneficiaries in the battle against child poverty are, in this 
sense, the weakest agents, who are at least to some extent dependent 
on others who advocate their interests and claim justice for them. That 
is, it seems, a central difference between children and adults in poverty. 
Poor adults are often treated like children, which is humiliating and 
degrading, while children are actually able to act as agents of justice for 
themselves only to a limited extent. This does not mean that children 
should be treated as objects without agency or the ability to express 
some of their interests; but some kind of paternalism is usually justified 
and needed in order to protect their interests. Again, it is very difficult to 
draw a line from what age, on a child’s view, should be taken as authori-
tative; the context is certainly relevant to an adequate answer to that 
question. Especially for younger children, it is very likely that those who 
have the strongest interest in realizing justice for them are not the chil-
dren themselves but their parents, families or other caregivers who have 
a close bond to them. They should have at least such a strong interest as 
part of their parental responsibilities. 
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 One additional important issue is connected to the idea of interest 
as a ground for attributing responsibilities to agents of justice: adap-
tive preferences. We have already argued that adaptive preferences are 
normal during childhood and that development during childhood itself 
is always an adaption to the environment in which one grows up and 
lives. No child is in a position to choose these things autonomously, 
naturally coming to terms with her situation. This is one of the reasons 
why functionings, not capabilities, are to be preferred as units of justice 
for children: it is simply unreasonable to emphasize freedom of choice 
when the agent in question has only very limited knowledge and experi-
ence of what she is choosing. Hence, the normative core of adaptive 
preferences is tricky to catch in the case of children, because it seems as 
if, from an objective (adult) point of view, children often tend to alter 
preferences based on what is made available to them by adults. Children 
sometimes neglect injustices happening to them; in extreme cases they 
still love and bond with abusive parents and view themselves as respon-
sible for the parents’ behavior. Adaptive preferences can also affect the 
parents and other caregivers who directly interact with the child daily. 
Parents can have adaptive preferences in the sense that they do not want 
their children to be educated or that they neglect their health issues. 
Here, the issue of parental autonomy, parental rights and duties and 
the responsibility of other agents of justice to interfere becomes crucial; 
we will come back to this later, when we discuss the responsibilities 
of parents and caregivers. For now, we highlight that the idea to put 
responsibilities on the poor as agents of justice always faces the diffi-
culty that those who should have the most interest in overcoming an 
injustice often support its existence. In such cases, it might be justified 
to neglect the choices of the poor and to enforce certain changes, even if 
it goes against their will. Expert-driven poverty alleviation is sometimes 
necessary, and in the case of children, even justified. They certainly 
cannot be expected to always make the right choices and know what is 
best for them in order to reach justice. 
 Finally, Young argues that  collective abilities are relevant. Fighting 
structural injustices is usually a matter of joint actions. Individuals 
have to work in a coordinated way in order to effect change. There 
are typically networks and groups concerned with questions of social 
justice – NGOs, trade unions, several faith-based organizations – but 
universities and other educational institutions also unite many individ-
uals. Consequently, their structures can be used to initiate or maintain 
movements aimed at undermining structural injustices. Their collective 
abilities provide a very helpful starting point, and it is reasonable to 
Responsibilities for Children in Poverty 133
suggest that this particular characteristic puts them in a position where 
special obligations arise. 
 In summary, it is crucial for both the liability model and the social 
connection model of responsibilities to identify  specific agents of justice . 
The liability model puts the focus on the intended causation of harm 
(or the knowing omission of an act causing harm); it is predominantly 
backward looking and suitable to circumstances where the causal rela-
tionships are clear and where agents who deliberately and knowingly 
bring about and keep up morally untenable outcomes can be located. 
The social connection model, in contrast, starts from the assumption 
that many injustices cannot be grasped in this way, because causal rela-
tionships are blurry and those contributing to and upholding unjust 
social structures have no bad intentions. It suggests, however, that there 
are different grounds for attributing different agents with different 
kinds and degrees of responsibilities, depending on their social posi-
tions. According to Young, primarily the categories of power, privilege, 
interests and collective abilities can be used to decide who actually has 
which responsibilities to act. 
 We think Young’s model provides a very helpful way of looking at 
responsibilities for justice. However, making it fit the special issues we 
are concerned with in this book requires some additional consider-
ations. The model has to be extended and refined in some parts for our 
purpose of identifying grounds relevant to assigning responsibilities for 
acting against child poverty. Let us start by adding another ground, one 
Young touches on only superficially, one rooted in every child’s depend-
ency on love, care and respectively close relationships. We separate the 
interest of someone that child poverty should be alleviated and over-
come from the relation to the child and the particular responsibility 
that stems from being a parent or close caregiver, having the duty and 
right of parenting. Young seems less concerned with close relations and 
how they influence the kind of responsibilities we have. We have argued 
that her grounds can and should also guide attribution of responsibil-
ities in contexts where the connection between an agent of justice and 
those who benefit is less blurred. Child poverty, as we have often said, 
is almost always family poverty, and parents have a major influence 
on their children. Parents, however, do not only have such an influ-
ence, their poverty does not only cause their children to be poor as 
well; they have different kinds of relations, which are constituted by 
being a family. Parents have some rights but certainly also responsibil-
ities towards their children; some of them can be caught by using the 
grounds discussed before. This does not, however, apply to all of them. 
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The fact of being close to the child, the fact that the child is attached to 
her parents, which is essential to the child’s development, constitutes 
another strong ground for responsibility. Children depend on having 
caregivers and being parented – whether by their biological parents or a 
different person – and it has been shown that continuity of care matters 
heavily. Parents and caregivers have thus a responsibility solely based on 
the relation they have to these children, a relation that cannot be broken 
without causing serious harm. So to our existing list of four grounds on 
which an agent can be held responsible, we add a new one: the relation 
of a child being attached to this agent and depending on her to continue 
to care and take on some responsibility. 
 The different grounds for attributing responsibility have produced 
different variations of understanding responsibility. In the liability 
model it is closely tied to causing an injustice; the social connection 
model attributes responsibility on other grounds, but it is unclear what 
this means exactly. Does responsibility of an agent of justice imply that 
she is to blame? Does it imply that she has the duty to act, a duty that 
can be enforced by others (primary agents of justice)? How is responsi-
bility tied to autonomy and choice, hence the ability to do something 
different, and how is it related to knowledge and the ability to know 
about the result of one’s actions, participating in a web of social rela-
tions that are structurally unjust? And what do we want to do with these 
five grounds? Can they help us rank agents of justice and their respon-
sibilities, for instance? Answering these questions is our aim in what 
follows. 
 An agent of justice is, so we suggest, responsible if any of the five 
criteria discussed above can be applied, with two refinements. On the 
one hand we need to consider knowledge; that is, what an agent of 
justice has known or could have known with reasonable effort about the 
results of her actions or the structural injustices she helps to create. The 
grounds presented by Young, which we also endorse, suggest that not 
knowing does not mean no responsibilities exist, though it can reduce 
the responsibility one has. On the other hand we need to put more 
weight on choice and if an agent might have acted differently or did act 
differently in the future. The ability to act differently in the past, that is, 
in creation of an injustice, is important. Nevertheless, the possibility on 
the part of the agent to alter her actions now and in the future, undoing 
the injustice or at least helping something change for the better, counts 
as well. It seems that agents are completely free of responsibilities only if 
two things can be shown: First, if they did not participate in any actions 
that led to an injustice or helped create or sustain a structurally unjust 
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context; and second, if they did not benefit in any way from the exist-
ence of an injustice and were in no position to alter their actions in a 
way that would create more justice. Applied to child poverty in welfare 
states, this means that basically everyone – except for people with severe 
disabilities or dementia or in coma or for (young) children – has some 
sort of responsibility and should therefore act to counter child poverty. 
 Young uses the grounds she specifies under the social connection 
model to specifically address injustices which are structural. In these 
circumstances, it is very unclear who is directly or causally responsible 
for the existence of a harm, making it virtually impossible to attribute 
responsibilities on the basis of the liability model. Child poverty is 
certainly such an issue; it is to a large extent a structural injustice rooted 
in the cultural, social, political and economic order of a society. It is 
upheld and reproduced by the way capitalistic societies work and how 
they are supported by nearly all people living within them, directly 
or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily. There is nearly no way to 
escape these social connections besides moving to a detached island 
and cutting off all contact to the outside; but doing many little things 
differently can make a difference: voting for another party, supporting 
the state and its institutions, not avoiding taxes, buying clean clothes, 
doing some community work and supporting those who are let down 
by the state via charity, paying fair prices and – if one is an employer – 
fair wages. Such actions and behaviors have an effect on poverty and 
on how it affects children. These effects are often indirect, but it is still 
important to anchor moral responsibilities in these “small” domains. 
If many people come up to these demands, important changes will be 
seen. 
 We want to use these grounds to assign responsibilities to agents of 
justice where the causal relation of causing an injustice is simply unclear. 
These are the cases Young developed her model for, and we follow her in 
this respect. At the same time, we wish to suggest that they also apply to 
cases where agents of justice have a more direct relation to the victims of 
injustices than just via taking part in a context of structural injustice. As 
Young presents the liability model, only those who willingly and know-
ingly cause an injustice should be held responsible; we believe this to be 
too narrow. Those who cause an injustice directly but unwillingly and/
or unknowingly should be held responsible, though to a lesser extent. As 
we saw in discussing the beneficiary principle, doing something invol-
untarily and/or unknowingly does not let one off the hook. Moreover, 
there are many cases in which agents of justice are not far away from the 
victims of injustice. In the case of global justice, where relations between 
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people living in rich states and poor states are discussed, arguing with 
closeness is usually beside the point. Thousands of kilometers separate 
them, and often no emotional bonds are present at all. In the case of 
child poverty in welfare states, however, many possible agents of justice 
interact directly with the child and influence her well-being and well-be-
coming, both directly and indirectly, through contributing to structural 
injustices within which child poverty is embedded. We therefore argue 
that these four grounds – power (we will later show that this includes 
the ability to take collective action), interest, privilege and closeness – 
together with the main ground of the liability model, causation, are all 
relevant in attributing responsibilities. 
 In a nutshell, there are many different ways in which agents of justice 
can be directly or indirectly connected to the existence and susten-
ance of child poverty and what it does to children. People can have 
many different relationships to children in poverty, and we suggest that 
this position in the child’s “environment” matters for the attribution 
of responsibilities. This category of closeness, the specific nature of the 
relation to the victims of injustice, can be implicitly found in all other 
grounds. An agent’s power to help can increase if she is closer to victims 
of injustice and is able to provide direct help (e.g., providing shelter for 
a homeless child). Likewise, the benefits gained through an unjust situ-
ation can also depend on the closeness (e.g., an employer who exploits 
a single mother benefits more from doing so than the middle-class man 
who buys the cheap clothes produced by the company to save money). 
It is also reasonable to think that state institutions such as social welfare 
departments and their employees have particular responsibilities due to 
their professional relation to families in poverty and the power they 
have to influence their lives; the responsibility to treat everyone in a fair 
way and with due respect certainly falls into this category. A neighbor 
not detecting that a child is maltreated or undernourished can be excus-
able, but if a social worker fails to do so, something is certainly wrong 
(either because the social worker is just not good at her job or because 
the state failed to provide the working conditions and resources she 
needed to do it). 
 Such a broad concept of responsibility as we endorse here makes clear 
that everyone has some share of responsibility; we cannot just lie back 
and say that it is not our problem, that others have to solve it. But there 
is danger involved, too; if everyone is responsible, this easily leads to the 
conclusion that, in the end, no one is, shifting the responsibility back 
to the “usual suspects”: the state and the families these poor children 
grow up in. We are well aware of this problem; using the grounds we laid 
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out to clarify and help identify concrete agents of justice and determine 
their responsibility is what is needed. In the best case, it would even be 
possible to determine what has to be done. We will not be able to go into 
these details here, but we will propose a first model of how these five 
grounds should be ranked and weighed against each other. 
 Our proposal is vague to some extent, in that we cannot attach exact 
numbers to each ground and then calculate a given agent’s responsi-
bility based on that. Notwithstanding, we will be more specific than 
most other models are, going far beyond just saying that each and every 
ground has the same normative force and leaving it wide open which 
agents should be held responsible. 
 The strongest reason for being responsible as an agent of justice is if 
an injustice is caused and upheld willingly and knowingly, even if this 
happened due to negligence. It seems uncontroversial that such a causal 
role carries strong responsibility for the agent in question; in fact, this 
reasoning motivates the liability model. By holding someone respon-
sible we mean that she is the first one to whom the victims of injustice 
can go and claim that the injustice should be undone or compensated. 
The respective responsibilities are therefore not only backward looking, 
as Young’s interpretation of the liability model suggests. They have a 
forward-looking component as well and demand that actions be taken 
to improve the situation in the future. 
 Second to that is power, especially the power to be a primary agent 
and to create institutions and hold other agents responsible. If an agent 
can help undo an injustice (with reasonable effort, be it noted), she 
should do so even if she did not cause it. Third on the list is the rela-
tion a certain agent has to the child, in particular if it is a caring rela-
tion, which is essential for the child. We put this high on the list simply 
because of the particular needs and vulnerabilities of children. Fourth 
in our ranking is gaining privileges and benefiting from the existence 
of an injustice. The fifth and weakest reason to be held responsible is to 
have an interest in overcoming the injustice, in particular if the interest 
stems from being a victim of this injustice oneself. Let us support this 
ranking with an example. Consider a family with three children that 
is pushed into and held in poverty because of the action of an agent, 
A. The father was the only one working in the family, but A employed 
him in precarious and exploitative conditions. He had to work more 
than he could bear and eventually quit his job due to health reasons, 
leaving the whole family without an income. It is reasonable that agent 
A is the first one to be held responsible. We also have agent B, who has 
nothing to do with what happened but has a lot of power and is well 
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equipped to step in and support the family. In a rich society, the state 
typically meets these criteria. If agents A and B cannot do anything to 
help, then it is up to the mother to try to find a job, leaving her children 
alone during the day. But if she cannot find anything or finds only jobs 
she cannot accept for good reasons, she will be in a situation in which 
she no longer is able to provide a decent living for her children. In these 
circumstances, another agent comes into play: a person in her neighbor-
hood, who works closely with the father’s employer and who has bene-
fited from the fact that A exploits his workers and his profits are high. 
The neighbor did not intend to do anything wrong and was not aware 
of the schemes of his business partner, but he surely benefited; if there is 
no one else to turn to, his responsibilities are strong. The children them-
selves have the weakest obligation in respect to their own poverty. The 
two younger ones, aged one and three, obviously cannot do anything. 
The older one, aged ten, could work for the neighbors and support her 
mother and siblings, but from a moral point of view, this fact can confer 
only very weak responsibilities. 
 Three important things should be noted here. Firstly, in many cases 
more than one reason to be responsible can be applied. The state, for 
example, is powerful and has some interest in keeping children out of 
poverty. Then there might be an uncle that is well off and close to the 
children; he certainly ought to step in and support the mother if the 
state fails to do so. It is possible that the state might fail but the society 
has other powerful institutions like charities. Secondly, responsibility 
rises if more than one reason can be applied. Take a company that has 
the means to pay fair wages and provide good working conditions but, 
due to its focus on maximizing profits, exploits women and hence harms 
both them and their children. This company is more to blame and needs 
to shoulder more responsibility than an equally powerful company that 
makes only moderate profit because it pays fair wages but could do more 
in respect of better work-life-balance programs for its workers. It is again 
important to keep in mind that the responsibilities individuals have are 
attached to their positions within an institution. A politician has the 
responsibility to make the state and its institutions work in such a way 
that injustices do not occur or are alleviated; this may happen by trying 
to increase the working conditions and introduce a minimum wage. 
As a private person, her responsibilities are different and have more to 
do with paying a fair wage to her cleaner instead of exploiting her, for 
instance. Finally, it is possible to construct examples in which arguments 
speak against our weighting or in which the case is less clear. Such an 
example would be another very rich neighbor who is powerful but did 
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not profit from the precarious conditions the father was employed in. Is 
she responsible for stepping in even before the mother tries to work to 
make ends meet, because power ranks higher than closeness? We would 
agree that, in such a case, the rich neighbor has a responsibility towards 
these children and has to step in if the mother could provide for her 
children only by excessive and harmful means like leaving them alone 
and moving to another country for work. 
 3.2 Important agents of justice and their responsibilities 
 In the previous section, we tried to narrow down grounds on which 
agents of justice can be held responsible and presented a ranking of 
the grounds. A still missing but equally important point is to identify 
agents of justice in the first place. Some clarifications are needed before 
we can do that. One the one hand, we need to distinguish between 
agents responsible for doing something about the child being poor and 
agents responsible for doing something about the negative effects of 
being poor. These are different issues. We argued that child poverty is 
unjust because it leads to severe deprivations in important function-
ings. Hence, it is a state of ill-being and leads to ill-becoming; it is a 
major obstacle to developing important capabilities adults should have. 
But these negative effects of child poverty can certainly be alleviated 
to some extent without changing the poverty condition itself, at least 
if one uses a monetary definition of poverty. Think of the example of 
social inclusion from the previous chapter. Children in poverty are 
more likely to be excluded due to a lack of adequate transportation and 
because they are often stigmatized by other people, including their peers 
in school. Both aspects could be different without moving the child out 
of poverty measured by household income. In such a case, the harsh 
effects of poverty are alleviated, and the deprivation in this aspect 
might not even occur. Again, household income is just one measure for 
poverty in welfare states; measures like deprivation indicators could use 
access to transportation and being stigmatized as indicators for poverty. 
In that case, providing transportation and a change in the behavior and 
attitudes of other persons and children towards their poor peers would 
translate into a move out of poverty. It is also very likely that some 
agents who cannot do much about the poverty of the child can do a 
lot in regard to how poverty translates into disadvantages and depriva-
tions. A more inclusive health care system that provides free and low-
threshold health care might be combined with outreach social work. 
Taken together, these measures can certainly make a difference and 
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help increase the health of many poor children. Some agents may be 
able to do much about the poverty status of the child while not directly 
influencing other dimensions of its well-being and well-becoming. The 
employer of the father or mother, for instance, who decides to pay a 
higher wage and improve working conditions, aiming at more family-
friendly working hours, certainly influences what a child is able to do 
and be. Eventually such changes can move her and her family out of 
poverty, but the employer still can influence the health and education 
of the child only indirectly. 
 Since the relation between poverty and the deprivations discussed in 
Chapter 2 suggests that poverty is a very important cause for them, we 
argue that poverty should be targeted directly if possible. Alleviating 
the effects of poverty is like fighting the symptoms and not the disease. 
This in no way implies that one should not care about alleviating the 
effects of child poverty. Setting up more inclusive health care systems 
that directly target poor children is definitely a good thing. We know 
that they are a particularly vulnerable group and in need of support. In 
situations where it is unlikely that poverty can be directly tackled or in 
which it is foreseeable that progress on that front is coming very slowly, 
it is necessary to use all means available to counter what poverty does 
to children, even if they cannot be moved out of poverty. One must not 
forget, however, that the fundamental normative problem is that chil-
dren grow up in poverty and that there is a need for a systematic change 
to this. 
 Identifying agents of justice for child poverty is a task that should be 
informed by empirical evidence. The relations between different agents 
in the child’s environment and the way they actually influence her 
well-being and well-becoming is complex, and we have already indi-
cated that a focus on state and family is too narrow. A very influential 
theory that guides our specification is the ecological model proposed 
by Urie Bronfenbrenner, a psychologist who worked on child devel-
opment (Bronfenbrenner 1979; Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2007). His 
bioecological model aims to conceptualize child development based on 
an understanding that development is the change and continuity of 
biopsychological characteristics of humans over the life course, a devel-
opment shaped by direct and indirect interactions between the devel-
oping human being and her environments. Bronfenbrenner’s model, 
used in empirical work for more than three decades, is also applied in 
research that aims to understand the effects of child poverty and in social 
work (Eamon 2001; Jack 1997). Such ecological approaches are especially 
fruitful in concepts of child well-being and well-becoming, which follow 
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a multidimensional approach and want to understand the embedding 
of children in different environments and how they are influenced by 
them (Aldgate 2010; Graf and Schweiger 2015). Bronfenbrenner distin-
guishes five so-called systems: the microsystem, the mesosystem, the 
exosystem, the macrosystem and the chronosystem. Bronfenbrenner’s 
model is not a philosophical one; it is also not primarily interested in 
child poverty and not conceptualized to identify agents of justice in the 
sense explored before. It simply tells us what different kinds of envir-
onments are important in children’s lives, as well as something about 
how child poverty can affect the child through these different systems 
by affecting the microsystem and the direct interaction between parents 
and child and other environments in which the child is present, like the 
school, the neighborhood and social service. Furthermore, this model 
can provide relevant information for a general concept of justice for 
children by showing what necessary conversion factors children need 
to develop – hence for developing functionings and, once they have 
reached a certain level of freedom, capabilities. In a nutshell, such a 
bioecological model shows that children’s development, the very 
acquiring of any functioning on which later functionings and capabil-
ities can grow, is a process in which many different agents are present 
and where they have direct and indirect influence. 
 This ecological approach gives further weight to Young’s approach, 
according to which one must look not just at those who directly and 
knowingly cause harm and injustice but at the broader context in which 
children grow up to see whether this context is suitable and supporting 
or harming and disadvantageous for some children. In political phil-
osophy and most theories of justice, there is a focus on the state and 
its institutions (basic infrastructure, as one might say) or on powerful 
international and global institutions that shape the lives of hundreds 
of millions of people by their policies and actions. We have already 
argued with Monique Deveaux that weaker individuals can also be seen 
as agents of justice, in the sense that they can do something important 
to overcome an injustice. In general, we think it is very plausible to 
view both persons and institutions as possible agents of justice. Since 
all institutions are made up of persons acting within them, the attrib-
uted responsibilities are transferred to them as far as they are in institu-
tional roles. For example, if a certain company is called upon to change 
its behavior, the call is directed more at that company and less at the 
managers leading it. This becomes clear if a change in management does 
not lead to a change in the attribution of responsibility on that company. 
The people running the company are the ones responsible for its actions 
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but only insofar as they have roles within the institution. The managers 
of the company may have many other responsibilities in their other 
roles: being members of a particular society, living in a certain commu-
nity, having children, profiting from structural injustices or injustices 
they cause directly through their jobs and the like. The same can be 
said of politicians who are in charge of designing their society’s institu-
tions and also those of the world in general through an international 
agency in which they act and which they support or help design. If one 
understands agents of justice in this sense, the categories of power and 
collective ability seem to collapse into each other and become one. An 
institution is often powerful because it can coordinate the actions of 
many people through their being members of that institution. 
 Partially following this ecological approach, we distinguish eight 
agents according to their relation to the child. The agents are listed such 
that they grow ever more distant from the child in poverty in terms of 
direct interaction. This says nothing about other parameters, like influ-
ence on the child via indirect interaction or structural injustices or in 
terms of causing the child’s poverty and connected harm and depriva-
tions. We use “agent” in a loose sense and in some cases prefer to name 
environments and institutions, not particular individuals. In accord 
with what we said before, however, we always address the relevant indi-
viduals within these environments and institutions, since in the end 
they must start acting against child poverty. 
 The child herself. The child herself is an active agent interacting with (1) 
her environments and also influencing and shaping them to some 
extent. Children in poverty are not mere passive objects. From an 
early stage on, they position themselves within their living condi-
tions and must try to cope with them in some way, whether success-
fully or not. Participatory research has revealed many different ways 
that children try to do so (Ridge 2009). Poverty makes living harder 
for children; if it is very severe, it can kill them. It would, however, 
be wrong to deny them any agency when it comes to evaluating 
their condition or determining how it should be changed. We have 
argued that any justifiable theory of childhood nowadays incorpo-
rates a strong agency aspect that actively involves children in their 
own development. At the same time, one has to be clear that the 
exact moral status of their perspective has to be weighed by their 
age and maturity. 
 The family and close caregivers. The family is obviously crucial to (2) 
alleviating child poverty and securing justice for children. Child 
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poverty most often happens in the family children grow up and live 
in, and the condition of the family is a major source of the child’s 
ill-being and well-being alike. Furthermore, it largely shapes the 
future of the child and influences what capabilities and function-
ings can be developed and achieved. Early development especially is 
based on interactions between the child and close caregivers, which 
can hardly be replaced adequately. Attachment and love and care 
are needed for the healthy development and well-being of a child. 
Poverty can, as we have already shown, disrupt families and even 
destroy them (Barnett 2008; Goodman et al. 2009). As the exact 
meaning of “family” is still in dispute, the mentioned relationships 
of love and care can – within certain limits – take on different forms 
depending on the social and cultural context. However, the import-
ance of some form of family relationship for a child’s well-being and 
well-becoming is recognized across different cultures and times. 
 Friendship, leisure and neighborhood. This category describes all (3) 
the different agents with which, besides the core family, children 
in poverty interact in a nonprofessional way. This group is obvi-
ously very heterogeneous and encompasses close friends as well as 
neighbors, school peers and relatives. Although their influence on 
the poverty condition of the child is typically limited and they are 
not in a position to alleviate material hardship, they still exercise 
some influence. For instance, they are crucial for the way a child 
experiences her situation in terms of social exclusion and feelings 
of disrespect and humiliation. Children are often excluded, stigma-
tized and denigrated for being poor by their environment, which 
is highly stressful. Such experiences are likely to lead to isolation, 
shame and low self-worth, factors that make reaching important 
functionings and capabilities difficult. 
 The social and political institutions on the local and state level (e.g., (4) 
public infrastructure, health care, education). This group of institutions 
and persons acting within them is crucial for children’s development 
and well-being. Children in poverty are to a great degree dependent 
on the existence of public health care, education and social services 
in order to achieve capabilities and functionings. Without them, they 
are in danger of ill-being and ill-becoming in various ways, and poor 
families have no resources to take the place of a failing public infra-
structure. Therefore, they are the ones hardest hit by austerity meas-
ures that cut the welfare system. It is important to note that these 
institutions have to be inclusive and set up in a way that they can also 
be afforded, reached and used by those who need them. 
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 The economy and the labor market. Besides the public infrastruc-(5) 
ture and the welfare system, the economy and the labor market are 
probably the most influential institutions when it comes to child 
poverty, although children are kept out of both to a large extent 
in many countries. It is a widely shared conviction in many coun-
tries, especially in the highly developed world, that children should 
not work to provide for themselves, and up to a certain age it is 
certain they cannot do so anyway. The economic position of the 
family, however, determines the life chances of the children who 
live in them in many ways. Work, income and wealth, education, 
health, social status and power are interdependent throughout the 
life course, even before birth and early childhood. It is therefore no 
surprise that welfare and workfare are very close and that work and 
improvements to the family’s economic position are seen as primary 
child poverty alleviation measures in many countries. They enable 
families to provide for children without aid from the state or other 
national and international institutions and NGOs. 
 The community of citizens in a society. Every child is a member (6) 
of a wider community; in most cases, children are citizens of the 
states they live and grow up in. Citizenship is important for access 
to services and institutions and determines which rights children 
have on the national or local level. The citizenship of their parents 
or caregivers is equally important. On the one hand, if children 
and their families are illegal immigrants or have refugee status, 
they usually have significantly lower opportunities in the country 
they live in; they may be denied political and social rights. On the 
other hand, being member of a bigger community provides certain 
opportunities. In many states, the welfare system is supported by 
the majority of citizens who finance it, and there is a certain degree 
of solidarity between them. Whether or not one agrees that justice 
is dependent on such a mutual sense of community, it is certainly 
the case that citizens influence each other’s well-being even if 
they never interact directly. Prominent examples are tax systems, 
to which everyone contributes and which are crucial to financing 
the welfare system from which the worst-off profit the most. Other 
examples are political institutions: on the one hand, they might be 
designed in an inclusive way, supporting poverty alleviation and 
creating a sense of solidarity; on the other hand, they might opt for 
gated communities, private schools, cuts in the welfare system and 
the criminalization of begging, thereby marginalizing poor families 
and their children. 
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 The economic and political institutions on the international and (7) 
global level. The local and national economy and labor market, 
as well as local and national public institutions, are not insular 
and detached from the international and global level. The global 
economic and political architecture and the power of transnational 
companies to avoid taxes, to put pressure on states and to lobby 
their interests highly influence child poverty and pose challenges 
for the supporting welfare systems. Especially in poorer countries, 
poverty alleviation is directly financed and designed by international 
institutions and NGOs; international treaties and agreements shape 
such countries’ economic and social development and their ability 
to design and control policies in areas from health care to the labor 
market (Craig and Porter 2006). Hence, particularly in poor coun-
tries dominated by such international rules, child poverty is shaped 
to a large extent by forces external to their own political and social 
institutions. 
 The global community of humans. Humans share one earth, and (8) 
through the various forms of globalization, the connections between 
them have intensified. The global chains of production and trade, 
which certainly produce winners and losers, mass tourism across 
the whole world and a globalized aid system in which resources 
from rich countries are transferred to poorer ones in the name of 
charity are just three examples of how people living in very distant 
places can effectively influence each other’s lives. These connections 
are typically manifold and interlaced, making it difficult to isolate 
and specify an individual’s exact position in the overall “network”. 
Nevertheless, these relations exist, and their normative dimensions 
must also be considered in an account of responsibilities. 
 We now have eight different groups of agents that are obviously 
involved in the well-being and well-becoming of a child in poverty and 
her being poor in the first place. Each of these groups and the agents 
within them, such as companies, deserve a close examination so as to 
scrutinize their responsibilities based on the grounds we distinguished 
before. Unfortunately, this would go far beyond the scope of this book, 
and so we present only a first systematization and ranking. After that, 
we will focus on two agents, the family and the state, since they are 
crucial to the alleviation of child poverty. 
 High level of responsibilities. The group with the highest level of (a) 
responsibilities encompasses social and political institutions on the 
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local and state level (public infrastructure; health care, school, social 
care) and close caregivers. Based on our criteria for attributing respon-
sibility, it is clear why these two are so important. Within the family, 
parents especially are closely related to their children, influencing 
them heavily and having direct power to alter their lives. They have 
(or should have) a strong interest in overcoming the child’s poverty 
(this often implies that they themselves escape poverty). At the same 
time, the family is often weakly positioned to change the poverty 
condition because it is most likely poor and marginalized, a state 
that can be reinforced by health issues or related problems. Thus, its 
power has to be seen in the relevant context, acknowledging that it 
is often severely limited. The state, on the other hand, is the most 
powerful agent, especially if it is a modern welfare state. It can hold 
other agents and parents responsible and define what they owe chil-
dren. Moreover, the state can be said to be a major source for the 
existence of child poverty in the first place, because it failed to set 
up an inclusive labor market and a well-working economy in which 
everyone finds a decently paid and secure job. The state has a strong 
interest in alleviating child poverty as well, because it is founded 
around such ideas as equality of opportunity and justice for adults, 
to which child poverty is a major obstacle. The state can further-
more be interested in avoiding many of the functional deprivations 
connected to poverty, since they amount to high costs over the life 
course (e.g., in the health care system or the social welfare systems 
that have to pay long-term unemployment benefits to adults who did 
not get a decent education when they were young). Social and polit-
ical institutions on the local and state level are in the best position 
to help – if they are financed and equipped properly, as we assume 
here for argument’s sake – and they can do so without any sacri-
fice on their own. They can successfully support children and their 
families and can provide them with such crucial conversion factors 
as health care, education and public infrastructure. We believe this 
analysis still widely holds true for the states we focus on. However, 
we acknowledge that the state’s actions are limited insofar as it is 
embedded in wider international and global relations and institu-
tions. In fact, there is an observable tendency that many states give 
up some of their power to transnational companies, which are more 
and more in a position to blackmail rich states and avoid taxes and 
lobby to weaken labor laws. These are trends that must be observed 
closely, since they clearly have the potential to alter the account of 
responsibilities we are developing here. 
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 Midlevel of responsibilities. This group of institutions includes (b) 
the community of citizens within a society, friendship, leisure and 
neighborhood, the economy and the labor market, as well as polit-
ical institutions on the international and global level. The commu-
nity of citizens has only midlevel responsibilities that include the 
obligation to financially and politically support institutions and 
policies necessary for alleviating child poverty. They should do so 
to the extent they can without their own claims of justice being 
infringed. Citizens can have more comprehensive responsibilities to 
help if institutions fail or are not sufficient, as in cases of natural 
disasters. Persons interacting directly with poor children, like their 
peers, friends, neighbors and other persons they meet in public, 
have only midlevel responsibility, too. Naturally, this group has the 
same types of responsibilities as the community of citizens, since it 
is a subgroup of it, but there are some additional factors. As these 
agents are closer to the child, their direct influence is greater, as is 
their ability to intervene; therefore, their responsibilities have more 
weight. One very important obligation in this domain is treating the 
child respectfully and refraining from humiliating and excluding 
behaviors. Another is to keep the neighborhood safe and child-
friendly, not make it a dangerous and insecure place. Surely, friends 
and peers who are themselves children have fewer responsibilities 
than adults; they usually belong to the last group we will discuss. 
But again, the line is difficult to draw; with teenagers, there might be 
cases where responsibility is relatively high. The economy and the 
labor market are in this midlevel because of their important influ-
ence on the child’s poverty by providing families with decent jobs 
or goods and services at fair and affordable prices. The economy 
and labor market – together with failed policies to regulate them 
properly – are among the main initiators of child poverty. Political 
and economic institutions on the international and global level are 
often overlooked, and child poverty is conceptualized as a local or 
national problem – but it is not in any exclusive sense. Every state is 
embedded in the global economic and political regime, and effective 
poverty alleviation will have to include significant changes on this 
level as well. 
 Low level of responsibilities. The group with the lowest level of (c) 
responsibilities is composed of the global human community and the 
child herself. The child is clearly in the weakest position to change 
her situation, at least until a certain age. We would argue that older 
children, who have achieved a certain level of competency and are 
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therefore also allowed a certain degree of autonomy and choice for 
themselves, have a certain degree of responsibility for their choices 
and actions. They do not have an obligation towards themselves in 
the strict sense, but if they make deliberately bad choices that lower 
their well-being and well-becoming – like criminal acts and drop-
ping out of school – they should also face the consequences. Still, 
the degree to which adolescents should be held responsible is debat-
able. The global community of humans – we exclude here those in 
high positions of power – has only weak responsibilities towards 
children in poverty living in other countries. The possibility of influ-
encing their condition is limited, especially compared to the local 
and national public institutions available in all developed countries, 
about which we next speak. This does not mean that they have no 
responsibilities at all, such as to support change on the global level. 
 3.3 The family and the state 
 Having presented a first systematization and ranking of agents of justice, 
we wish to comment further on the family and the state. The first issue 
that needs to be addressed is causality and responsibility for the child’s 
being poor. The second is causality for the negative effects of child 
poverty and whether the parents are largely to blame for it because their 
behavior is an important mediating factor. The reason for discussing 
these issues is that if the parents are held responsible but obviously fail 
to fulfill their responsibility, strong intervention could be justified. We 
will then explore what the state and society in general owe parents as 
support for them in taking care of their children. 
 If the parents of poor children are responsible for their children’s 
poverty and/or for severe but preventable deprivations due to their 
poverty, the state has basically four options: to support the parents and 
help them become better parents and escape poverty; to take the chil-
dren away and put them in state care; to take the children away and 
give them to other parents; and as a preventive option, to make it less 
likely that poor parents have children in the first place. All the options 
are based on the assumption that the parents of poor children are not 
in a position to prevent and overcome their own poverty and that of 
their children, at least not without being helped by others. This assump-
tion is very important, because in most literature regarding responsibil-
ities towards children it is argued that the parents have to take care and 
that it might even be unjust to put the costs of care on other agents, 
including the state. In the case of poverty such a conclusion is not of 
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much help, because poor parents cannot do what might be reason-
ably demanded of nonpoor parents under the circumstances of a just 
society. As soon as a child comes to exist, she has a claim to justice; if her 
parents fail to provide for her, someone else must. Anything else would 
be unjust and cruel, since children cannot be held responsible for being 
born to parents who are ill adapted to meet their needs and claims of 
well-being and well-becoming. In this sense we take here a child-cen-
tered line of argument and are not closely concerned with the question 
of whether fulfilling claims of justice of poor children puts unjustifiable 
burdens on other agents. We think that it does not and that each and 
every citizen has a responsibility to support its state to realize justice 
for all children, whether or not the citizen is a parent. In the nonideal 
circumstances in which we live now, this is even less controversial than 
it might be in an ideally just society, where everyone has a fair share and 
would be expected to give something from it. Today we are far from that 
situation. 
 We begin by discussing briefly the relationship between parents and 
their children and the rights parents have. It is now widely acknowledged 
that children have certain rights and parents also have rights and that 
parents can make and need to make important decisions for their chil-
dren. Compulsory education is a case in which the state itself exercises 
a right to determine large parts of children’s lives. The tension between 
parental and children’s rights and the right of the state to intervene in 
the family is obvious. We take here a child-centered approach that argues 
that in this triangle children are the primary right bearers and parents 
have rights that flow from them. In terms of justice this means that chil-
dren have claims of justice towards their parents and that it is the parents’ 
responsibility to fulfill these claims up to a just minimum. Hence, we do 
not think that a property view of parental rights, which views children 
as the property of their parents, is appropriate. Under the premise of the 
capability approach, no person is the property of another, because this 
would violate the demand of equal respect. This is similar to an argument 
developed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift that argues convincingly 
that parental rights should be based on the children’s rights to be cared 
for in their interest – though maybe not their best interests, because these 
are hard to define and unlikely to be accomplished perfectly. There is no 
society-wide feasible alternative to the family as a place for children to be 
raised, although in thought experiments such options can be imagined. 
In theory, it is thinkable that a well-run orphanage might do a better job 
than any parent could do and that such a society would be more just 
in terms of equality of opportunity, but this comes at very high costs 
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(Munoz-Darde 1999; Schoeman 1980). It is very unlikely that parents 
would be willing to give up their children. They would sooner consider 
leaving the country or trying other ways to keep and raise their children 
themselves. The same applies to such ideas as redistributing babies to 
better (i.e., richer) parents as a generally used mean to secure justice for 
children. To deprive poor parents of their children simply because they are 
poor would be fighting one injustice with another. Some practical issues 
stand against such an idea as well, such as the problem that there might 
not be enough rich families who would want to raise another person’s 
children. There is also some evidence that suggests that the risk of being 
abused and mistreated is higher for children raised by those to whom they 
are not biologically related (Daly and Wilson 1999). Taking away the child 
is, thus, a last resort. Moreover, attachment theory suggests that taking 
away a child always mean harming the child; staying with close caregivers 
the child is attached to is very important for the child. Still, in cases of 
abuse and severe neglect, taking away the child is justified. This means 
that parents, even poor parents, have a right to act as parents only as long 
as they provide their children with a minimally decent life. A similar argu-
ment was made by David Archard in his defense of parental rights. 
 We have said both that parents’ rights are limited and that they are 
conditional on parents’ protecting certain of the children’s interests. 
Failure to protect those interests amounts to a forfeiture of the right, 
in the same way that failure to obey just laws implies forfeiting one’s 
right to freedom of association. All accounts of parental rights, in 
order to be plausible, have to make them conditional on parents’ 
meeting certain of their children’s interests adequately (Brighouse 
and Swift 2006, 103). 
 In sum, the rights individuals have as parents within a liberal society 
are the rights to bring up their children as they choose so long as 
they discharge the morally prior duty of ensuring that their children 
enjoy a minimally decent life. They do not have the rights of prop-
erty owners to dispose of their offspring as they would their estate. 
However they are not required, as liberal principles might seem to 
demand, to bring up their children to enjoy maximally open futures; 
nor must they do so in such a way as would satisfy a liberal principle 
of legitimacy. (Archard 2010, 50) 
 The tricky question in regard to poverty is if being poor falls below the 
threshold and if parents who can be said to be poor through their own 
fault should lose their rights as parents. In this case, it would be justified 
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to take away their children, because the harm of being taken away would 
be less severe than the harm of staying in the family. Poverty would 
then fall into the same category as abuse and severe neglect, which also 
count as legitimate reasons for state intervention today. In fact, empir-
ical research shows that children from poor families are more often 
taken away, and it has also been suggested that social workers are more 
likely to intervene in poor families than in richer ones, even if the level 
of neglect or abuse is similar. 
 We now want to discuss why parents are not fully responsible for being 
poor and why this leads to the conclusion that even if poverty should 
constitute falling under the threshold necessary to uphold parental rights, 
parents should be supported instead of having their children taken away. 
Most people in poverty are not poor by choice, in the sense that they 
wish to be poor. The question is whether poor parents can be seen as 
being poor because they made bad and wrong choices, which lead them 
to become poor against their will and desire. This would be evaluated as 
a kind of deserving poverty. The first argument that speaks against such 
a conclusion is that poverty is very often grounded in childhood, and 
the intergenerational transmission of poverty suggests that people move 
through the life course on a trajectory that is very hard to change. It is 
certainly not impossible to escape poverty, but it is hard to because of the 
many disadvantages we discussed, like deprivations in health and educa-
tion. The second argument in favor of our conclusion is the structural 
nature of poverty. The economic crisis of the last years pushed millions 
of people into poverty and made it much harder to escape it, showing 
impressively that the individual is dependent on the economic and social 
chances she finds. If there are simply not enough jobs available, someone 
will be unemployed, and if the economy changes in a way that transfers 
jobs from one country to another, the individual worker with a family 
and a mortgage to repay simply cannot move along (in fact, in most cases 
this would not help much, since it would still be too expensive). 
 The counterargument, that uneducated persons are much more vulner-
able to poverty, captures only one dimension and so must be rejected 
at least partly. Educational choices are in many countries made very 
early and depend on such things as available schools in the neighbor-
hood or the support from parents. Children cannot control them, and 
when they reach an age at which they can be held partially responsible 
for their educational achievements and choices, it is often too late. We do 
not wish to dismiss adolescents completely, but they are at least partially 
the victims of their circumstances and the environments in which they 
grew up, which makes it more likely that they will leave school early, 
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become teenage parents or start to work early in insecure low-wage jobs. 
Furthermore, education is important, but so are other factors – for example, 
health and disability. The fact that single parents are much more often 
poor speaks not so much against these mothers and fathers as it reflects 
gender inequalities in the labor market (England 2005), the undervaluing 
of jobs done mainly by women and the lack of economic recognition of 
care work, as well as the difficulties of supporting young children with a 
part-time job in an environment which does not have enough affordable 
child care facilities. Many poor adults have certainly made bad choices 
and are partially to be blamed for them, especially if they are respon-
sible for children, in which case their bad choices’ consequences fall upon 
others who are particular vulnerable. But all the knowledge and evidence 
about poverty in welfare states suggests that most people are victims more 
of their circumstances than of their bad choices. 
 This conclusion is closely connected to the second point concerned 
with the behavior of poor parents and how they influence their chil-
dren’s well-being and well-becoming. We saw in the last chapter that 
parents mediate how poverty affects their children. Two examples from 
research illustrate this point. An older study on the effects of severe 
economic hardship on children during the Depression found that 
parenting behavior plays a crucial role (Elder, Nguyen and Caspi 1985). 
The most interesting result, however, was that the rejecting behavior 
of the fathers had a significant negative impact on the psychosocial 
well-being of their daughters, a behavior related to the physical attract-
iveness of the daughters. Put simply, fathers treated their daughters 
better if they were more attractive, which led to higher psychosocial 
well-being in these girls. This means that the child’s development and 
her well-being and well-becoming were influenced by the economic 
downturn, and this had influenced a major agent in their lives and 
the interactions taking place between the child and this agent. More 
importantly, this interaction was also shaped by a characteristic of the 
girls themselves, although they had no control over it. In a 2002 study, 
Mary Eamon investigated the relation between poverty and antisocial 
behavior of children from twelve to fourteen (Eamon 2002). She found 
that physical punishment, lower levels of parental emotional support, 
deviant peer pressure and neighborhood problems all predict anti-
social behavior and that children living in poverty are more likely to 
experience these. The effect of poverty on antisocial behavior is there-
fore influenced by both the interactions within the family (parenting 
behavior) and the interactions with peers and with the wider social 
environment (neighborhood). 
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 Both these examples show how important parents’ behavior is in the 
translation of poverty into negative outcomes in other areas of well-
being and well-becoming. How much blame for the outcomes can be 
attributed to the parents, then, and can it lead to a justification of state 
intervention? Again, we argue that it is enough to show that parents 
are not fully responsible for many of their choices that affect their chil-
dren and that this suggests that the state has a responsibility to support 
rather than punish them. Parents living in poverty in most cases have 
limited opportunities – and capabilities and functionings – when it 
comes to improving their own living conditions and those of their chil-
dren. Lack of resources translates into a lack of freedoms in this respect, 
which becomes evident for such things as paying for heating, a better 
flat, moving to a different neighborhood or paying for repairs and special 
treatments not covered by general insurance (in some modern and highly 
developed societies, millions of children and families are not covered by 
any medical insurance). Trickier from a moral point of view are “choices” 
such as taking drugs or drinking during pregnancy, child neglect due 
to addictions or simple bad parenting (as in the two earlier cases). We 
make a much weaker claim here: namely, that behaviors are themselves 
partially determined by socioeconomic position and how one grows up 
and is socialized; this claim seems to be supported by some evidence now 
(Pinderhughes et al. 2001; Russell, Harris and Gockel 2008). The claim 
that at least some important aspects of the choices we make are socially 
determined is, we believe, uncontroversial. The case of fathers treating 
their attractive daughters better shows that. Under better circumstances, 
such behavior probably carries little weight or does not happen at all. It 
is hence something that is not under full control of these fathers, and so 
we argue that the responsibility should be at least partially shifted from 
the fathers to the economic downturn and the state, which was unable 
to compensate adequately. We cannot specify how many of the choices 
poor people and parents make can be attributed to factors they cannot 
control themselves, but we would claim the portion is large enough to 
support our interpretation that the behavioral influence on their chil-
dren’s life is not in their full responsibility and that as they have often 
limited possibilities to alter their behavior, they cannot be held fully 
responsible for it. William J. Wilson has come to the same conclusion in 
his influential study on urban poverty in the USA:
 This is not to argue that individuals and groups lack freedom to make 
their own choices, engage in certain conduct and develop certain 
styles and orientations, but it is to say that these decisions and actions 
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occur within a context of constraints and opportunities that are dras-
tically different from those present in middle-class society. (Wilson 
1997, 55) 
 This does not indicate that they are not responsible at all and that poverty 
is an excuse for everything. It is certainly not. Let us consider another 
example: a study has shown that the economic downturn of the last 
years increased significantly the cases of children suffering from abusive 
head trauma (shaken baby syndrome; Berger et al. 2011). It seems as if 
stress caused by unemployment and financial strain leads more parents 
to behave in this abusive and severely harmful way. In such a case we 
believe two lessons can be learned: On the one hand, poverty does not 
excuse such behavior. Parents’ responsibility is to support their children, 
not hurt them. On the other hand, if poverty helps us understand why 
parents act in such a way, it certainly implies that other agents of justice 
for children, mainly the state and its institutions, should either alle-
viate poverty and unemployment in the first place or act preventively 
to support families and parents so that they do not display this kind of 
destructive behavior. 
 Where does this leave us now? Parents are an important mediator, 
they are not fully responsible for being poor or for all of their (moder-
ately) bad parenting, and there is no really feasible alternative to them, 
since placing children either in state care or with other, richer parents 
incurs many other problems. Would it be best if poor parents did not 
have children in the first place? The state then would not have to inter-
vene, and there would be no issues of responsibility for poverty or bad 
parenting to begin with. There is actually some support for this claim 
to be found in the literature, not only with a focus on children that 
would not be born and then could not be harmed. We leave aside the 
nonidentity problem and do not discuss whether it would be good if 
no one had children, considering it to be always harmful. We start with 
the assumptions that being born is good and that children born into 
poverty are more likely to have a bad life, in the sense of an unjust 
life, hampered by deprivations in important functionings and capabil-
ities. We assume furthermore that the state has the ability to intervene 
and that it could alleviate poverty for these children by supporting their 
parents or that it could at least alleviate most negative effects of child 
poverty, limiting them to an extent that is within reasonable range of 
the risks every other child has to live with. Hence, if the state changes, 
it can secure justice for children having been born poor, which certainly 
comes at some costs the state could use otherwise if these children were 
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not born at all. Under these circumstances – and we think they more 
or less accurately reflect what is possible in all modern welfare states – 
the state is allowed to enable and responsible for enabling all people, 
adolescents in particular, with a real choice if and when they want to 
become parents. It is thus responsible for providing knowledge about 
reproductive health and helping them plan their parenthood. Again, 
we are confronted here with a very sensitive issue about which many 
different opinions exist (e.g., religious groups that argue that family 
planning is always wrong and the state should never provide manda-
tory sexual education). Adaptive preferences, or to put it more moder-
ately, unreflecting choices of younger adults and adolescents are an issue 
here. The reasons why young women get pregnant are multifold and 
can include gender roles, carelessness, lack of knowledge and the hope 
of stabilizing a relationship with a baby. Considering this, there is a fine 
line between education, helping people make good choices for them-
selves – this is the ideal of the capability approach – and manipulating 
or pushing them to make a choice that is good for the state. Under the 
circumstances described above, all adults and, to a lesser extent, adoles-
cents are entitled to become parents if they wish, and the state has the 
responsibility to support them in making that decision freely and with 
respect to their own life plans. The state has the further responsibility 
to support the parents on their way to parenthood, providing prenatal 
health care and social services in cases where there is an indication that 
problems exist, as for parents-to-be in poverty. Furthermore, the state 
certainly has the responsibility to support the parents after birth and in 
their efforts to be good parents; it is not allowed to compel poor persons 
to not become parents in the first place for the sake of merely sparing 
some funds. Reproduction and the capability of becoming a parent 
and acting as a parent – on the condition that one provides for that 
child sufficiently, with the help of the state, if needed – are part of what 
constitutes justice for adults. 
 Our arguments so far have been concerned with the claim that the state 
is not allowed to take children away from poor parents solely because 
they are poor or to hinder them from becoming parents. We have said 
little about the responsibilities the state has subsequently in regard to 
children born into poor families or living in families that become poor 
while the children are young; we also have not explored the responsibil-
ities poor parents have in respect to their children, besides having to care 
for them sufficiently – for which Brighouse and Adams used the term 
“interests” and Archard used “a minimal decent living”. We wish to use 
here an argument developed by Anne Alstott, who argues that parents 
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have an obligation to stay and no right to exit their parenthood; based 
on that responsibility, the state has the responsibility to support them 
in doing that. She derives the obligation to stay from an analysis of the 
importance of continuity of care. Put otherwise, children’s well-being 
and well-becoming are dependent, not totally but largely, on continuity 
of care, on having caregivers who stay and do not leave them. 
 No Exit is the flip side of continuity of care. We have seen that 
society expects parents to provide continuity, and it depends on 
them to do so. But when parents commit to continuity of care for 
their children, they limit their own capacity to exit, in two senses. 
Most obviously, parents undertake to stay with their children for the 
long term and not to leave them. But in addition, continuity of care 
requires parents to reshuffle their priorities: parents must strive to 
meet their children’s material and emotional needs, and they must, 
if need be, limit their own aspirations and forgo opportunities to do 
so. (Alstott 2004, 51) 
 Alstott is interested in what continuity of care, hence the no exit obli-
gation, implies for parents – namely, that they are limited in their 
autonomy, both in local autonomy to make choices (like going on a 
spontaneous romantic trip) and global autonomy, which concerns 
long-term choices. Such a parent-centered approach coincides with a 
child-centered approach that asks not what the state owes to parents 
but what the state owes to children; from this the parents benefit only 
because they are the mediators and conversion factors of state resources 
that cannot be directly given to children due to their limited capaci-
ties, vulnerability and powerlessness. Such a child-centered line of argu-
ment can even conclude that poverty-alleviating measures targeted at 
children benefit parents only as a side effect, since they are the neces-
sary mediators. In some policy areas, such an argument is more likely 
to receive support than a parent-centered approach that claims parents 
have certain entitlements or rights regardless of the benefits for the chil-
dren. The parent-centered argument, according to which parents fulfill a 
necessary responsibility towards children that demands certain sacrifices 
and in which they deserve to be supported, and the child-centered argu-
ment – according to which children are entitled to certain functionings 
and parents being the best mediators to help realize them, parents need 
to be supported because of that – come to very similar conclusions. 
 Parents have basically eight different types of responsibilities towards 
their children; they show a great overlap in regard to what we demand 
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of justice for children in terms of functionings they are entitled to. The 
first, as Alstott convincingly shows, is the responsibility to stay parents 
and not to leave, unless staying is either unbearable for them or would 
harm the child more. Parents should stay because children need them 
to. This implies that whenever parents make a decision that could affect 
their children, they are to take them into account and give them due 
weight. The second responsibility is to provide for them materially and 
give them decent living conditions. This encompasses a wide range of 
functionings: having adequate shelter, clothes, toys, time for play and 
the like. It is not possible to draft a final list detached from a particular 
context, but deprivation indicators that select necessary goods in a 
particular society can be used here. The third responsibility is to meet 
the health needs of their children and provide them with access to 
health care when they need it, seeing that they are healthy, develop 
healthy lifestyles and acquire knowledge about their bodies and minds. 
The fourth responsibility is to provide for them emotionally and let 
them experience deep attachments and security. Others have discussed 
whether a child has a right to be loved (Liao 2006); we see good grounds 
to deny that (Cowden 2012). An emotion can never be enforced by 
others – this is the only meaningful interpretation of having a certain 
right. But parents or other caregivers can be required to let the child 
experience attachments necessary for her healthy development. The 
fifth responsibility is to take care of children’s well-becoming and see 
that they acquire functionings that will help them develop important 
capabilities in the future. This includes being responsible that children 
get some good options in their life so that they can participate in their 
own development. Joel Feinberg has prominently argued that chil-
dren should have a right to an open future (Feinberg 1980). This claim, 
however, should not be interpreted in terms of maximization (Mills 
2003): No one can ever provide a child with a fully open future, because 
growing up and developing functionings and capabilities always closes 
the door to other options. The life course is in many ways structured, 
not only by parents but by the whole environment and the state (Kohli 
2007), and nothing more can be demanded from parents than to help 
their children develop into autonomous beings who have a broad range 
of options, selected on the available knowledge at that time. Parents are, 
thus, not to be blamed if they support a child in becoming a journalist 
and she later becomes unemployed because the news branch is hit hard 
by new technological developments; at the time, becoming a journalist 
might have seemed a very good option and life plan. The sixth respon-
sibility of parents is to aim for inclusion in social activities and groups. 
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They should help their children make friends and be in the public. The 
seventh responsibility is to give their children room for making deci-
sions themselves according to maturity and competencies. To guide their 
children, parents are allowed to prevent them from doing things, but 
children should be heard, be given voice and be able to decide (small) 
things for themselves from a certain stage on. Parents are responsible for 
letting children take on some responsibility for their actions. The eighth 
and last responsibility is to protect children from harm and dangers. 
This responsibility to protect, based in the vulnerability of children, is 
never fully comprehensive. Growing up and exploring the world always 
implies some dangers and the risk of accidents, injuries or other bad 
experiences. Parents cannot and are not responsible for fully protecting 
their children; this would be possible only by applying very restrictive 
measures that would rob the children of other valuable experiences. 
Parents should therefore protect their children, but exposure to poten-
tial risks is always necessary and justified within reasonable limits. 
 The parents’ responsibilities that focus on their own child also imply 
that they have good reasons to favor the best result for their child, 
even at the expense of other children. This partiality is unavoidable in 
parenting not only because of the special relationship between children 
and parents but also because parents have only little influence on the 
choices of other parents; it is reasonable for them to expect that other 
parents will increase the functionings and capabilities of their children 
even if this has negative side effects on other children. The state, on the 
other hand, can set up and run education and health care systems which 
provide every child with a fair chance and produce healthier and better-
educated children regardless of their socioeconomic background. As the 
state has to look after all its children and citizens, it also has the respon-
sibility to interfere with parents’ decisions and actions that either harm 
their own or other children. This leads us to propose a first systematiza-
tion of responsibilities of the state towards children in poverty based on 
our examination of justice for children. 
 At first, the state has to come up with a list of important function-
ings and capabilities and discuss whether or not these are all of equal 
value. We argued in Chapter 1 that fertile functionings should be treated 
with priority because of their positive influence on other functionings 
and capabilities (e.g., for their instrumental value). We further argued 
that this means that corrosive disadvantages should be tackled with 
a higher priority because they undermine many important function-
ings and capabilities. We discussed lists and methods to select dimen-
sion; this is an ongoing effort, particularly in regard to formulation of 
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concrete policies. We are confident that the functionings and capabil-
ities discussed – health, education and inclusion – will be on any such 
list and also will come out with a high priority. 
 Secondly, this means that child poverty is a corrosive disadvantage; to 
put it in positive terms, the functioning of being not poor is a fertile area 
and so should receive close attention. This implies two different tasks: 
the first is to alleviate poverty itself, to provide for the material well-being 
of child and family; as this can be done in many different ways, further 
scrutiny is needed to see which way shows the best results. The second 
task is to alleviate the corrosiveness of child poverty, hence its negative 
influence on other functionings and capabilities. Health, education and 
inclusion, for example, can be enhanced for children in poverty without 
alleviating their poverty directly. For example, if it is known that stress 
due to poverty during pregnancy affects the birth outcome, it could be 
a good measure to include a mandatory stress screening in prenatal care 
and to reach out to at-risk women and provide them the opportunity for 
counseling or other forms of stress management. In some countries such 
programs have already been set up and show positive results (Loureiro 
et al. 2009). 
 Thirdly, in regard to these functionings and capabilities, the state 
needs to further specify them and set adequate thresholds; it should 
aim to set them in a way that shows equal concern for each and every 
child, that minimizes inequalities in them based on such arbitrary and 
undeserved traits as being poor and that secures an equal opportunity 
for well-being in later life. It does that adequately only if it invests as 
many resources in children’s well-being and well-becoming compatible 
with its other responsibilities of justice to all its citizens. Here, again, the 
idea of a priority view is important: the state should prioritize children 
in poverty and help them overcome the group-based injustices they 
suffer from. The limits to this priority view are drawn by the justified 
claims of other children and adults, which should not be put below the 
threshold, and also by the supply-side sufficiency view, which claims 
that the state should not overburden itself. 
 Fourth, the state is responsible for supporting parents or other 
caregivers in their responsibilities, which we laid out earlier. It has to 
give them the means to be good parents to the extent that is possible, 
but it is also responsible for dimensions of justice that cannot be covered 
by the parents, such as equality of opportunity for all children. Parents 
can support their children in being educated and can also make some 
crucial choices regarding their education, but whether the education 
system itself produces equal outcomes is far beyond their control. If 
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parents or other caregivers cannot fulfill their responsibilities, the state 
is obliged to step in. The particular vulnerability of children and their 
limited capacity to take care of themselves adequately imply necessarily 
that the state – or if the state fails then a different agent of justice – 
has to substitute and provide for these children, whether it does so by 
seeking new guardians for them or by putting them in protectory. 
 We have derived responsibilities of the state towards children from 
the perspective of what is owed to these children in order to provide 
them with well-being and well-becoming. Because poor children most 
often live in poor families, the costs attached to these state responsi-
bilities cannot be shouldered by them. We have said much about the 
family and the state, which could lead one to the conclusion that justice 
for poor children is an issue concerned just with these two agents. This 
is, however, certainly not what we argue. The responsibilities of family 
and state derive from their relation to the child, from their power and 
interest in overcoming child poverty to support these children. Other 
agents have other reasons to be responsible; the state, as one important 
primary agent, can influence them much more than the family, which is 
faced with such problems as how the economy works, how gender roles 
are attributed and how to deal with the stigma of being poor. 
 3.4 Conclusions 
 In this chapter we have explored the issue of responsibilities towards 
children in poverty, focusing on the relevant agents of justice who can 
be held responsible for doing something about it. Our model is still 
vague, but this vagueness reflects both the complexity of the issue and 
the limits of philosophical inquiry. Based on the criteria presented, to 
attribute concrete responsibilities to the groups of agents we named 
would require a much deeper empirical knowledge. To some extent it 
would not be possible to disentangle relations and interferences. We 
argued that families in poverty are limited in their power and that 
parenting behavior is shaped and influenced by how these parents grew 
up and lived in poverty. It is not possible to disaggregate exactly how 
much of their harmful behavior can be attributed to circumstances 
for which they are not responsible themselves and how much respon-
sibility they have to shoulder. Being poor comes with a restriction of 
freedom, one that is, however, not total. It would be unjust to neglect 
poor parents completely as agents of justice; this would either degrade 
them to children, which they are not, or to persons with severe mental 
disabilities who are not able to make choice for themselves. Likewise, it 
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is not possible to calculate the responsibility of any given company, one 
that just does what nearly all others do: try to take advantage of their 
workers, make a profit, avoid taxes and so on. But even without exact 
calculations, we believe that our extension of Young’s model of respon-
sibilities to the issue of child poverty is a step in the right direction. The 
identification of different reasons for attributing responsibilities and 
agents of justice can offer initial guidance to coordinated actions neces-
sary to achieve real improvements. 
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view 
a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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 4 
 Advancing Our Approach to 
Global Justice for Children 
 So far, we have outlined a concept of social justice for children in welfare 
states and criticized child poverty within them as unjust. We have argued 
that different agents are responsible for securing justice for these children 
and that the respective extent of their responsibility can be determined, 
at least approximately, using different criteria relating to the capacities 
of these actors and their role in the causation of child poverty, as well 
as their relation to the child and her living condition. The state and its 
institutions – education system, health care, social protection services 
and so on – are obviously the most important agents in this respect: 
as they possess metaresponsibility, they should enforce, if necessary, 
the responsibility of other agents. We have already discussed the inter-
national and global level briefly, acknowledging that it is of importance. 
We have argued, however, that we view the state and its institutions as 
the primary agent in the case of child poverty in modern welfare states – 
they are still strong enough and have plenty of opportunities to shape 
their own institutions and societies. Still, child poverty in welfare states 
is more likely to be alleviated and eradicated if the international and 
global structures within which these states have to act and by which their 
opportunities and institutions are influenced also change. Nevertheless, 
welfare states can do much about child poverty even under the present 
unjust global structure. The situation is different for ‘weaker’ and devel-
oping countries, where child poverty is more widespread and severe. 
These countries have fewer opportunities, and it is very unlikely that 
child poverty in these regions can ever be eradicated without thinking 
about global justice; their problems are simply too closely intertwined 
with imbalances in the current global order. 
 It is clear that in poorer countries child poverty is a much more severe 
and widespread problem than in welfare states, where most poor children 
OPEN
Advancing Our Approach to Global Justice for Children 163
reach a level of well-being and well-becoming that is higher than that of 
most children worldwide. Yet one should never use these differences in 
the severity of absolute poverty, so to speak, to underestimate or down-
play the severity of relative poverty; this is certainly not our intention 
in this chapter. Child poverty in welfare states is an injustice that weighs 
heavily and demands coordinated action. An examination of child 
poverty on the global scale, however, shows how it deprives even the 
most fundamental functionings and capabilities, leading to starvation, 
homelessness and death. These forms of deprivation constitute such 
blatant injustices that one can only wonder why it is still allowed to 
exist in a world that has reached such a high technological level. 
 UNICEF (2005) reported that in 2005 every second child in the world 
(1 billion) lived in poverty, that one in three children (640 million) in 
developing countries lived without adequate shelter, that one in five 
children (400 million) had no access to safe water and that one in seven 
children (270 million) had no access to health services. In 2011, close to 
6.9 million children died before their fifth birthday, most of them due 
to a lack of access to nutrition and basic medical care (UNICEF 2012). 
These figures alone give a glimpse of how child poverty in poorer coun-
tries affects many dimensions of the physical, emotional, social and 
economic well-being and well-becoming of children and of how our 
world fails to deliver to these children what they are entitled to as a 
matter of justice. Hence, in this last chapter we wish to at least outline 
how we think our approach extends to these issues. We touch upon two 
aspects of particular importance: first, the task of identifying function-
ings and of setting thresholds that work as a benchmark for criticizing 
global child poverty; and second, the need to prioritize the attribution 
of responsibilities on a global scale. 
 In Chapter 1 we proposed criteria to help identify functionings chil-
dren are entitled to as a matter of justice; we do not see why they should 
not be applicable to any context and to all children in this world. Built 
into these criteria, however, is the claim that the functionings and 
respective thresholds have to be interpreted according to the context 
in which a child lives and that the level of welfare in that country is of 
particular relevance. As we furthermore argued, thresholds of function-
ings as well as capabilities are best interpreted in terms of more specified 
functionings and capabilities. To come back to the earlier example, the 
adequate threshold for the general functioning of being educated can be 
the functioning of going to school for nine years or achieving an educa-
tion that enables one to succeed in the labor market in that society. 
Thresholds are thus specifications of functionings, and it is possible to 
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understand them in terms of a combination of different such specified 
functionings. The threshold of the functioning of being healthy can, 
for instance, be specified using three functionings: (a) living as many 
healthy life years as the average in that society, (b) receiving all vaccines 
medical evidence identifies as beneficial and (c) not being affected by 
more illnesses than others due to arbitrary features that cannot be traced 
back to voluntary choices as an adult or to innate features that cannot 
be altered by medical care without subjecting other persons to other 
injustices. 
 These three functionings refer to important aspects of being healthy, 
but whereas the first and the third directly address the status of being 
healthy, the second one is related to a preventive measure. This points 
to another important issue; namely, that the thresholds of functionings 
are often to be translated into functionings that affect the achievement 
of the respective functioning. The chosen threshold is, then, only an 
indirect specification. We have largely ignored such problems in the 
selection of concrete functionings and their thresholds; instead, we used 
a ‘negative’ approach to criticize the injustice of poverty by looking at 
what it does to the poor children compared with their nonpoor peers who 
live in the same country. We have not judged the effects of child poverty 
on education by using a particular threshold, but we examined how well 
children in poverty fare in the education system and what educational 
achievements they have compared with those of nonpoor school chil-
dren. It can be criticized that this strategy to disclose injustices gives an 
inaccurate evaluation because it is possible that all children in a certain 
society are below the threshold for the functioning of education and 
that looking at the inequalities produced by child poverty does not give 
a clear picture of the problem. We are aware of that; unfortunately, we 
could not come up with a better answer than to say that for the context 
we are interested in – namely, modern welfare states – we assume that 
the majority of children are above the threshold and that looking at the 
inequality and disadvantage produced by poverty is what counts under 
such advanced circumstances. If one uses the threshold of going to 
school for six or nine years, nearly all children in modern welfare states 
reach this threshold, but as we made clear, there still exist injustices in 
education – a deprivation in the functioning to be educated – that are 
related to the socioeconomic position of the child. Furthermore, we did 
not tackle the question of whether comparative weighting of different 
functionings is reasonable and feasible, even necessary in some circum-
stances, but assumed that at least the four functionings examined in 
more detail are highly important – but are they equally important? 
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 For an expansion of our approach to cover global child poverty, 
these issues become even more problematic, since a sufficient answer 
for welfare states – to look at relative poverty and the disadvantages it 
produces – is surely not enough for developing countries. It could be 
argued that there is a much more urgent need to prioritize certain func-
tionings in poorer countries – for example, health and nutrition – and 
to give them more weight than, say, education. Such a prioritization 
should not be understood as devaluing education. Poverty alleviation 
relies on improving education and also empowering poor people to 
become agents of justice; the role of education is crucial. Furthermore, 
as was argued in some detail, education can be seen as a fertile func-
tioning, influencing many other aspects of a person’s life and the lives 
of whole communities. Still, without having one’s nutrition and basic 
health secured, education’s value is usually marginal; thus there is good 
reason to secure first what is essential for survival and only then secure 
other functionings and capabilities. This reasoning has strong parallels 
to Henry Shue’s arguments for a basic right to subsistence:
 No one can fully, if at all, enjoy any right that is supposedly protected 
by society if he or she lacks the essentials for a reasonably healthy 
and active life. Deficiencies in the means of subsistence can be just 
as fatal, incapacitating, or painful as violations of physical security. 
The resulting damage or death can at least as decisively prevent the 
enjoyment of any right as can the effects of security violations. (Shue 
1996, 24) 
 On the global level, using such absolute thresholds and specifying func-
tionings that define them is necessary. This is a very tricky task, and 
poverty research is limited in what functionings it can use as well, since 
some are easier to measure and to survey than others. In some cases, the 
functionings used to measure poverty are the result of the data available. 
Sabina Alkire, a pioneer in the application of the capability approach 
in global poverty measurement, used the following six indicators to 
measure child poverty in Bangladesh (Alkire and Roche 2012):
 Nutrition. Children who are more than two standard deviations (1) 
below the international reference population for stunting (height 
for age) or wasting (weight for height) or are underweight (weight 
for age). The standardization follows the algorithms provided by 
WHO’s Child Growth Reference Study. 
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 Water. Children who use water from an unapproved source, such as (2) 
open wells or springs, or use surface water (time to reach the water 
source is not included because this information was not available for 
the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 1997). 
 Sanitation. Children who use an unapproved sanitation facility, (3) 
such as a pit latrine without slab, open pit latrine, bucket toilet or a 
hanging toilet. 
 Health. Children who have not been immunized by age two. (4) 
Children are deprived if they do not receive at least eight of the nine 
vaccinations – bcg, dpt1, dpt2, dpt3, polio0, polio1, polio2, polio3, 
measles – or do not receive treatment for an illness involving an 
acute respiratory infection or diarrhea. 
 Shelter. Children who live in a house with no flooring (i.e., a mud or (5) 
dung floor) or inadequate roofing (overcrowding was not taken into 
account because the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 
1997 does not register the number of rooms used for sleeping). 
 Information. Children with no access to a radio or television (i.e., (6) 
broadcast media). This indicator applies only to children above age 
three. 
 Alkire herself is well aware that this selection reflects just a few dimen-
sions of child poverty and that other important information is missing, 
but these pragmatic choices can be justified in empirical research –having 
some knowledge of a few functionings is always better than having 
none. For a concept of global justice, this is certainly not enough. 
Unfortunately, philosophers have seldom engaged with this task in 
such a way that they came up with functionings or capabilities that can 
really be measured. Nussbaum and others do write about the problem 
but do not provide us with many answers; it is unclear what the exact 
thresholds for capabilities on Nussbaum’s list are, for being healthy, for 
example, or being able to use one’s senses. Not long ago, Ingrid Robeyns 
called the capability approach radically underspecified (Robeyns 2006), 
a critique that is still valid. For children, developing beings that change 
significantly over a rather short period of time, these problems are even 
more compelling, and issues of poverty dynamics and evolving func-
tionings and capabilities are more relevant. We do not aim to come up 
with a definite list of functionings and respective thresholds for these 
functionings in terms of specified measurable functionings either. What 
is important, though, is to tackle the problem of differences between 
contexts. The functionings described above and used by Alkire in the 
context of Bangladesh show that over 90 percent of children live in a 
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house with no flooring or inadequate roofing, and the deprivation rates 
for nutrition, sanitation and information (access to broadcast media) are 
nearly 60 percent. These numbers speak for themselves and make the 
injustice of child poverty in Bangladesh and other developing countries 
clearly visible. But in regard to the nature and effects of child poverty 
in modern welfare states, these functionings provide us with barely 
any information at all. Still, there is poverty, and in the course of this 
book we have presented some of its moral implications. The fact that 
it cannot be measured using the functionings employed by Alkire in 
Bangladesh must not lead to the conclusion that the living conditions 
of the respective children are free from any problems. 
 Against this background, where should the thresholds be set? In which 
functionings should they be specified? There is a real danger in setting 
them either too low or too high. We see two different basic strategies 
for handling the questions, though with important variances. The first 
is to differentiate between countries and allow them to set their own 
thresholds, at least within reasonable limits. This approach is favored 
by Nussbaum and also by Sen, who has a far more pragmatic approach 
and leaves the selection of the relevant functionings and capabilities up 
to the respective nations or societies. Nussbaum has made her approach 
clear on numerous occasions: 
 Setting the threshold precisely is a matter for each nation, and, within 
certain limits, it is reasonable for nations to do this differently, in 
keeping with their history and traditions. (Nussbaum 2011, 41) 
 Indeed, part of the idea of the list is its  multiple realizability : its members 
can be more concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and 
circumstances. It is thus designed to leave room for a reasonable 
pluralism in specification. The threshold level of each of the central 
capabilities will need more precise determination, as citizens work 
toward a consensus for political purposes. This can be envisaged as 
taking place within each constitutional tradition, as it evolves through 
interpretation and deliberation. (Nussbaum 2000, 77) 
 There are at least two problems with this solution, of which Nussbaum 
and others are well aware; still, no one has come up with a sufficient 
answer so far. On the one hand, this differentiating approach produces 
results that seem to contradict the aim of a concept of justice; namely, to 
provide all children with sufficient functionings that they need for their 
well-being and well-becoming. Again, we use the example of education. 
Mario Biggeri and his colleagues researched child poverty in Afghanistan 
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and used the percentage of primary-school-age children who are not 
enrolled in school to measure educational functioning (Biggeri, Trani 
and Mauro 2010). Interpreting this in normative terms in a concept 
of justice, we say that every child of primary school age is entitled to 
go to school. For a child in a welfare state like Germany or the United 
Kingdom, the threshold would be different due to the fact that nearly 
all children of that age are enrolled, making it much more reasonable 
to take completion of secondary education as a minimum standard. In 
the language of justice, each and every child in Germany is entitled, 
as a matter of justice, to finish secondary education because this is the 
basic threshold for the functioning of education. If one uses these two 
different thresholds, a puzzling and disturbing result is that a child who 
does not finish secondary education in Germany is evaluated as being 
wronged, while a child in Afghanistan in the same circumstances is not. 
This seems questionable, as these two children are different in no feature 
save the arbitrary one of birthplace. It would be unjust in itself, so it 
appears, to tolerate exactly the same deprivation for one child and criti-
cize it for the other. Is the child living in Afghanistan not entitled to 
the same level of functioning in education as the child in Germany? Is 
she of unequal worth? Does she not have the same entitlement to well-
being and well-becoming? 
 On the other hand, Nussbaum and others claim that for some func-
tionings or capabilities, the threshold should be universal and in some 
even strictly egalitarian in the sense that every human is entitled to 
the same. An example for adults would be voting rights, which should 
be, according to Nussbaum, distributed equally; it would be unjust if a 
society decides to let only men vote or to let them vote for their house-
hold. An example for children would probably be the functioning to 
live free of exploitation (which is on the list of Biggeri); it seems reason-
able and necessary to claim that each and every child, no matter in 
which society, is entitled to being equally free of exploitation, with all 
the relevant protections in place. The question then arises: what func-
tionings and capabilities (of children) should be universal, and what 
thresholds should be used? Furthermore, it is not obvious who should 
be able give answers to these questions, and, again, the issue of power 
arises forcefully. 
 We believe that these difficulties give us enough reasons to dismiss 
this strategy and be in favor of the second one, which sets universal 
thresholds for all children wherever they live. This implies that the 
threshold children are entitled to reach in a specific functioning is the 
same in Austria, the USA, Bangladesh, India and South Africa. As we said 
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in regard to some functionings, this is also claimed by proponents of 
the first strategy. We gave as examples voting rights and freedom from 
exploitations, where any differentiations between different members of 
society are clearly always wrong. But we go a step further and demand 
this feature for each and every functioning that matters for justice. 
 The crucial question, then, is how to set such universal thresholds, 
which should neither be too high, so that they cannot be reached by 
most countries, nor too low, so that many forms of injustices cannot be 
detected and criticized. We agree that solving this problem cannot be 
done by relying on philosophical reasoning alone and that empirical 
knowledge that goes beyond the scope of what we are able to provide 
here is needed. Nonetheless, we believe that a concept of global justice 
still has to come up with some answer that goes beyond simply handing 
over the problem to the social sciences or politicians. 
 Our solution is to claim that the threshold for each functioning (or 
capability, if it comes to older children) should be set at a level as high as 
it is already for the majority of children in welfare states. Let us explain 
this solution in more detail: the first assumption is that today’s world 
is highly unjust and that children across the globe are hindered from 
developing and sustaining high levels in all important functionings. 
They die too young, they suffer from preventable diseases and they lack 
sufficient education as well as inclusion and political participation. We 
assume that this world could do a much better job and that its polit-
ical, cultural, social and economic institutions could be designed and 
implemented in a much better way, reducing or even setting aside the 
inequalities between children – and between the countries they live in. 
We assume that all children in this world could reach the level of func-
tioning reached by a majority of children in modern welfare states if the 
world just looked different. This is one main reason that we propose a 
universal threshold – it gives a clear picture of a world in which it is not 
enough that children in poorer countries are a little bit healthier than 
they are today, get a little more education and are a little less likely to be 
deprived of shelter, food and clean water. Doubtless, such a world would 
already constitute an improvement, but it is not one we should aspire 
to. The goal must be to improve the well-being and well-becoming of 
all children to a level that some children worldwide – and a majority of 
children in welfare states – enjoy today, simply because we can do it. We 
know that this account is connected to a very high level of sufficiency, 
one that is not even realized for all children in modern welfare states, 
but everything else seems too low. We do not strive for perfection with 
these thresholds either, and it should be clear enough that the level of 
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well-being and well-becoming that the majority of children in welfare 
states enjoy (the best indication for a just threshold, in our view) are 
still far away from a maximum. In the first chapter, we have already 
dismissed a maximizing view in well-being and well-becoming for two 
reasons: first, it is too demanding on the side of those who are respon-
sible for securing it for children, and second, it is highly unclear how 
such a maximum could be defined in the first place. Our threshold, 
instead, takes up a more realistic stance concerning what should be 
achieved; that it is already achieved for many children in many coun-
tries also counters the objection that such high thresholds are not feas-
ible. If a few countries can do it, why should the whole world not be able 
to set up a much more inclusive welfare system, with social protection, 
education, health care and so on? Still, our approach leaves a lot of room 
for differentiation and different ways to realize justice for children. Here 
it is important not to mix thresholds of functionings with the conver-
sion factors to achieve them. A threshold can, according to our account, 
take the form of enabling each and every child a comprehensive educa-
tion that prepares them with the necessary skills and competencies to 
become active members of society, to make informed decisions and to 
be aware of the equal worth of all humans. This threshold has to be set 
in accordance with the levels of well-being and well-becoming currently 
achieved in modern welfare states and is, in this sense, not relative. It is 
oriented toward what is reasonably achievable and goes beyond typical 
capability theorists’ rather relativist approaches. It is important to note, 
however, that we are dealing here with a threshold in terms of specified 
functionings – and so we argue for a universalist account (one adaptable 
through time and in general circumstances on a global level, though). 
 But the conversion factors to achieve this threshold can be very 
different. They can refer, for example, to a public school system that 
limits the role of private schools or to an active role by organizations 
and the early inclusion of children and adolescents in regional decision-
making processes. Modern welfare states today show a wide range of 
such conversion factors, and it is often not clear which yields better 
results; it seems that there are always trade-offs to be considered and 
that a conversion factor that is highly beneficial to achieve one func-
tioning has a slightly negative effect on a different functioning or that 
two conversion factors can come into conflict with each other. There is 
plenty of room for each society and state to design its own institutions. 
Such a universal threshold is also in line with what we did over the 
course of this book in regard to child poverty in welfare states and highly 
developed societies. Even within them, children in poverty fall short in 
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comparison with their nonpoor peers and are contingently disadvan-
taged in many dimensions. These societies would be much more just if 
they enabled all children living within them to reach what is reached for 
the majority of children who are not poor. 
 The second question that seems crucial for a concept of global justice 
for children concerns attributing responsibilities. We have proposed a first 
systematization for children in welfare states, and the main difference to 
this in respect to global child poverty is probably the responsibility we 
can lay upon poor states and their institutions. Poorer countries, where 
child poverty is most severe and widespread, are much weaker than in 
the USA and European welfare states. These states have far less power 
and fewer opportunities to counteract child poverty in their countries, 
to secure justice for these children and allow them to achieve a sufficient 
level in each important functioning (Babb 2009; Williamson 2011). 
Most theorists of global justice acknowledge this inequality between 
states, especially the international political and economic order’s role in 
producing and reproducing these inequalities, keeping poorer countries 
from developing and from building stronger social protection systems 
and achieving a higher level of welfare for their citizens. 
 Poor countries need trade for development. They do not get fair 
trading opportunities under the WTO regime; but one that failed 
to sign up would find its trading opportunities even more severely 
curtailed. Any poor country is forced to decide about whether to sign 
up to the WTO rules against the background of other rules that it 
cannot escape and that make it extremely costly not to sign up. One 
such rule is, for instance, that the people and firms of poor coun-
tries may not freely offer their products and services to people in 
rich countries. This rule enables the rich countries to exact a price for 
whatever limited access to their markets they are prepared to grant. 
Part of this price is that the intellectual property rights of rich-country 
corporations must be respected and enforced. Poor-country govern-
ments must help collect rents for those corporations, thereby driving 
up the cost of pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs for their own popula-
tions. Paying this price makes sense perhaps for poor countries, given 
their calamitous circumstances. But this calamity is due to a rule that 
the rich countries impose unilaterally, without any consent by the 
poor. (Pogge 2007, 43) 
 This leads us to conclude that the responsibilities of the agents of justice 
in regard to global child poverty should be weighted differently and that 
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the agents on the international and global level have a much higher 
responsibility, while the states high up on the list when it comes to child 
poverty in welfare states move down. They are to a substantial extent 
the victims of injustices themselves and have only limited options to 
move their citizens, adults as well as children, out of poverty. Still, these 
states share some responsibility and are obliged to do what is in their 
power to secure justice for children living in their societies and to adapt 
their cultural, social, political and economic institutions in such a way 
that they provide the necessary conversion factors to let all children 
achieve a just threshold in each important functioning. Poor states are 
partially responsible for their own situation, and justice demands that 
they try to alter and enhance their capacities to change. This also applies 
to the people living in these states. We see here an analogy between poor 
states and poor parents: even if they have responsibilities of justice, as 
David Miller (2007) argues, for example, as soon as they are not able to 
fulfill them adequately, a different agent of justice, in this case richer 
and more powerful states, has to substitute. It would be unjust to hold 
poor states responsible for the costs of children’s suffering, because they 
cannot be said to be responsible. 
 Furthermore, in the global context, some of our endorsed consider-
ations on the sufficiency principle gain additional force (see Chapter 1). 
We urged an interpretation of the sufficiency principle combining a 
demand-side view with a supply-side view, claiming that those in privi-
leged positions must give sufficient attention to inequalities in the 
distribution of functionings and capabilities. The meaning of ‘sufficient 
attention’ however, depends in large part on how urgent the needs of 
the ‘demand side’ are; that is, the people who are suffering. In addition, 
we presented a priority view consisting of three elements for tackling 
functionings. It asks how important a functioning is, how severe and 
widespread its deprivation, and what is needed to overcome the depriv-
ation in this dimension. From these considerations it follows that alle-
viation of global child poverty is even more urgent than alleviation of 
child poverty in welfare states. Again, this diagnosis must not lead to 
the conclusion that relative child poverty is nothing to worry about. It 
is evident that global poverty (a) jeopardizes even children’s most basic 
functionings (in fact it often leads to death), (b) exists to an extremely 
high degree and (c) can be alleviated considerably by relatively small 
changes to the global order. It therefore triggers strong claims of respon-
sibilities on the supply side. 
 This brings us to a further group of agents that are assumed to have 
different kinds of responsibilities for global child poverty in respect to 
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child poverty in welfare states: other persons in the global community of 
humans. We gave these agents of justice a rather low ranking in regard to 
child poverty in welfare states because most members have only limited 
capacities to change something and have only limited responsibility for 
the existence of child poverty. We took into account that the majority 
of agents in this global community are themselves poor or have a low 
status of well-being because they live in poorer countries. This is still 
true in the case of global child poverty, but nonetheless, many agents in 
the global community, people who live in welfare states, who are there-
fore much richer and have much more resources, can make a real diffe-
rence. If a middle-class adult in a welfare state adopts a poor child from 
another welfare state, this child’s situation will probably improve; this 
improvement, however, has to be weighed against possible harms; for 
example, when a child is removed from her biological parents and has 
to move to another country or the burden that is put upon the parent-
to-be. In the case of global child poverty, our skepticism regarding a 
responsibility that can be translated into a duty to adopt poor children 
without sufficient means seems less reasonable. Daniel Friedrich has 
recently defended such a duty to adopt (Friedrich 2013); as applied to 
the case of child poverty, it is true that moving a child likely to die 
or suffer severely over her whole life in her home country – perhaps 
even against her will and the will of her parents – to a middle-class 
parent or family in a welfare state would certainly improve her condi-
tion to such an extent that our counterarguments become less valid. 
This implies that there might indeed be such a duty to adopt, maybe 
with some caveats; for example, that this duty apply only to those who 
wish to have children in the first place or only as long as child poverty 
is as severe as it is now. 
 We note again that a concept of global justice for children should 
also make use of an ecological approach, such as the one proposed, and 
differentiate between different agents and their responsibilities. This 
implies giving the poor themselves and poor children, as they reach a 
certain level of competencies and maturity, a role in the alleviation of 
poverty and in the design and implementation of measures of justice 
(Deveaux 2013). Reasons for doing so are not limited to the fact that the 
poor have a right to be heard and included in decisions affecting them; 
there are also pragmatic reasons built on the knowledge that measures 
that take the poor seriously and are developed on the basis of real know-
ledge about them and their situation work better. Besides, taking the 
agency of the poor seriously is empowering (Drydyk 2013). This aspect 
of participation and empowerment of poor people is both relevant for 
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global (child) poverty as it is for (child) poverty as it typically occurs in 
welfare states. In both contexts the poverty knowledge of poor people 
and their interest in overcoming their poverty and their children’s give 
them, as we argued in Chapter 3, certain responsibilities, albeit limited 
ones, for action against child poverty. However, there is a relevant diffe-
rence to be noted, too. The severe poverty of the global poor and their 
typically very limited scope of action leads to the conclusion that they 
have almost no responsibility toward poor children living in welfare 
states. On the contrary, it makes sense to assert that poor people in 
welfare states have certain responsibilities toward poor children in devel-
oping countries or failed states. They profit, albeit to a smaller degree 
than many of their fellow countrymen, from an unjust global order and 
often they contribute with their consumption, at least to some degree, 
to the upholding of structural injustices on a global level. It therefore 
makes sense to think about their relationship to poor children on a 
global level in terms of responsibilities and to call upon them to rethink 
their actions and behaviors in some aspects, as is generally done for 
members of affluent states. Naturally, the kinds and weights of responsi-
bilities of agents within these societies differ; application of the grounds 
for attributing responsibilities that we identified in Chapter 3 will lead 
to the conclusion that generally the responsibilities of poor people in 
affluent societies toward the global poor are low compared with those of 
their rich and powerful fellow countrymen. However, they should not 
be completely ignored. 
 4.1 Conclusions 
 In this section, we have given some ideas how our critical theory of 
child poverty, which we developed first and foremost for modern welfare 
states in affluent societies, can be extended to the global level. We have 
defended the view that it is important to aim for relatively high thresh-
olds in the most important functionings (and capabilities, if applicable) 
for children, independent from where they happen to be born. The 
basic commitment of the capability approach to show equal concern 
and respect for every human being points, in our interpretation, clearly 
toward this goal. It does not seem fair to apply different standards for 
well-being and well-becoming based on completely arbitrary features, 
and a reasonable point of reference seems to be provided by what has 
been already achieved for most children in welfare states. We are aware 
that this goal is, in practice, hard to achieve and often changes and 
that improvements have to be implemented pragmatically and in small 
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steps. Still, a normative concept of justice should also open up horizons 
that are worth aspiring to. For this, it is not necessary to develop a tran-
scendental theory of justice that tries to fully specify the concept in all 
details (Sen 2009). It is enough to work with the realistic and rather 
simple conception of justice we have developed in this book. 
 We acknowledge that what we have discussed here about a global 
concept of justice for children is just preliminary and is insufficient 
in many aspects. Capability theorists need to do more work to specify 
the functionings and capabilities children are entitled to and how the 
thresholds for each of them should be set. Our solution needs to be 
scrutinized in more detail to be proven a viable alternative to the most 
common strategy of using different thresholds in different nations, 
which we dismissed. Our examination of the attribution of responsibil-
ities to different agents of justice is also just a first dip into a much wider 
issue. Nonetheless, we have argued that such an expansion of justice 
from the domestic to the global level is needed and that this demands 
aiming high and not being satisfied with making the lives of children in 
poverty just a little less harmful and deprived but making real progress. 
The fact that hundreds of millions of children are born into circum-
stances where even the most basic goods are missing and where it is 
just not possible for them to have a minimally decent life is surely not 
their fault and can never justify claiming less for them than what we 
claim for children who had the luck to be born in a welfare state. As 
a matter of justice, each and every child matters the same and has the 
same entitlements. 
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view 
a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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